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MICHIGAN'S ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
ACT OF 1970: A PROGRESS REPORT
] osepk L. Sax* and Roger L. Conner**
It is true that the Natural Resources Commission, upon my recommendation, approved construction . ••• It is likewise true that
suit has been brought under the Environmental Protection Act by
persons who disagree with that decision. The Act-one of the landmark pieces of environmental legislation in the nation-was passed
for precisely that reason; to allow dissenting citizens an opportunity
to register their dissents in court. Even though we have been made
the defendants in this suit, we welcome it as an expression of public
interest in the environment, and another step toward redefining
the law so that we can better interpret the wishes of the people.
-Ralph A. MacMullen, Director, Michigan Department of Natural
Resourcest

I.

INTRODUCTION

Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970 (EPA) 1
represents a departure from the long-standing tradition under
which control of environmental quality has been left almost exclusively in the hands of regulatory agencies: it gives to ordinary
citizens an opportunity to take the initiative in environmental law
enforcement.
The statute is uncharacteristically brief and plain-spoken. It authorizes any person to bring suit against either a public agency or
private entity for: declaratory or equitable relief to protect the "air,
water and other natural resources and the public trust therein from
pollution, impairment or destruction."2 Once the plaintiff has demonstrated that such harm has occurred or is likely to occur, the
defendant may prevail only if he can demonstrate affirmatively that
there is "no feasible and prudent alternative to defendant's conduct
and that such conduct is consistent with the promotion of the public

T

HE

• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1957, Harvard University; J.D.
1959, University of Chicago.-Ed.
•• Second-year student at the University of Michigan Law School. Member, Michigan Air Pollution Control Commission.-Ed.
Our research for this study has been made possible by a grant from the Council
on Law Related Studies, for which we are most grateful.
t Letter to the Editor, State Journal (Lansing), Jan. 28, 1972, at A-6, col. 6.
I. MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. §§ 691.1201·691.1207 (Supp. 1972). The full text of the
EPA is reprinted as Appendix. H. A brief legislative history of the Act appears in Note,
Michigan's Environmental Protection Act: Political Background, 4 U. MICH. J. L. REF.
358 (1970).
2. EPA § 2(1), MICH. COllIP. LAws .ANN. § 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1972).
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health, safety and welfare ...."3 If regulatory proceedings are available to pass upon the defendant's conduct, the court is authorized
-but not required-to remit the parties to such proceedings,4 and
is, in any event, empowered to grant equitable relief pending the
outcome of such proceedings to protect the rights recognized by the
Act. 6
·
Beyond giving private citizens the right to initiate or participate
in environmental proceedings, the EPA is a significant departure in
another way. It enlarges the role of courts because it permits a plaintiff to assert that his right to environmental quality has been violated
in much the same way that one has always been able to claim that a
property or contract right has been violated. 6 In taking this step, the
legislature reduced the broad discretion that regulatory agencies
formerly had. Previously these agencies had been given a sweeping
mandate to enforce environmental standards as they thought best,
and their decisions were subject to judicial review only for arbitrary
and abusive use of their authority or for violation of explicit statutory language. Now these agencies must be prepared to defend themselves against charges that their decisions fail to protect natural resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction.7
This combination of increased private initiative, expanded judicial involvement, and restricted regulatory-agency authority, all
brought together in Michigan's Environmental Protection Act, elicited considerable doubt: Was it unrealistic to expect private citizens
and environmental groups, however well intentioned, to play a significant part in law enforcement-especially considering the technical
complexity of the questions likely to be raised and the expense
usually incurred in litigation? Would circuit judges be able to understand and deal with intricate environmental issues? Could court
orders, issued case by case, significantly ameliorate environmental
problems? Finally, would the regulatory agencies themselves find
their well-developed programs subject to continual attacks in the
courts?
3. EPA § 3(1), MICH. CollIP. LAws .ANN. § 691.1203(1) (Supp. 1972).
4. EPA§ 4(2), MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 691.1204(2) (Supp. 1972).
5. EPA § 4(2), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1204(2) (Supp. 1972).
6. Thus the EPA both recognizes and makes enforceable a new substantive right.
The Act implements art. IV, § 52 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963:
The conservation and development of the natural resources of the state are hereby
declared to be of paramount public concern in the interest of the health, safety
and general welfare of the people. The legislature shall provide for the protection
of the air, water and other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment and destruction.
7. The EPA governs private conduct as well as the conduct of state agencies.
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Because these questions are difficult and important, it seemed
desirable to follow the Act during its early days and to try to determine how well, or how ill, it fulfilled the expectations of those
who worked assiduously for its enactment. We have attempted to
monitor all the litigation instituted under the Act during its first
sixteen months. 8 What follows is a report on what we have learned.0
It did not take us long to discover that a comprehensive evaluation of even one statute ·within a single state over a brief period of
time was beyond our competence. Plainly, a statute's influence is not
limited to lawsuits actually instituted. Industrial and administrativeagency behavior may be modified by the fear of a lawsuit and its
attendant publicity; developments in one suit may bring about institutional changes of behavior in similar matters; and, of course,
it is never possible wholly to isolate the presence of a statute from
the public atmosphere in which it was enacted. If there have been
behavioral changes, it is not easy to identify them as the product of
the EPA rather than as responses to increased public concern with
environmental quality.
We made no effort to investigate systematically all the matters
just mentioned. Such an inquiry would be useful, and we hope it
can be undertaken at a later stage. We did, however, acquire some
informal data about the general effects of the statute.10
To monitor suits filed, we regularly read daily and weekly Michigan newspapers, as well as bulletins and newsletters of environmental, industrial, and government organizations. We tried to attend
all hearings on motions and trials on the merits; when this was not
possible, we attempted to acquire stenographic transcripts or tapes.
Files were also kept on newspaper publicity that the cases received.
In addition we developed a state-··wide network of informants, which
included officials of citizen organizations, journalists, and attorneys,
and we exchanged information with the Attorney General's office,
which also maintained a list of suits filed. In March 1972 we sent a
follow-up questionnaire to all Ia-wyers involved in EPA cases. Our
questions, with a summary of answers, appear in Appendix I.
8. See EPA § 2(1), MICH. CoMP. LAws .ANN. § 691.1201(1) (Supp. 1972). The report
is current to March I, 1972. Additional information received after that date, but prior
to publication, has been inserted.
9. One of the authors, Joseph L. Sax, drafted the original EPA. Both authors
worked toward enactment of the bill. Obviously, we arc interested parties, We have
made no effort in this Article to conceal our own views, but we have tried to present
an unbiased report on what has occurred.
IO. See text accompanying notes 181-93 infra.
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STATUS OF TIIE CAsES:

A

BRIEF SUMMARY

At the time this Article was being ·written, no case had reached
either the court of appeals or the supreme court.11 Thus every significant legal issue, including the Act's constitutionality, remains
unresolved by appellate courts.12 This in itself is interesting and
invites speculation about the way in which a statute like the EPA
evolves.
Despite a much-invoked fear that enactment of the EPA would
flood the courts with suits, only thirty-six cases have been filed in
sixteen months, and they have been evenly distributed over that
period, with nvo or three filed each month.13 The modest number
of cases filed is neither cause _for joy nor for gloom. It implies that
both the proponents and opponents of the Act were wrong; the
statute is not as easily accessible a tool as its supporters had hoped
or its opponents had feared.
The cases have been widely spread among the circuit courts in
the state. Only two counties have had more than two cases filed.14
In one sense, this dispersion of cases is caused by the provisions of
the statute, for the EPA limits plaintiffs to the circuit court "where
the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur."15 Plaintiffs have
not wholly been deprived of choice of forum, however, in those
cases in which a state agency is a defendant and the issuance of a
11. But see note 170 infra. The status of the cases is set out in Appendices F & G
infra.
12. The constitutionality of the EPA is discussed at notes 244-66 infra and accompanying text. See also text at note 71 infra.
13. See Appendix A infra. Cases cited in this Article are referred to' by name only;
other citation details are contained in Appendix A. Two of the thirty-six matters are
not court cases, but are administrative-agency interventions. Three new cases have been
filed since this Article was completed. (1) Irish v. Green, No. 14306-C (Cir. Ct., Ingham
County, filed April 12, 1972) challenges a subdivision development in West Traverse
Township, Emmet County. A change of venue was granted to Emmet County, where
the file number is No. 162-3 (Civil). (2) Wayne County Health Dept. v. City of Dearborn,
No. 203110-R (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, filed April 1972) seeks a preliminary injunction to stop open burning of trash pending the outcome of the lawsuit. A hearing
was held April 7, 1972, and continued to May 5, 1972, when testimony was taken. An
order has not yet been issued. (3) McPhail v. Corps of Engineers, No. 205-941R (Cir. Ct.,
Wayne County, filed April 24, 1972) challenges a channelization project on the Rouge
River. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan where the file number is 38203.
A fourth case, just discovered, Braun v. Detroit Edison Co., No. 5552. (Cir. Ct.,
Washtenaw County, amended complaint filed Jan. 18, 1972) challenges condemnation
proceedings for a transmission line easement. See text accompanying notes 220-24 infra.
14. See Appendix A infra.
15. EPA § 2(1), MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1972).
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permit or license is an alleged "tVTong.16 In such cases, plaintiffs may
sue at either the state capital or at the place where damage to the
environment occurs. Thus four cases have been filed in the circuit
court for Ingham County, the site of the State Capital, in three of
which the conduct of a state regulatory agency has been at issue. The
only other circuit in which more than two cases have been filed is
Wayne County, which includes Detroit; there the Wayne County
Health Department has been the most frequent user of the Act.
Public agencies have been plaintiffs under the Act more often
than was anticipated. Government entities, including cities and counties, have been plaintiffs in about one third of the cases filed. 17 They
have been defendants in about one half of the cases.18 Some agencies,
not surprisingly, have been both plaintiffs and defendants in different cases,19 and in one case there is a state agency on both sides.20
Environmental organizations-despite their intense efforts to obtain enactment of the law-have not used the bill frequently. 21 Apparently, environmental groups in Michigan were not well prepared
to use the law when it came into force. Although several of these
groups have the benefit of volunteer attorney-members, no Michigan
group retains regular litigation counsel. These groups have thus far
neither the funds nor the staff to undertake an organized litigation
program.22 More surprising, perhaps, is the fact that no group has
clearly defined a target problem (such as air pollution or highway
construction) or a target industry (such as foundries) for which to
develop a well-defined legal strategy. This observation is not made
critically; it well may be that these organizations, poorly funded
and insufficiently aided by technically skilled professionals, are not
now prepared to do much beyond responding to problems that are
brought to their attention. Perhaps, too, they have been spread thin
in valiant efforts to "plug the dike." The problem is exacerbated
by the absence of public interest law firms in the state. In light of
the preceding observations, it should come as no surprise that suits
under the EPA have varied widely in character and have shown no
16. For a discussion of venue, see text accompanying notes 280-97 infra.
17. See Appendices B &: C infra.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. Water Resources Com.nm. v. Chippewa County [Water Resources Commission
hereinafter WRC] (State Highway Department as third party defendant).
21. Sea Appendices B &: C infra. Only organizations with more than local interi:sts
and membership are included in the figures. Many cases involve groups of local resi•
dents and ad hoc organizations.
22. For comments on the economics of EPA litigation, see Appendix I infra.
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evidence of a concerted attack on any one phase of environmental
problems.23
Two encouraging features in the EPA's early history are the
expedition ·with which most cases have been handled24 and the willingness of the courts to face up to the environmental issues that
truly divide the parties. The thirteen cases already concluded have
averaged approximately six months in length.25 Of course, most of
these cases have been settled out of court, but a number of them
were controversies that had previously dragged on for years. Plainly,
the EPA is serving as a useful prod to negotiated settlements.
Of the eighteen cases that are still active, only a few have stood
for much more than six months without decisive action.26 Five have
gone to trial on the merits. Most of the others have been quite
promptly brought on for hearings on motions for preliminary relief.27
One case is being held in abeyance because the issue is not yet ripe
for decision.28 We are aware of no case in which a defendant is under a restraining order and ready for a trial that is being delayed
either by the plaintiffs or by court congestion.29
· Beyond the willingness-indeed, the expressed eagerness-of the
judges to bring pending cases to trial, so there has been an admirable
readiness to get to the merits of the cases as soon as possible, rather
than to tolerate delaying technical issues interposed by the parties.
The courts have, in almost every instance, resisted the temptation
to dispose of cases on jurisdictional grounds as a way of avoiding the
merits.31 When the environmental issues have been presented, the
23. See Appendix E infra.
24. See Appendix G infra. Slower moving cases are WRC v. Chippewa County (delay
in getting to trial despite judge's efforts) (see note 78 infra); Lakeland Property Owners
Assn. v. Township of Northfield (seven months from trial to issuance of decision);
Beaman v. Township of Summit (summary judgment expeditiously granted, but appeal
has delayed termination): and Blunt v. Apfel (partial summary judgment granted for
defendant; confusion concerning next steps).
25. See Appendix G infra.
26. See id.
~- Preliminary injunctions and restraining orders are discussed in text accompanying notes 151-80 infra.
28. Leelanau County Bd. of, Commrs. v. DNR, Order of Judge Brown ijune 14,
1971) (denying motion for summary judgment).
29, Of course, when an EPA suit has been joined with an action for damages in
a jury case, there is delay. Bise v. Detroit Edison Co. is the only such case so far.
30. E.g., Ray v. Raynowsky, Transcript of Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Injunction (Nov. 23, 1971) (Ray went to trial on June 19, 1972); WRC v.
Chippewa County, (Sept. 1, 1971) (authors' notes from pretrial hearing) (see note 90
infra). In Tanton v. DNR, Judge Brown quickly brought the case on for full trial,
rather than hearing extended testimony on preliminary motions.
31. See text accompanying notes 280-97 (venue and jurisdiction), 72-101 (primary
jurisdiction) infra. See also Appendix I infra.
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courts have in the vast majority of cases understood them and been
able to cope ·with them intelligently.32 To be sure, some of this judicial success is attributable to the limited scale of the cases brought
thus far; but perhaps this limited scale is a desirable feature of an
evolutionary process.
III.

FACTORS AFFECTING SUCCESS AND FAILURE

A.

Negotiated Solutions

Experience thus far suggests that the EPA, at least during its
early development, is most likely to be successfully applied33 in what
may be called the natural small-scale case.34 One of the most inter. esting of these cases is Wayne County Health Department v. Chrysler
Corporation. Chrysler's Huber Avenue foundry in Detroit had installed modem air pollution control equipment that broke down
with disconcerting frequency. Efforts over a period of several years
by the Wayne County agency to correct the situation had been unavailing.35 Chrysler knew that in the event of litigation, a trial judge
might respect Chrysler's need to keep the foundry operating lest
automobile production lines be forced to close down.
As the Wayne County Health Department (WCHD) viewed
its authority prior to the EPA's enactment, it had only two alternatives from which to choose when handling problems like those
in Chrysler. It could in some situations seek a judicial order closing
the plant, a stem remedy it had never previously invoked; or it could
institute a criminal misdemeanor proceeding and recover a $100
fine, a tactic it had followed frequently in other cases with predictably unsatisfactory results.36 Once the EPA was enacted, however,
32. See text accompanying notes 113-50 (trials), 151-80 (preliminary relief) infra.
33. See Appendix F infra for a "won-lost" record.
34. Frequently the scale of a case depends on the lawyer's strategy. West Michigan
Env. Action Council v. Betz Foundry, Inc., involving illdustrial air pollution, might
well have been developed on a larger scale. Some cautious preliminary skirmishing by
plaintiff, West Michigan Env. Action Council's [hereinafter WMEAC] lawyer led the
company-which had not complied with Air Pollution Control Commission regulations
for four years-finally to order control equipment. The case might have been used
as a vehicle to challenge the Commission's casual enforcement policy and its generous
use of the variance.
35. Morris, What Pollution Has Cost a Community: A Four-Year Record of a
"Clean" Foundry, Detroit Free Press, Nov. 22, 1970, at 1-B, col. 1.
36. Wayne County, Mich., Health Department, Air Pollution Division Regulations
art. XIV, § 14.3 (1972), provides that suit can only be brought with formal approval
of the County Health Board after findings of repeated violations. However, this provision was inapplicable in Chrysler's case, since art. VI, § 6.6 of the regulations e.xemptcd
"upset conditions" or "breakdowns." This exemption has recently been eliminated.
Adopted Amendments and Revisions to Wayne County, Mich., Health Department,
Air Pollution Control Regulation Guly 22, 1971).
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the agency's attorney immediately used the new statute to file suits
against three large industries. One of these was Chrysler, ·with which
he had unsuccessfully sought negotiated solutions.37
It was clear from the first day suits were filed that the agency's
attorney intended to use the case as a lever to extract a settlement
from Chrysler rather than take the case to trial. He knew that a
hard-fought suit by so substantial a defendant could be protracted
and expensive; yet he was obviously sensitive to the fact that this
prospect could be used to his advantage in negotiating a settlement.
If Chrysler appeared to be recalcitrant in front of a busy judge, who
was unlikely to be interested in trying a complex air pollution case,
the plaintiff would have a powerful weapon with which to force
Chrysler to the bargaining table.
But the defendant had a counter weapon. The statute was new
and its constitutionality untested. Chrysler's lawyers gave warning
that if too much were demanded of them, they would be ·willing to
turn the case into a test litigation.
For several months, negotiations seemed stalemated. Ultimately,
the dilemma was resolved in a most interesting way. Several hundred
local residents, who had damage suits pending against Chrysler under
the common law of nuisance, intervened as plaintiffs in the Chrysler
case.38 This action broke the stalemate by casting the WCHD as a
moderate and by setting determined, private plaintiffs against a
determined, industrial defendant.39
With their eyes on their own damage cases, the private plaintiffs
insisted that Chrysler, as part of the settlement, admit to its wrongdoing. Such an admission was the last thing Chrysler wanted. A
search was thus begun for a compromise solution. The demands of
the WCHD began to appear eminently reasonable.
Within sixty days, a proposed settlement was presented to the
judge.40 It provided that Chrysler would carry a ten-day inventory
at all times so that if the foundry had to close down for repairs of
the pollution control equipment, the automobile production lines
would not have to close down as well. In addition, the proposed settlement required Chrysler to close down its foundry if the equipment malfunctioned and could not be repaired within twenty-four
37. Subsequently, five more cases were filed; see Appendix A infra; note 13 supra.
38 Intervention is permitted by EPA § 5(1), MICH. CoMP. LAws .ANN. § 691.1205(1)
(Supp. 1972).
39. Ultimately, the judge dissolved the intervention order; see text accompanying
notes 272-79 infra.
40. The consent judgment was entered by Judge Rashid, Oct. 14, 1971.
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hours. Chrysler was also required to make periodic reports to the
WCHD in a form of imposed self-surveillance.
The order exemplifies an innovative response to a troublesome
conflict between the demands of a major industry for continuity and
the demands of the community for air pollution control. Without
judicial intervention to prod Chrysler toward compliance, it seems
likely that negotiations with the county might have continued interminably. Without private intervenors to give an added push to a
well-meaning, but cautious agency attorney, the case might have been
permitted to slip onto the inactive docket. The Chrysler case repre' sents a most important success under the EPA in respect of the scope
of the order issued.41 It also typifies the expeditious and inexpensive
solution that the EPA seems best suited to promote.42
Another in this species of case is Trout Unlimited v. Milliken.
The controversy here arose when a heavy ·winter snowfall raised
cottage-lined Otsego Lake to record levels, threatening the homes
with flooding. The Governor declared a state of emergency and requested the United States Corps of Engineers to assist local officials
in the designing and funding of a lake drainage project.48 A proposal was made to dig a channel from the lake to the nearby Au
Sable River, one of the most famous trout streams in Michigan, and
to drain the Lake into the Au Sable at up to eighty cubic feet per
second.
Fearing erosion, siltation, and eutrophication of the river from the
drainage, a coalition of conservation groups, led by Trout Unlimited,
threatened a lawsuit if the proposal were approved in its existing
form. Local officials responded to the expressed concerns with an
agreement to limit maximum drainage to forty cubic feet per second,
to install a shutoff valve, and to allow the Natural Resources Commission to monitor the project. On this basis the Commissiondespite a staff report44 that delineated the problems inherent in the
project-gave its approval, and the Governor authorized the project.4G
The next day Trout Unlimited, several property o-wners along
the Au Sable, and the Board of County Commissioners-dissatisfied
41. Communications from local residents indicate that the foundry is still causing
environmental problems; thus the effectiveness of the consent order remains in question.
42. A consent judgment was also expeditiously obtained in WCHD v. American
Cement Corp., Consent Judgment of Judge O'Hair (Dec. 8, 1971). The other WCHD
cases are still in negotiation.
43. Detroit Free Press, June 18, 1971, at 8-A, col. 2.
44. DNR Statement on the Environmental Consequences of the Otsego Lake De•
Watering Project into the North Branch Au Sable River, June 14, 1971.
45. Detroit Free Press, June 18, 1971, at 4-A, col. 6.
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with the agreement approved by the Commission-filed suit under
the EPA. The court granted a temporary restraining order, and the
following day the defendant county officials sat down to bargain in
earnest with the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs knew exactly what concessions they would require: a reduction in the maximum rate of flow,
an explicit monitoring agreement that spelled out the conditions
under which the flow would be reduced or stopped, and control over
the shutoff valves in the hands of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) rather than under the control of the County Road
Commission's engineers.
Each of these demands, as the intensive bargaining sessions demonstrated, was consistent with the cottage owners' minimum needs.
Under the shadow of an imminent courtroom hearing, each was accepted; a detailed order formalizing the results of the bargaining session was then signed by the judge.46
Trout Unlimited was a classic version of successful citizeninitiated litigation in which plaintiffs who know what they wantbut who also know that what they need is somewhat less-are prepared to negotiate with their adversaries. In such circumstances, a
court is used most efficiently, for its potential power gives leverage
to the plaintiffs and suggests to both parties that they ought to hone
their demands down to the point that would be sustainable if the
case went to trial. This manner of using the courts to change the
balance of power, while leaving the court itself in the background,
has been one of the most successful tactics for plaintiffs under the
EPA. It suggests that in a number of environmental controversies a
central problem has been a power imbalance among the interested
parties-a concern that was central during the legislative consideration of the bill.47
Trout Unlimited suggests also that the EPA works most efficiently
when used as a lever to press regulatory agencies into seeking new
solutions to environmental problems. Although the Natural Resources Commission had done a study on the Otsego Lake drainage,
it had not fully considered all the alternatives; and the negotiations
carried on under the threat of a trial pushed into the foreground
other possible solutions, including-as it turned out--one sufficient
to satisfy all the participants.
46. Trout Unlimited v. Milliken, Interlocutory Consent Order of Judge Hughes
(Aug. 9, 1971).
47. Testimony of Joseph L Sax on H.B. 2055, before the Committee on Conservation and Recreation, Michigan House of Representatives, Jan. 21, 1970, excerpts re•
printed in 14 Mich, Law Quad, Notes Z1 (1970).
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Finally, the case demonstrates the usefulness of a law like the
EPA in "liberating" regulatory agencies from political pressure.
Given the highly political content of the controversy, which included meetings with the Governor, it would have been difficult
without the EPA for the Commission to hold out for important,
but not highly visible, constraints-such as a detailed procedure for
monitoring rather than a simple, more general agreement, and use
of its own staff rather than that of the Road Commission to control
the shutoff devices. Yet, when forced to anticipate what might have
to be proved in a courtroom-in a suit instituted by a private citizen
under the EPA-the Natural Resources Commission was able to respond more professionally and less politically. As the assistant director
of the Commission described the outcome of Trout Unlimited in
responding to an inquiry about the case: "The settlement definitely
strengthens our hand ·with respect to controlling any possible adverse
effects .... I am certain that without the order, we would not have
[been able] to completely control the situation."48

B. Politically Volatile Controversies

Trout Unlimited was only one of several cases in which the EPA
has been a useful device for relieving pressures in highly charged
political controversies. These cases emphasize the special importance
of permitting private citizens to take legal initiatives.
Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Anthony 40 was filed
under the EPA to require Indians to comply with State fishing regulations. The controversy, arising out of a concern with the depletion
of Great Lakes fisheries, reached an interim crisis in 1971 when the
Michigan supreme court decided People v. ]ondreau,r;o The defendant in that case, a Chippewa Indian, was prosecuted for violating
the State fishing laws; the court concluded that the law could not be
applied to him because a treaty between his tribe and the United
States guaranteed him certain rights to hunt "without limitation,
restriction or burden."51
The Attorney General orally advised the DNR that the decision
applied to all Indians, and the DNR, as a result, suspended enforcement of game and fishing laws against all Indians.52 Shortly thereafter
48. Letter from A. Gene Gazley, Assistant Director, DNR, to Roger Conner, Aug.
2, 1971, on file with author.
49. See text accompanying notes 175-77, 290-97 infra.
50. 384 Mich. 539, 185 N.W.2d 375 (1971).
51. 384 Mich, at 552, 185 N.W.2d at 381.
52. Evening News (Sault Ste. Marie), Sept. 1, 1971, at 1, col. 3. The DNR con-
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Donald Anthony, an Indian, began fishing with large, mesh-nylon
gill nets. Given the long struggle to control the use of gill nets and
existing tension between whites and Indians, the ensuing conflict was
not surprising. Reports began to circulate that Indians could wipe
out sport fisheries in Grand and Little Traverse Bays in a year with
their gill nets, 53 and rumors that sports fishermen were threatening
to "[d]estroy the Indians' nets, sink their boats and, even, shoot the
netters,"54 ran rampant.
Finally, the Governor, in an attempt to bring the opposing factions together, personally intervened by calling a meeting. The tone
of the meeting was bitter. 'We will make up our own peace force
and do what we have to do to protect ourselves and our equipment,"
one Indian warned darkly. 55 A task force was appointed by the Governor, but-beyond recommending that the DNR work with Indian
leaders to seek a solution-it was unable to find a compromise acceptable to all parties. In a sense, government was paralyzed; the
buck had been passed from the DNR to the Attorney General, to the
Governor, to a task force, and back to the DNR.
With tensions continuing to xise and no solution in sight, Michigan United Conservation Clubs (MUCC) filed suit under the EPA to
enjoin all Indians not specifically covered by Jandreau from violating
state fishing regulations. The suit relieved the pressures mounting
from newspaper attacks and focused attention on legal issues that
would have to be resolved in the courtroom. Following an extensive
hearing, in August 1971 the court issued a preliminary injunction
requiring compliance ·with fishing regulations. 56 The decision, though
not warmly received by the Indians, at least provided an opportunity
for passions to cool. By September the DNR had announced that,
while it would begin enforcing the fishing laws against the Indians,
it would nevertheless issue some free "compassionate" commercial
licenses to Indians for areas in which additional netting "[w]ill not
place undue pressure on Great Lakes Fish stocks."57
tinued its suspension of enforcement of the law against Indians even after the supreme court in denying a petition for rehearing on Aug. 30, 1971, clarified its ]ondreau
opinion indicating its narrow application to particular bands of Indians. See Evening
News (Sault Ste. Marie), Sept. 1, 1971, at 8, col. 1. This is indicative of the politically
heated nature of the controversy.
53. North Woods Call, June 30, 1971, at 6, col. I.
54. Id.
55. Pontiac Press, July 8, 1971, at C-3, col. 3.
56. :MUCC v. Anthony. The hearing and order are discussed at text accompanying
notes 175-77 infra.
57. Michigan Daily, Sept. 22, 1971, at 3, col. 5; State Journal (Lansing), Jan. 26,
1972, at B-4, col. l; North Woods Call, Feb. 9, 1972, at 5, col. 1.
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In Payant v. Department of Natural Resources, 68 the EPA was
used effectively to moderate another highly controversial local issue
-the hunting of antlerless deer. The DNR's policy of allowing
antlerless-deer-hunting was strongly opposed by public opinion in
Dickinson County, where suit was brought to enjoin the Department's program shortly before the beginning of the 1971 hunting
season.
In 1970, the county commissioners had held a referendum in
which the county's citizens voted by a three-to-one margin to support
a three-year moratorium on the hunting of antlerless deer. 69 This
referendum placed the DNR in an unenviable position. It was enforcing a program it believed to be scientifically sound, but the program was in perpetual jeopardy because of political pressures generated by its unpopularity. At the same time, the DNR feared the
outcome of a lawsuit in hostile territory. When suit was finally instituted-by the state legislator who represented Dickinson County
-the Department's worst fears seemed to be coming true. It was
reported that "nvo of three judges assigned to the case were known
to be lacking in sympathy for the deer management program," 00 and
one DNR staff biologist was quoted as saying that "an Upper Peninsula judge might give more credence to 'some old hunter's opinion
than to ours... : "61 The suit was prominently played up in local
newspapers, the court galleries were filled during the trial, and
pickets paraded outside the courtroom.62 One of the judges even
received anonymous threatening phone calls.68 The case promptly
went to trial, and soon thereafter the court issued an opinion completely vindicating the defendant DNR.
Perhaps the final comment on this subject should be left to A.
Gene Gazley, Assistant Director of the DNR:
With respect to the Payant case, it is certainly true that the Department is better off after proving its case than it would have been
58. See text accompanying notes 113-23, 198-99, 237-38 infra.
59. Payant v. DNR, Complaint 6.
60. Letter from A. Gene Gazley, Assistant Director, DNR, to Roger Conner, Dec. 14,
1971, on file with author [hereinafter Gazley Letter]. Three judges were appointed to
hear the case under MICH. Cr. (GEN.) R. 9253 (1969). It is interesting to note the
availability of this rule in controversial local cases. It eases the responsibility of any
single judge without requiring abdication of judicial responsibility.
Three judges were also appointed in Muskegon County v. Environmental Protection
Org., another highly controversial case.
61. North Woods Call, July 21, 1971, at 1, col. 4.
62. Interview with Judge Brown, Jan. 29, 1972, on file with authors.
63. Id.
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had the case never occurred ... the unanimous opinion that resulted
from the trial was a ringing endorsement of our program.
It is reasonable to expect that an opinion of this sort is bound
to impress some of the people that were either skeptical or against
our management program ... the fact that the complaint was dismissed in the homeland of the adversary was reassuring and a
definite credit to our management program. It should make it easier
to ·win some of the future battles that are certain to occur in the
Legislature and on the home front over this very controversial topic
of deer management.64
C.

The Ambitious-Case Problem

Having discussed some of the prototype small-scale suits under
the Act, we tum to a case that was intended to be big and important,
Roberts v. Michigan.65
The plaintiff in Roberts was an inventor of equipment for the
control of automobile exhaust emissions.66 Concerned that the state
had been lax in controlling automobile air pollution, Roberts could
have brought suit against the Michigan Air Pollution Commission
and challenged their program of monitoring, regulating, and enforcing automobile exhaust. Instead, he chose a much more radical
course, suing the State, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the
State Department of Highways. Roberts alleged first that the Secretary of State violated the EPA by granting licenses to operate motor
vehicles that polluted the air and by failing to adopt standards and
regulations to control motor-vehicle-caused pollution. The plaintiff
sought to have adequate standards imposed by court order and to
have the licensing and operating of motor vehicles enjoined until
such standards were established and enforced.
Roberts also alleged that the State Highway Department was violating the EPA by allocating tax money for construction and maintenance of highways in the state, the use of which caused air pollution. Plaintiff sought the establishment of regulations to govern
pollution arising from the use of the highways, and also asked that
highway construction be enjoined unless and until adequate safeguards dealing with this problem were adopted.
64. Gazley Letter, supra note 60. The issue is not yet dead; some still oppose antlerless-deer-hunting. Ann Arbor News, March 19, 1972, at 34, col. 1.
65. See text accompanying notes 225-30, 239-41, 256-60 infra for further discussion
of Roberts.
66. So far as we know, Alvin E. Bertrand, Inc. v. City of Detroit is the only other
EPA case in which the plaintiff was a business competitor. Bertrand has a disposal
business, and the suit involved an allegedly polluting city incinerator.
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While the underlying issues in Roberts-the adequacy of Michigan's automobile air pollution regulations and their enforcementwere hardly shocking, it was inevitable that the relief sought would
impair whatever value such a case might have had in calling attention to the automobile exhaust question. Newspaper reports on the
case were predictable: A typical one was headed "Pollution Foe Bids
Roadbuilding Halt,"67 but a more extreme article contained the
heading, "Inventor Sues to Halt Pollution by Eliminating Cars," 08
and began with the sentence: "Michigan will have to go back to the
horse and buggy for transportation if Charles G. Roberts has his
way."
The Roberts case cannot be put aside simply as a valiant, if misguided, early effort to use the EPA to its fullest extent in dealing
with a serious environmental problem. Indeed, Roberts demonstrates
one of the most troublesome issues arising out of the enactment of
a law designed to benefit what may loosely be called a movement or
a cause-the inability of any leadership to control the kinds of cases
brought or the manner in which they are litigated. Ironically, the
real problem is quite the opposite of that feared by those who opposed the EPA's enactment; these critics had been worried that
overzealous environmentalists might concertedly organize to tie the
hands of regulatory agencies or to attack in overwhelming fashion
certain agricultural or business interests. 69 Instead, the danger is that
inadequately planned litigation will produce damaging legal precedents and will generally impair the reputation of plaintiffs who use
the statute.
Roberts also potentially opened one of the most complex questions in environmental law: Upon which regulatory agencies does
the task of environmental management rest?70 The EPA, properly in
our judgment, is drafted so that the issue can be raised. The disturbing thing about Roberts is that the plaintiff seemingly stumbled into
this question, posing a dilemma for the judge. If the question of
what parties were proper defendants was to be resolved, difficult
legal issues, which none of the lawyers were prepared to confront,
67. Grand Rapids Press, Oct. 28, 1970, at 8-C, col. 4.
68. Detroit News, Oct. 29, 1970, at 17-A, col. 1.
69. See Mining Journal, Jan. 22, 1970; Michigan State Chamber of Commerce State
Legislation Report, Jan. 15, 1970 at 2; Michigan Riparian, Sum. 1970, at 4, col, I.
70. See, e.g., Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970) (duty of Corps of Engineers
to consider effects other than navigational); New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969); Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC,
419 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (obligations of the AEC other than protection against
radiation hazards).
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had to be untangled. Predictably, the judge responded by lashing
out at the statute itself, finding it in part unconstitutional as applied
to the facts of the case.
Fortunately, the opinion on unconstitutionality in Roberts has
not been treated as a significant precedent in other EPA litigation.
Roberts has been appealed, and it appears that the plaintiff-appellant
will substantially tone dmvn his case in an effort to win a reversal
of the trial court's order of dismissal.71
IV.

INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE

EPA

AND THE

.ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

A. Primary Jurisdiction
The EPA permits lawsuits to be instituted on matters cognizable
before administrative agencies even though administrative action has
not been completed.72 Our single-track tradition in law enforcement,
which is manifested in the primary jurisdiction doctrine, is so well
established that considerable concern was expressed about the feasibility of an enforcement system in which different legal routes for
dealing with a given environmental problem would be simultaneously available.
The theoretical potential for conflict is obvious, but the legislature was persuaded that in twn respects the risk was worth taking.
Because regulatory agencies are not always diligent, it was hoped that
private plaintiffs, using the potential power of a court order, could,
when necessary, prod the agencies to a more energetic fulfillment of
their responsibilities. In addition, it was thought that the range of
environmental problems is sufficiently great that a more flexible
arsenal of enforcement techniques would be helpful. Thus, while
71. Roberts v. State appeal docket, No. 13640, Mich. Ct. App. In Marble Chain of
Lakes v. Water Resources Commn., the only other "big" case brought thus far under
the EPA, the WRC was challenged for allowing discharges of water that are of lesser
quality than the receiving water. In short, the case questioned the legitimacy of using
water for waste assimilation. The complaint was filed in December 1970, and the case
was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff on May IO, 1972. Certainly, the plaintiff would
have faced great difficulty in obtaining the extraordinary technical evidence that would
have been necessary in such a far-reaching case. In essence, he sought to obtain by
judicial mandate what other environmentalists hope to accomplish through the pending
federal Water Pollution Control bill: a no-discharge rule for Michigan streams and
lakes. See S. 2770 &: H.R. 11896 (92d Cong., 2d Sess.) (1972). A weaker version of H.R.
11896 was passed by the House March 29, 1972. N.Y. Times, March 30, 1972, at 18,
col. 4.
The federal bill is itself hotly controverted as an unrealistic aspiration-even for
ten years hence when the bill takes effect and even with a multibillion dollar authorization for treatment works construction. The bills are discussed at length in Barfield,
The National Journal, Jan. 15, 1972, at 84, Jan. 22, 1972, at 136.
72. EPA§ 4(2), MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. § 691.1204(2) (Supp. 1972).

1020

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 70:1003

in some cases it is no doubt more appropriate to follow the elaborate
process of notice-hearing-final order that many regulatory statutes
incorporate,73 there are also cases in which immediate resort to the
courts for injunctive relief might be more serviceable.
Because the most desirable enforcement technique could not be
easily identified and reduced to a statutory formula, the EPA left
considerable flexibility to a judge before whom suit was brought to
decide whether to carry the case directly through the judicial process
or to return it, in whole or in part, for administrative action. The
statute provides in section 4(2) that whenever administrative proceedings are available to determine the legality of the challenged
conduct and suit is brought under the EPA, "the court may remit
the parties to such proceedings,"74 and in-doing so may grant interim
equitable relief if necessary to protect the interests governed by the
Act.
While in theory the alternative-route approach should solve the
problem of the need for judicial maneuverability, whether such
flexibility would in practice be achieved was one question that could
only be answered after the EPA had been in effect for some time.
Though several Michigan statutes incorporate similar schemes,71l
vigorous application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine by the
Michigan courts76 has made administrative proceedings, for the most
part, the sole legal tool available to complainants.
In Water Resources Commission v. Chippewa County, the EPA's
alternative-route strategy was soon put to the test in a rather unexpected setting. The Water Resources Commission (WRC) brought
suit against Chippewa County and the Board of County Road Commissioners alleging a violation of the EPA.77 The conduct challenged
by the Commission was the storage of salt for winter road-clearing on
the Road Commission's land. Allegedly, the salt seeped into the
73. See, e.g., Air Pollution Act § 7-14, MICH. ColllP. LAws ANN. § 336.18-.24 (1967);
Water Resources Commission Act § 7-13, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 323.7-.13 (1967),
as amended, (Supp. 1972).
74. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1204 (Supp. 1972) (emphasis added).
75. For instance, the Water Resources Commission Act § 6(c), MICH. Co111P. LAws
ANN. § 323.6 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1972), allows the Attorney General to abate
water pollution as a public nuisance while section 12-12(a) of the Act, MICH, CoMP.
LAws ANN. § 323.12-.12(a) (1967), explicitly makes the Act ancillary and supplementary
to the existing law governing water pollution.
76. White 'Lake Improvement Assn. v. City of Whitehall, 22 Mich. App. 262, 279-80,
177 N.W.2d 473, 481 (1970).
77. The suit also alleged that the conduct constituted a continuing trespass upon
the underground waters of the state and a public nuisance under § 6 of the Water
Resources Commission Act, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 323.6 (Supp. 1972), abatable pursuant to the Revised Judicature Act, § 2940, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2940 (1968),
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ground water from which nearby residents took their domestic water
supply by wells.
Under the facts as asserted by the plaintiff WRC, the case was
impressive. The concentration of chlorides in the nearby wells had
been ·within the limits established by the United States Public Health
Service prior to the defendant's act, but shortly thereafter it was
found to be substantially in excess. As a result, the residents had to
transport water from a nearby city in five- and ten-gallon cans twice
a week.
The salt stock.pile had been removed by the time the case began,
but one problem still remained. There was no feasible way in which
to decontaminate the already saline water. The suit, therefore, must
have been brought to obtain at least one of two practical solutions
for the nearby residents: the acceptance of financial responsibility by
the Road Commissioners for an interim supply of water,78 or an
arrangement to tap the residents on to the nearest municipal water
supply.
One is naturally curious why the WRC departed from its customary administrative procedures and went directly into court under
the EPA, for there was no evidence that the WRC ·was searching for a case in which it could test the EPA. A likely answer is
suggested by examining the background of the controversy. Following complaints by local residents, the WRC undertook an investigation that demonstrated to its satisfaction that there was contamination
caused by the salt storage.79 At that time the WRC called in the
Board of Road Commissioners to try to work out a solution.80 The
Road Commissioners, however, refused to take any corrective action,
78. The complaint did not expressly seek damages. It sought an injunction against
further storage and "to the extent that abatement ••• is necessary ••• [a] mandatory
order directing said Defendants to pump, or otherwise remove, said contaminants
from the underground waters." WRC v. Chippewa County, Complaint at 6.. This
relief was probably designed to force the defendant to accept financial responsibility
for the costs of an alternate supply, for there is no accepted way to decontaminate the
ground water. As to a claim that any damages would have to be sought in the court
of claims, the court held that the Court of Claims Act did not oust a circuit court
of jurisdiction it otherwise had under a statute. WRC v. Chippewa County, Opinion
and Decision of Judge Hood (May 27, 1971) (denying defendant's motion for summary
judgment or accelerated judgment). The following comment was recently made concerning this litigation in a letter from Raymond F. Clevenger, attorney for defendant,
to Joseph L. Sax, May 31, 1972, on file with author: "[T]his case was scheduled for trial
in May [1972]. But it wasn't tried, and I still doubt that it will be-or should be ••••
At the 'final' pre-trial, a greater consensus was found that the entire matter should be
resolved by building a water system. The cost • • • is now estimated at $220,000. In
addition, the property owners want approximately $40,000. We're trying to find the
money."
79. Affidavit of Ralph Purdy, Executive Secretary WRC, Feb. 10, 1971, at 2.
80. Id. at 1-2.
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arguing that they were merely agents for the State Highway Department.81
Chippewa County thus presented none of the usual problems for
which the WRC's ordinary administrative approach was especially
useful. The WRC was satisfied that the facts had been established;
the usual problems of financing or scheduling that arise in an ordinary industrial- or municipal-pollution case were not present. The
case called for an imaginative solution to the question of who should
bear the costs for the harm done. The local residents were, understandably, seeking as expeditious a solution as possible; and the sticking point seemed to be a purely legal question: upon whom did
responsibility lie, the county or the State Highway Department?
Chippewa County must have seemed a particularly appropriate
case for the invocation of the new direct-action EPA. The WRC
referred the case to the Attorney General, and suit was filed in
February 1971. Predictably, the defendant County Road Commissioners, seeking indemnity for any liability imposed upon them,
joined the State Highway Department as a third-party defendant.82
At this point the Board of County Road Commissioners sought
summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff WRC had not
complied with its own regulatory statute, which, the motion asserted,
"requires that said Water Resources Commission give notice of any
violation of said act and that its findings be made after proper
Hearing, with a resultant Order .... No Hearing was had and no
Order has been made by Plaintiff to this Defendant."83
Judge Hood, noting two often forgotten provisions of the Water
Resources Act, responded that there is no statutory requirement and
no state policy requiring all water pollution controversies to follow
the WRC's routine administrative procedure:
The Water Resources Act contemplates and permits alternate procedures where a violation of the act is claimed. One procedure
81. Id. at 3.
82. This development created the unusual situation in which the Attorney General
was counsel for both plaintiff and defendant. Apparently, no serious problems de•
veloped from this extraordinary arrangement; separate lawyers were assigned to each
client and each seems to be representing his client with appropriate vigor. Of course,
the Highway Department attorney is not invoking constitutional objections to the EPA,
but that is consistent with a policy of the Attorney General's office in all cases under
the EPA. During the legislative consideration of the EPA, the Attorney General sup•
ported the bill's enactment; and he has also testified in favor of similar federal legislation. Hearings on H.R. 49 & 5071, Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 1st Scss. at 7 (1971).
83. Motion of Defendant for Summary or Accelerated Judgment, April 28, 1!171,
"WRC v. Chippewa County. Reference is to Water Resources Commission Act § 7,
Mica. CoMP. LA.ws .ANN. § 323.7 (Supp. 1972).
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involves notices, hearings, findings and orders by the Water Resources Commission itself, as set forth in Section 7 of the Act; but
the alternate procedure is direct court action as set forth in Sections
3 and 6.c of the Act. If direct court action is used, notices, hearings,
findings or determinations by the Commission are neither necessary
or pertinent to the court action; and it is immaterial that the Water
Resources Commission may have had some proceedings without
proper notice or proper hearing.84
Turning then to the court-made doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
Judge Hood noted the view of the court_of appeals85 that administrative agencies, such as the WRC, "normally should not be bypassed. "86 However, he continued:

[As] the Court of Appeals indicated, there are no hard and fast rules
for application of the "primary jurisdiction" doctrine; and whether
to apply it to a particular case depends upon many circumstances.
In the White Lake case the Water Resources Commission had taken
jurisdiction and acted after a dismissal order had been entered in the
Circuit Court suit ... to take the matter out of the hands of the
Water Resources Commission and return it to the Circuit Court
would require the Circuit Court to duplicate the efforts of the Water
Resources Commission. It was noted that considerable sums may
already have been expended on engineering and other like work in
connection with the implementation of the existing Water Resources
Commission orders. . . . In our case there has been no agreement,
decision or order by the Water Resources Commission. . . . The
interest of justice ·will not be served by the Court passing the
problem back to the Water Resources Commission at this time.87
What Judge Hood did not say, although it may perhaps be read between the lines of his opinion, is that it would push the primary
jurisdiction doctrine-a doctrine that cautions against excessive judicial intervention in the administrative process-to a ludicrous extreme if it were enforced against the very administrative agency that
has itself come into court as a plaintiff seeking judicial aid and has
84. Chippewa County Opinion, supra note 78, at 3. Water Resources Commission
Act§ 3, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 323.3 (Supp. 1972) provides: "The Commission shall
be authorized to bring any appropriate action ••• either at law or in chancery as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this act, and to enforce any and all laws
relating to the pollution of the waters of this state." Section 6(c) of the Act, MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.6 (Supp. 1972) provides: "Any violation of any provision of
§ 6 shall be prima fade evidence of the existence of a public nuisance and in addition
to the remedies provided for in this act may be abated according to law in an action
brought by the attorney general in a court of competent jurisdiction."
85. White Lake Improvement Assn. v. City of Whitehall, 22 Mich. App. 262, 279,
177 N.W.2d 473, 481 (1970).
86. Chippewa County Opinion, supra note 78, at 4.
87. Id.
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asserted that "further administrative proceedings would not alleviate
or correct the [problem]."88
Finally, the judge made clear that whatever rigors might have
been thought to characterize the law of primary jurisdiction previously, the EPA had added a significant statutory dimension to the
question:
This Court notes that under the Environmental Protection Act of
1970 the court under some circumstances, while retaining jurisdiction, may remit the parties to proceedings before administrative
agencies. It may be that during the course of these proceedings such
remission ·will appear advisable and may be ordered. At this stage,
however, the Court feels that the interest of justice will be more
swiftly served by this case proceeding as rapidly as possible to issue
before this Court. After the case is at issue, determination can be
made as to the procedural steps then to be taken. Perhaps it will
then appear expedient for this Court to decide certain factual issues
which might dispose of the case; or which could furnish the foundation for remitting the parties to the Water Resources Commission
for determination of the measures to be taken to eliminate contamination.89
Beyond its usefulness as a precedent on the relationship benveen
the EPA and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the salt pollution
case is important because it suggests that the EPA may be playing a
significant role in liberating both the administrative agencies and
the courts from their traditional approach to disputes. To be sure,
the WRC might have brought a suit similar to this one as a conventional public nuisance suit; but that power has long existed and has
been used very rarely in situations subject to the routine hearingorder practice. Similarly, judges might have been able to break
away from traditional notions of primary jurisdiction, but in the
absence of the new EPA, such a move might have seemed unduly
innovative.
There is, naturally, a large measure of speculation in these
analyses of the EPA's impact, but it is important to consider that the
legal system, like all institutional structures, is highly inertial, and
that a strong statutory invitation, such as that provided by the EPA,
may be most significant in its power to suggest new ways of doing
business. Plainly, the EPA cannot press an agency or a court to take
initiatives that it feels are imprudent. But if, as seems to be the case,
the WRC felt frustrated with the recalcitrance of the Board of Road
88. Purdy Affadavit, supra note 79, at 3-4.
89. Chippewa County Opinion, supra note 78, at 5-6.
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Commissioners and uneasy about the efficacy of its usual procedures;
and if a judge feels that the case is an important one,90 and one that
he is likely to be able to handle, the EPA can work as an effective
catalyst.
The primary jurisdiction problem arose in a more conventional
setting in Lakeland Property Owners Association v. Township of
Northfield. The defendant township was piping its treated sewage
some miles and discharging it into bodies of water situated near the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, claiming that the waters constituted pollution, challenged a proposed enlargement of the treatment plant and
sought an alternative place of discharge. Among the plaintiffs' allegations was the complaint that the public needed effluent standards
more restrictive than those established by a WRC order91 previously issued against the defendant township.
The WRC-having issued the order just mentioned-was apparently finished ·with the case except for possible monitoring of compliance. When suit was filed under the EPA, however, the defendant
sought a remand to the WRC under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.92 The plaintiff replied that among its claims were issues not
cognizable by the Commission, such as trespass and nuisance; andmost important-that it was challenging "the reasonableness of
orders of the Water Resources Commission, and it would thus be
improper to remit this action to the Commission and ask it to pass
on the reasonableness of its own orders."93
Certainly, the court was not being asked to interfere with any
ongoing proceeding before the WRC,94 nor was it obvious that there
90. The judge opened the pretrial Sept. I, 1971, with the following comments:
How close is the matter to being ready for trial? • • • This is an important case.
The situation should be resolved as soon as possible. If there is responsibility in
one of the defendants or not, it should be known at the earliest possible time••••
Is there anything I can do to push this along? • • • There is no point in playing
games with witnesses and discovery.
Authors' notes taken at hearing.
91. Final Order of Determination, Proceedings Against the Township of Northfield
for Abatement of Pollution of the Horseshoe Drain and the Huron River, No. 1316
(August 20, 1969).
92. The defendant relied heavily upon White Lake Improvement Assn. v. City of
Whitehall, 22 Mich. App. 262, 177 N.W.2d 473 (1970).
93. Response and Memorandum of Plaintiff in Opposition to Motion for Reference
to WRC at 2, Jan. 7, 1971, Lakeland Property Owners Assn. v. Township of Northfield.
94. See text accompanying note 90 supra. See also note 84 supra. See discussion of
Lakeland in text accompanying notes 146-50, 171, 261-66 infra. A variant situation
arose in WMEAC v. Betz Foundry, Inc. See note 34 supra. The foundry had failed
to comply with the Air Pollution Control Commission's regulations for almost four
years. The Commission began to take an active interest in the case just as the lawsuit
was filed and, shortly thereafter, negotiated an agreement with the foundry for the
installation of control equipment. To protect itself, the plaintiff, after filing suit,
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was any further contribution of technical expertise that the Commission was prepared to provide for the suit. Accordingly, the judge
held that
there were matters before this court not triable by the ... Water
Resources Commission or any administrative tribunal. It -was the
further opinion of this court that the court 'Would retain jurisdiction
of the suit now pending in those areas where it does have primary
jurisdiction ·with specific reference to the setting of effluent levels
currently being discharged by defendant.... The court was further
of the opinion that the convenient administration of justice -would
necessitate retaining jurisdiction.90
He then denied the motion for reference to the WRC, adding "this
order shall not be construed to deprive ... the Water Resources
Commission of any jurisdiction they may have under the statutes
... and such administrative bodies may pursue any proceedings they
are currently engaged in with respect to Northfield Township's
sewage treatment facility...."96
With this decision the judge maintained a posture of great flexibility. He permitted a significant controversy to go forward by rejectsought to intervene in the Commission proceedings under § 5(1) of the EPA, MICH,
CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1205(1) (Supp. 1972), while the court maintained jurisdiction,
The agency denied the application for intervention, and the court refused to require
the Commission to permit the plaintiffs to intervene before the agency. The court
stated that "the plaintiffs have no inherent right to be joined [in the Commission's
proceedings against Betz] without the consent of the Commission." WMEAC v. Betz
Foundry, Inc., Opinion of Judge Hoffius at 4 (Dec. 10, 1971). The reason given for
denying intervention was that "to permit each and every interested person ••• to be
made a party to the administrative proceedings ••• could so deter the Commission that
it could fail by reason thereof to carry out its responsibilities." Id. The court observed
that the plaintiffs could get review of Commission action through the review procedures
provided by the Air Pollution Act and the Administrative Procedures Act. In short,
the judge simply ignored the plaintiff's right to sue under the EPA, and he thus failed
to take advantage of the opportunity to integrate the pending court case with the
pending administrative proceeding involving the same parties. This decision has been
appealed. WMEAC v. Betz Foundry, Inc., appeal docketed No. 143355, Mich. Ct. App,,
Grand Rapids.
95. Lakeland Property Owners Assn. v. Township of Northfield, Decision and Order
of Judge Mahinske at 1·2 (Jan. 26, 1971) (denying motion for reference to WRC), See
also Lakeland Decision of Judge Mahinske at 20 (Feb. 29, 1972):
••• this Court is not unmindful of the law set out in White Lake Improvement
Association v. Whitehall•••• This Court is of the opinion that White Lake, and
the rules set out therein, is no longer controlling in that [the EPA] specifically § 2
thereof, denies the Water Resources Commission primary jurisdiction in matters
such as are now before the Court. The primary jurisdiction doctrine was the con•
trolling factor employed by the Court of Appeals in its disposition of White Lake
but such doctrine was coupled with considerations of the lack of advance judicial
proceedings when such doctrine was asserted and the fairness or unfairness of
remitting plaintiff therein to another proceeding, and further, such doctrine iVas
employed in the absence of the language now found in [the EPA]. It should be
understood that this Court does not disagree with the rationale for nor the necessity of the primary jurisdiction doctrine but merely points out that the same is
not absolutely controlling herein.
96. Lakeland Decision and Order of Jan. 26, 1971, supra note 95, at 2,
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ing defendant's argument that an appeal under the Water Resources
Act was the only way the plaintiffs could challenge the standards in
the Commission's order. And he retained the opportunity to pass
on those issues raised by the plaintiff that were not cognizable by
the Commission ·without depriving the WRC of any contribution it
might wish to make by taking independent action or by participating
in the litigation.
This judicial ploy was successful. Having lost the primary jurisdiction motion, the defendant went back to the WRC and obtained
a revised, and more detailed, order of determination that set specific
effiuent standards for a number of substances.97 The new order, according to a Commission expert, contained "some of the strictest
standards which have ever been applied to any municipal sewage
treatment plant." 98 Thus the suit prodded the WRC to far-reaching
action of a kind it had previously failed to take.
As subsequent events demonstrated, the WRC did not go far
enough to satisfy the court. Following a full trial, Judge Mahinske
issued a decision in favor of the plaintiffs, holding, inter alia, that
compliance even with the new standards, was not sufficient in all
respects to prevent unlawful pollution.99 Judge Mahinske, when
later interviewed by the press regarding his decision, noted that the
standards he imposed in Lakeland "are a compromise between the
zero-pollutant levels one expert witness ... called for in testimonythat is, pure drinking water ... and the WRC original standards."100
Thus far, Lakeland is the only EPA case in which detailed quantitative standards of an administrative agency have been revised.101
B. Augmentation of the Enforcement Process

Kelley v. Tannehill & DeYoung, Inc., involving the Northern
Reduction Company, a rendering plant that manufactures pet food,
97. Amended Final Order of Determination, Proceedings Against the Township of
Northfield for Abatement of Pollution of the Horseshoe Drain and the Huron River,
No. 1478 (March 18, 1971).
98. Testimony of Mr. F.B. Frost, at trial, July 22, 1971 (authors' notes taken at
trial).
99. Lakeland Decision of Feb. 29, 1972, supra note 95.
100. State Journal (Lansing), March 6, 1972, at B-5, col. 5-6. The judge said that
he relied on the WRC Water Quality Standards for total body contact waters that were
devised for Northfield.
101. The detailed deer hunting regulations of the DNR were vindicated in Payant
v. DNR (discussed in text accompanying notes 113-23 infra) and more general agency
authorizations have been put in question in a number of other cases. E.g., Blunt v.
Apfel (WRC new use permit; Dept. of Public Health septic tank approval); Ray v.
Raynowsky and Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee (Dept. of Agriculture orders); Tanton
v. DNR (dam permit).
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dealt ·with what may be the most notorious case of industrial recalcitrance in recent Michigan environmental history. The history of this
case dramatically demonstrates what can happen when an industry
committed to delay faces an agency with almost limitless patience
operating under a statute that requires it to use "conference, concilia•
tion and persuasion • . . to the fullest extent possible.''102
After a Health Department site visit in 1963, which was prompted
by local complaints of nauseating odors coming from the plant,
regulatory officials wrote, pleaded with, and issued orders to the
company, hoping to induce some cooperation from Northern in
eliminating the odors. Prior to 1968, Northern had undertaken some
housekeeping reforms to eliminate the odor, presumably to pacify
the Health Department, but when approached by the Air Pollution
Control Commission in 1968, Northern claimed that the odor, which
was caused by its waste treatment lagoon, would soon disappear.
When complaints continued to be made to the Commission-many
of these from a nearby factory manager who claimed that his employees were made sick by the smell-the Commission threatened
further action. Northern responded this time by agreeing to apply
an "odor counteractant" (a deodorant). The Commission staff was
convinced that more extensive controls on the company's cookers
would be necessary, but still the Commission took no formal action
that would lead to a judicially enforceable order. In 1969, the
stench still emanated from Northern's plant. The Commission sent
Northern a letter requiring a cleanup by November, but it then gave
the company a thirty-day variance,103 thus suspending enforcement
of its regulations during that period. Just prior to this action, a staff
officer of the Commission had made another in a long line of site
visits, and he later reported:
Every person interviewed felt that the odors from this plant were
102. Air Pollution Act § 8, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. 336.18 (1967). The Air Pollution
Act was enacted in 1965. Prior to that time jurisdiction was in the Department of
Health.
103. The function of a variance under the Air Pollution Act is not clear. The
statute provides that the Commission may suspend enforcement of any rule or regula•
tion if enforcement would be inequitable or would create an unreasonable hardship,
and that the Commission should take into consideration the progress that the person
requesting the variance has made in eliminating air pollution. Air Pollution Act §§ 19·
20, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 336,29-30 (1967).
The statute also sets out a procedure for enforcing rules and regulations, which
begins with issuance of a notice of violation and progresses through a hearing to a
final order of determination. It seems that a final order is a prerequisite to invocation
of penalties for a violation, and thus it is not clear why the Commission issues variances
prior to the time that it issues a notice of violation. The polluting company docs not
appear to need a variance during this period to protect it from penalties, See text
accompanying note 185 infra.
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severe and resulted in an unreasonable insult to the community. I
personally found the odors from this plant to be sickening at a
distance of over a mile from the plant.1M
After the counteractant failed to eliminate the odor, the company
promised to build an afterburner (equipment the Commission had
recommended), and the Commission granted an additional six-month
variance during which time the afterburner was to -be installed.105
Instead, without further notice or permission, the company installed
a quite different kind of equipment that the Commission had not
approved. This equipment failed to solve the problem.
At this point, spring 1970, the Commission activated its enforcement machinery for the first time. A notice of violation was issued,
a statutorily required hearing was held; and in November 1970 the
Commission issued a final order of determination that required the
odor to be eliminated by May I, 1971. On April 30, one day before
the pollution control equipment approved by the Commission was to
have been installed and operative, the company sought permission to
install yet another type of equipment, a so-called wet scrubber. The
long-suffering Commission gave its approval, but by June 1971 the
staff, having visited the plant again, reported that "nothing has been
done since the permit to install was approved by the Commission."106
Simultaneously with the expiration of the final order of determination, the company filed an application to the court for relief
from the operation of the order, a tactic authorized by the procedureladen Air' Pollution Act.107 The company did not prosecute its appeal, and the odor persisted as the summer of 1971 dragged on. The
Commission, finally infuriated by this :flagrant demonstration of its
impotence, referred the case to the Attorney General for prosecution.
The Attorney General took no action even though it was during the
hot summer months that th~ odors from the plant were particularly
noxious.
During this period, one of the public members108 of the Com104. Air Pollution Control Section, Staff Activity Report on Northern Reduction
Co., Tannehill &: DeYoung, Inc., Sept. 11, 1969, at 2.
105. Kelley v. Tannehill&: DeYoung, Inc., Opinion of Judge Fitzpatrick at 4 (Feb.
9, 1972).
106. Conversation between an Air Pollution Staff Investigator and Roger Conner,
notes on file with authors.
107. Section 13 of the Act, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 336.23(2) (1967), permits a
petition to be filed in the circuit court claiming that the order is "unreasonable or
prejudicial." The Act also requires de novo review and places "the burden of proving
the correctness of [the] ••• order" on the Commission.
108. The member was Roger Conner, a co-author of this article. The Air Pollution
Act § 3, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 336.13(2) (1967) provides: "Of the 6 citizens so
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mission began taking steps to file suit himself under the EPA. The
Attorney General entered the dispute when this member sought to
obtain a supporting affidavit from Lee Jagar, the chief technical
official of the Commission's staff; Jagar regretfully declined, reporting that the Attorney General's office advised him not to submit an
affidavit for a private litigant, but to wait and make his affidavit for
the state in the event that the Attorney General should decide to
intervene on the side of the plaintiff.
For lack of an interested local lawyer, the proposed private suit
was not filed, but the preparations for such a suit, which were known
to a good many people-including members of the press-made
apparent the need for the Attorney General to act. Finally, in October 1971 the Attorney General and the local prosecutor filed suit
alleging a public nuisance and a violation of the EPA. The court
granted a preliminary injunction on February 9, 1972.100
Undoubtedly, suit could have been brought in this case without
the EPA; the law of public nuisance would probably have provided
a sufficient cause of action, especially since the right to make such a
claim is expressly preserved in the Air Pollution Act.110 The value
of the EPA in such a case lies principally in its use as a psychological
prod. By arming the ordinary citizen with authority to go to court,
the EPA presses a reluctant public official to take action himself lest
he be embarrassingly pre-empted. By setting out ari unequivocal
mandate authorizing judicial action, the EPA eliminates technical
excuses that might be made to support inaction.111
Certainly, the EPA should not have been needed in Tannehill ~
DeYoung. Had the Commission moved more energetically, it could
have obtained judicial action under the older Air Pollution Act.
Likewise, the Attorney General might have filed a nuisance suit in
the early 1960's. And, at the least, he could have been ready with
a complaint to be filed on the first of May 1971 when the due date
under the Commission's order arrived. Unfortunately, we live in a
world of less than perfect regulatory action. It is for these situations
that the EPA was enacted, and the Act has already indirectly paid a
handsome dividend to the public in the form of a preliminary injunction against the Northern Reduction Company.112
appointed by the governor, 2 shall be representatives of industry ••• 2 shall be repre•
sentatives of local governing bodies ••• 2 shall be representatives of the general public."

109. See text accompanying notes 172-74 infra.
110. Air Pollution Act § 24, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 336.34 (1967).
111. E.g., primary jurisdiction claims. See discussion of Chippewa County and
Lakeland in text accompanying notes 77-101 supra.
112. Kelley v. Tannehill &: DeYoung, Inc., Decision of Judge Fitzpatrick (Feb. 9,
1972).

May 1972]

Michigan's Environmental Protection Act
V.

A.

1031

JUDICIAL R.EsPONSE

Cases Tried on the Merits

l. Payant v. Department of Natural Resources

Even the most enthusiastic proponents of the EPA were reluctant
to claim that the bill was desirable because it would give regulatory
agencies an opportunity to vindicate controversial or unpopular
programs in the courtroom. Yet that is precisely what happened in
Payant v. Department of Natural Resources.
During legislative hearings on the EPA, the DNR had supported
the bill, but with some reluctance. The DNR feared the consequences
to some of its programs if private citizens could initiate suits. For
example, the DNR had adopted a game management program for
deer hunting that it believed to be scientifically sound. Yet the program was quite unpopular in some areas of the state. The DNR
feared that a suit brought by private citizens to enjoin the program's
enforcement would be tried before popularly elected local judges
who might be responsive to community desires or who might be unable to appreciate the scientific evidence upon which the program
was based.113
The only response that could be given the Department was that
there was, indeed, a risk inherent in the bill; but it was a risk the
Department ought to be willing to take to obtain the advantages the
bill offered. Moreover, it was suggested that the DNR might be
underestimating the professional integrity and competence of the
judiciary.
Little did the DNR know how prophetic were its fears. Less than
a year after the bill's enactment, suit was brought by a state legislator
to enjoin the Department's deer-management program in Dickinson
County, where public opinion was strongly opposed to the Department's allowance of antlerless-deer-hunting.
The immediate question raised by the case was whether limited,
regulated hunting of antlerless deer helped or hindered the restoration of the state's declining deer population. People in the community felt that the prohibition of antlerless-deer-hunting until the
herds were restored in size would be the most appropriate solution
to this problem. The DNR, on the other hand, declared that the
source of the problem was not hunters, but severe winters, overgrazing, and lack of adequate forage; the size of the deer population,
113. Letter from Ralph A. MacMullen, Director DNR, to Mrs. Donna Halversen,
July 19, 1971, on file with author: "It is really too early to tell what the true effect of
the Jaw will be •••• Our earlier and only misgivings were that it could be used as a
nuisance to curtail good game and fish management programs • • • ."
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they said, was limited by the carrying capacity of the habitat. 114 In
short, if hunters were not permitted to shoot the "excess" deer, the
deer would die from starvation. Moreover, the DNR also took the
position that there was an affirmative reason to allow hunting, for
if too many deer were left to forage in an inadequate habitat, the
food supply would be spread too thinly, and the deer population
might be even further decimated.11 5
The underlying issues were in some respects more sophisticated.
These included the question whether the DNR was properly calculating the carrying capacity of the habitats and the question whether
it had been investing enough in habitat management to increase
carrying capacity.116
Payant also posed the question whether the judiciary could respond in a timely fashion to a problem in which time was of the
essence. Suit was filed on July 13, only 100 days before the 1971
hunting season was scheduled to open. The court promptly disposed
of several preliminary motions, and the case went to trial on October
5. After two days the three-judge court issued an opinion that completely vindicated the DNR; the hunting season, therefore, went
fonvard on time.
The unreported opinion merits considerable attention, for it reveals the court's attitude toward the importance of scientific evidence
in environmental cases. In reaching its decision, the court noted:
The issue before the court is whether the defendant's program
.•. is likely to impair or destroy the deer herd [under section 3 of
the Act]. Testimony introduced at the trial makes it clear there has
been a steady decline of the deer herd...•
Assuming that plaintiff made out a prima facie showing that
defendants' program of taking antlerless deer is likely to impair or
destroy the herd, the testimony introduced by defendants is overwhelmingly to the contrary. Such testimony was largely of a scientific
nature given by trained and experienced personnel and greatly outweighs the evidence brought against it. The preponderance of the
evidence convinces the court that the severity of winters in recent
years and the lack of suitable food for deer ... are primarily responsible for the decline of the herd. The testimony further establishes
that large numbers of deer have died in recent years due to the
harshness of the winters, lack of food and consequent starvation;
and that not only does the taking of a limited number of antlerless
deer result in harvesting deer which would die anyway but it also
114. See Sunday Chronicle (Muskegon, :Mich.), July 18, 1971, at 25, col, 4.
115. Id.
116. See Editorial, A. Closer Look at Deer Habitat Program, North Woods Call,
March 8, 1972, at 6, col. I.
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is beneficial to the remaining deer in that they have a better chance
of survival. The testimony of Louis Verme, a game biologist who has
spent the last 18 years studying nutrition as it relates to the reproduction of deer, is particularly convincing.1 17
The significance of this opinion lies partly in the effect it should
have on the confidence of the state regulatory agencies in the EPA:
An examination of the trial transcript118 should set to rest their fears
that local opinion, rather than demonstrable evidence, will govern
the court. Perhaps more important is the fact that Payant clearly
indicates that courts can handle scientific evidence concerning environmental matters.
An environmental trial, like any other well-litigated case, is an
exercise in reducing great quantities of seemingly unrelated and
contradictory data to a few critical issues, which will govern the
court's ultimate decision. Payant demonstrated this point well. The
plaintiff introduced statistical information about declining herds, the
location and nature of forage, the causes of deer death, and the
changing ratios of antlerless deer to bucks. It soon became evident
that the DNR's program was largely based on claims of inadequate
browse for the deer. The plaintiff then presented a number of witnesses-mostly local woodsmen-who testified that a great deal of
browse was available, that the deer ate the browse, and that, indeed,
there was more food available than was eaten. Several witnesses also
testified that they had never seen a starved deer and that they had
never known a fawn to survive when its mother had been shot.
Moreover, it was noted that com seemed to be an alternative food
source and that substantial amounts of corn had in fact been fed
to deer in the area.
By this point, the plaintiff had highlighted the key issues for the
court: How could it be said that deer were starving when great
quantities of browse had been seen by witnesses? Were other sources
of food, such as com, available? And did the DNR's hunting program decimate the herds? The defendant DNR's witnesses, and especially Louis Verme, who was commended in the court's opinion,
clearly and decisively put each of these contentions to rest.
First, Mr. Verme testified that in cold climates, like that of the
Upper Peninsula, deer must often make a choice between adequate
117. Payant v. DNR, Opinion of Judges Brown, Munro, Davidson at 3 (Oct. 7,
1971).

118. We were unable to obtain a stenographic transcript in time so we listened to
the court reporter's tape instead [hereinafter Payant Tape]. Summarization of trial
testimony is based on the tape.

1034:

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 70:1003

food and good shelter. According to Mr. Verme, "Deer instinctively
seek good shelter at the expense of food supply. In the Upper Peninsula deer experience extreme heat loss in travelling. And they need
a tight canopy for shelter. They also need to hide, for deer are a
prey species."119 Deer in a severe climate, he added, will rarely
travel more than a quarter-mile for food. Thus, even when it appears to a layman that the deer have adequate food nearby, in fact,
there may be none readily accessible to them.
In addition, Mr. Verme testified that even if deer are eating,
they may, nevertheless, be starving. While deer will eat anything,
the important question to consider is the nutritional value of their
food. Popple, for example, the browse in greatest abundance according to plaintiff's witnesses, is a poor deer food that is very low
in nutritional content. "Fawns," Mr. Verme said, "who feed solely
on popple browse for thirty days will die, and adults will experience
severe damage .... If there's not other food to supplement ... we
feel starvation conditions are occurring."120 Thus, it is possible that
"deer starve with their bellies full."
Mr. Verme also flatly denied the assertions that fawns die when
their mothers are shot. According to Mr. Verme, fawns are completely weaned by the hunting season, and-Bambi stories to the
contrary notwithstanding-they will compete with their mothers for
food. A hungry adult doe will push her own fawn away to feed herself. With respect to the factual issue of com-feeding, Mr. Verme
totally rejected this method's usefulness. Com is too rich a food for
hungry deer, he said; it is, in addition, too expensive to make generally available and makes the deer too dependent, creating what
Verme called a "barnyard effect."121
Perhaps the only point that was not neatly tied together by
Verme's testimony was whether the DNR was doing enough cutting
of adequate forage to reduce the problem. But even here, the defendant's witnesses were effective, for they noted the problems of restrictions on lumbering for forest products, the long time required
for needed trees to mature, and the DNR's own efforts to improve
forest management.
On the whole, no one who witnessed the Payant trial or examined
the testimony could doubt that the DNR made an effective case
without sacrificing detail and sophistication in the presentation of
their testimony. Moreover, Payant serves as an illustration of how
119. Payant Tape, supra note 118.
120. Id.

121. Id.
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capable courts can be in managing a case within the enlarged judicial review of agency decisions required by the EPA. The Payant
court did not uphold the DNR because the plaintiffs were unable
to prove arbitrariness or caprice, or even because the agency's own
record, standing alone, constituted substantial evidence to support
its decision. Rather, the court permitted the plaintiff to make its
prima facie case, and then put the burden on the agency to rebut
that case as the EPA requires.122 This the agency was able to do by
a preponderance of evidence. By accepting this larger burden and
by meeting the plaintiffs directly on the merits, the agency emerged
from the case stronger than ever.123

2. Muskegon County v. Environmental
Protection Organization
Muskegon County had been the recipient of a much-praised federal grant to develop a regional sewage treatment system that used
spray irrigation of partially treated water. The idea behind the project was to use the natural filtering process of land to treat waste
water. However, fearing that doubters might interminably delay
this important experiment with a last-minute lawsuit, the county
sued a local organization that had been critical of the program,
seeking a declaratory judgment that its plan was not a nuisance.124
As the plaintiff county predicted, the defendant organization
counter claimed for an injunction under the EPA, and the issues
were joined. The original suit was filed on March 15, 1971; there
was one day of pre-trial hearings; and the case came to trial on May
4, 1971.125 On May 18, the court rendered a decision in favor of
122. EPA § 3(1), MICH. CO.MP. LAws ANN. § 691.1203 (Supp. 1972).
123. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
124. The complaint, filed March 15, 1971, was brought against several named individuals and a local citizen group "individually and as representative of all persons
having an interest in the establishment ••• of the Muskegon County Wastewater Management System." Complaint at I. The idea was to prevent subsequent suits by others
challenging the program. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on
March 31, 1971, challenging the propriety of the class action on the grounds that
there was no question commonly affecting the entire class of defendants, and that
the named defendants "cannot possibly, represent" the class of defendants sought to
be bound. Answer of Defendant at 5-6. The citizens abandoned this motion when
the county conceded that a lawsuit filed after completion of the system on the ground
that it was malfunctioning would not be barred by a decision in the instant case. See
Muskegon County v. Environmental Protection Org., Transcript of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 16-29 (April 20, 1971).
125. The defendants (and cross-plaintiffs suing under the EPA) objected to advancement of the trial on the calendar, which had been requested by the plaintiff
under MICH. CT. (GEN.) R. 521.4 (1969). The court offered a fifteen-day, and then a
thirty-day, continuance, which defendants rejected as insufficient "without giving any

1036

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 70:1003

Muskegon County. A motion for a new trial was denied on June 3,
and the court's ruling was not appealed. The termination of the
case cleared the way for the county's program to begin.
At the trial, the opponents of the spray-irrigation treatment plan
built their case principally around three issues.126 They contended:
that this treatment system operated rather like a large septic tank
and that this system was discredited because it used infiltration into
the soil as a waste disposal method; that the ground water level in
this area was too near the surface for the filtering job to be effective;
and that the soil in Muskegon, as contrasted with soil in other
counties in which similar experimental programs had been carried
out, was unsuitable for this type of project.
To each of these contentions, Muskegon County witnesses responded effectively. As for the first, they noted that septic tanks had
two faults: they were anaerobic (lacking in oxygen during the period
of decomposition) and they lacked means for controlling water flow
and movement; but the county's witnesses further testified that neither problem existed in the county's proposed treatment works. As
for the other contentions-the undesirable level of ground water
and the unsuitability of the soil-the county's witnesses responded
that these factors merely created greater engineering problems. This
project, illustratively, had an elaborate drainage scheme to compensate for the high water table, and the soil in Muskegon County was
described as not the best, but quite suitable.
On a number of other issues, the opponents of the plan were
also unable to make any substantial headway. For example, while
the spray-irrigation plan was conceded to be imperfect in handling
certain nutrients that passed through the system, it was said to be
considerably better than most other waste treatment systems. On
such questions as what devices existed for dealing with system breakdown, the county adduced persuasive evidence illustrating that the
Muskegon County proposal was much more flexible than conventional treatment plants.
reasonable explanation why such a continuance would not be sufficient." Muskegon
County v. Environmental Protection Org., Opinion of Judge Piercey at 3 (May 18,
1971). Subsequently Judge Piercey inquired of the defendants' counsel whether a fortyfive-day continuance would be sufficient and defendants' attorney again gave the court
no assurance that he would be able to present his additional proofs within such period.
After due deliberation, the court denied defendants' motion for a continuance, Id, See
also Opinion of Judge Piercey Gune 3, 1971) (denying motion for a new trial),
126. Statements concerning trial testimony are the authors' summarization of an
e.-..::tensive transcript.
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The transcript demonstrates that the trial brought the essential
issues out into the open ·with sufficient clarity that the court was
quite able to handle them intelligently. The Muskegon County treatment plan was shown to be a well-considered and intelligent experiment for dealing with waste water. Although there may well have
been preferable alternative sites, as the opponents suggested, there
was no demonstration of any substantial reason to seek one out. A
decision-making process can hardly be expected to do more than
protect against significant and demonstrable mistakes.
3.

Crandall v. Biergans

The Crandall case127 is noteworthy because it arose out of a simple
common-law nuisance claim, a species of case that the judiciary has
handled for centuries. The defendant operated a hog-finishing barn.
The plaintiffs, who were neighbors of the defendant, claimed that
the odors from the defendant's activities were intense. Other neighbors only seemed to find the problem mildly disturbing, and experts
from both the Air Pollution Control Commission and the Department of Public Health testified that the odors were not severe.
Even if the plaintiff had prevailed on the odor issue, the case
would no doubt have been lost, for the defendant demonstrated
that there was no "feasible and prudent alternative."128 A number
of experts testified that the defendant's barn was of a very modern
design that effectively mitigated water pollution, rodent infestation, and aesthetic problems when compared with most hogfinishing operations.129 Alternatives suggested by the plaintiff, such
as lagoons and so-called oxidation wheels, were firmly rejected
by the defendant's experts. As to odor suppressants, it was shown
that whenever a new product came on the market, the defendant
had immediately contacted the manufacturer and had attempted to
use the product as soon as possible. The alternative of moving the
defendant's barn was demonstrated to be inadequate because it would
only bring defendant's activities closer to other neighbors. In short,
the defendant not only disproved the allegation that his activities
constituted a nuisance, but established an affirmative defense permitted under the EPA as well.
127. See text accompanying notes 251-55 infra for excerpts from the court's extensive opinion vindicating the defendants.
128. EPA§ 3(1), MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1203 (Supp. 1972).
129. Crandall v. Biergans, Tape of Trial, on file with author.
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Tanton v. Department of Natural Resources

Perhaps the most interesting case to come to trial yet under the
EPA is Tanton v. Department of Natural Resources,180 in which the
defendant DNR granted a developer a permit to dam Monroe Creek,
a tributary of Lake Charlevoix, to create a lake around which residential housing would be built. The plaintiff proved at trial that
the impoundment would have an adverse effect on trout fisheries.
Yet, at the same time, it was clear that the development would have
some compensating recreational benefits. There was little evidence
that the DNR had compared and evaluated the benefits and losses.
Thus, not only did this case raise the question of whether the defendant had met the affirmative burden of section 3(1) of the EP A,131 but
-more importantly-the trial brought into question the DNR's
land- and water-use policy. More specifically, the plaintiffs were asking the DNR to demonstrate that they had developed a policy against
which the propriety of proposals, such as the one involved in this
case, could be tested.
Indeed, the testimony of the DNR's Director, Dr. Ralph MacM ullen, suggested that a quite different set of considerations guided
the Department's decision. MacMullen conceded that he "would
prefer that the land remain in its wild state . . . [and] would prefer
to have preserved the trout stream," but, "the alternative would
have been uncontrolled development."182 MacMullen said that the
proposed development was, as he viewed the problem, "the lesser
of two evils": 133 Inasmuch as the developer's land was private property, his Department had no control over what would happen to it
in the absence of a dam,184 and since the land might be sold to "unregulated and unpredictable developers, the kind that are ruining
the north country,"185 the DNR ought to settle for the best environmental plan it can get under the circumstances.
130. We also have no transcript of Tanton. We did send a law student to attend
the trial, and our impression of the case is based on his extensive notes [hereinafter
Tanton Trial Notes]. See generally Charlevoix Courier, March 15, 1972, at 1, col, 1. See
discussion of Tanton in text accompanying notes 189, 233-36, 281-88 infra.
131. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 691.1203 (Supp. 1972).
132. Tanton Trial Notes, supra note 130. See also Petoskey News Review, March 7,
1972, at 1, col. 1; Charlevoix Courier, March 8, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
133. Tanton Trial Notes, supra note 130.
134. Id. See Memorandum of Dr. MacMullen to Natural Resources Commission,
Oct. 22, 1971, at 9-10, furn. C to Complaint [hereinafter MacMullen Mem.]. Regarding
the question whether an agency must consider alternatives beyond those that it has
authority to put into effect, see Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, F.2d-, 2 BNA Env. Rep. Cases 1558, 1561-62 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
135. Tanton Trial Notes, supra note 130.
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Dr. MacMullen's testimony indicates that the DNR does not
condition the granting of its permits on the basis of what is the best
environmental plan for the area,136 but rather on the basis of what
the DNR thinks might happen if the permit were denied. This approach requires the Department to engage in far-reaching speculation. For example, the evidence introduced at the Tanton trial
indicated that the DNR based its decision not on concrete alternatives for development, but instead, on its estimate of what might
happen if the land in question got into the hands of "unpredictable
and unregulated developers."137 Moreover, it became clear under
questioning by the judge that the DNR had made no study of local
land use controls that could be used as a basis for an opinion about
the DNR's authority to regulate other types of development of the
land in question.13B
To be sure, some risk is involved in judging a proposal on the
basis of its current environmental acceptability, for one can never
guarantee that a rejected plan might not lead to some other less desirable use. But the approach chosen by the DNR is considerably
less attractive. For example, one could imagine the Public Service
Commission approving an environmentally questionable pipeline
route because the landowners over whose property the pipeline
would run might subsequently decide to use that land for an even
more destructive purpose, which might not be controllable.
It is in this setting that the judge in Tant on will have to interpret the EPA. Does the Act permit the DNR to make a "lesser evil"
environmental decision, or must the Department use its permitgranting authority to evaluate the environmental impact of the
particular plan before it?139 In confronting these questions, the
court will have to take into account the fact that the validity of Dr.
MacMullen's limited view of his legal authority is questionable.140
136. In the MacMullen Mem., supra note 134, it is stated that
If the area to be developed had been in the public trust, my decision would have
been easy-hold on to it in its present state and do everything to lessen the impact
of the hordes on it. However it is (for all practical purposes) in private ownership
and the correct approach now is to control its development in such a way as to
provide benefits to the public and a fair and just treatment to the present
owners.
It should be clearly understood that we do not intend to consider this decision
to be a precedent for other apparently similar cases.
137. Tanton Trial Notes, supra note 130.
138. Id.
139. In addition, the Dam Act § 2(b), MICH. COMP. LA.ws ANN. § 281.132(b) (Supp.
1972), provides that a permit may be issued if "the presence of an impoundment will
not have a significant adverse effect on fish, wildlife or recreational values in the
watershed or infringe on the public rights in the waters of the state."
140. Nor is his view of the deference due land developers (see supra note 136) as
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Dr. MacMullen appears not to have considered the affirmative authority granted him by the EPA to challenge some other proposed
use of the land in question should the dam permit be denied; nor
has he taken into account the availability of the extensive traditional
powers the Attorney General has in the area of public nuisance, the
potential of other statutes such as the Water Resources Act,141 or-as
noted above-local land use controls, as devices to prevent egregious
alternative land uses.
In contrast to the DNR's timid view of its legal authority to
deal with potentially destructive land uses, it should be noted that
just weeks before Tanton went to trial, the Governor's Special Commission on Land Use issued a report. The following comments appeared in the summary of the report:
[T]he state should review major land sales to ensure adequate planning and to protect the natural resources and land areas with unique
values. Existing departmental rules and regulations should be closely
examined for use in this area of environmental abuse. •..142

Furthermore, the Report stated: "It is impractical to wait for the
adoption of a state land development plan as a precondition for
state regulation, and delay all action pending comprehensive plan
development. . . .''143 Moreover, after Tanton had been initiated,
but prior to the trial, the Natural Resources Commission unanimously pledged that it would "not in any way abet"144 new water
a constitutional matter necessarily correct. See Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971). See notes 144, 189 infra,
141. See note 75 supra.
142. SUMMARY OF REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL COMMISSION ON LAND USE 6 (1972)
(emphasis added).
143, REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL COMMISSION ON LAND USE 14 (1972),
144. State Journal (Lansing), Jan. 14, 1972, at B-2, col, I. The Natural Resources
Commission and the DNR. appear to have taken a much broader view of their authority, in talking to reporters, than the DNR did in testimony in Tanton. It was
stated in the Detroit Free Press, Jan. 15, 1972, at 3-A, col. 5 that
[t]he Commission pledged that it and the D.N.R. will withhold approval from all
private and public developments which are held to have the "potential to cause
major irreversible damage to the quality of Michigan's environment,"
••• A. Gene Gazley, assistant D.N.R. director ••• said the policy will allow the
D.N.R. to be "much more effective" in dealing with the problem of cheap, hap•
hazard development occurring in many northern areas of the state, , ••
The Commission pledged that in implementing the new policy it would act to
the limit of its statutory authority. In attempting to discourage projects over which
it lacked direct authority, the Commission promised that "all other means-persuasion, publicity, moral force-will be employed to prevent or at least mitigate
environmental damage."
Commission chairman Harry H. Whiteley said "from now on they (the de•
velopers) are really going to have to sell us" before the Commission or the D.N.R.
will approve development proposals.
See also North Woods Call, Jan. 19, 1972, at 1, col. 1,
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or land uses that could damage the environment. As the State Journal noted in its story on the Commission's action:
The interim land use policy was adopted in the wake of a report by
Gov. Milliken's Special Commission on Land Use urging statewide
land control.
Ironically, the approval came a day before an Ingham County
court test of the Commission's December decision to permit a 440acre impoundment of Monroe Creek in Charlevoix County.145
5. Lakeland Property Owners Association
v. Township of Northfield
In Lakeland Property Owners Association v. Township of Northfield, the plaintiffs challenged the present operation and plans for
enlargement of a local waste water treatment plant.146 The testimony
in the case was extensive and detailed, but the weight of evidence
was not as clear-cut as in Payant or Muskegon County. The judge
appeared also to be affected by the cavalier attitude of both the
Water Resources Commission and the Department of Health in
dealing with the plaintiff's complaints. Before and after construction
of the treatment facility, officials from both agencies made representations to members of the plaintiff community that were not
carried out; indeed, during the trial it was revealed that the letters
had been consigned to a dead file. 147 Moreover, the WRC upgraded
its Final Order of Determination during the pendency of the litigation, obviously in response to the suit. This course of action is
hardly likely to inspire confidence in the "scientific" nature of the
WRC's judgments.14s
Besides being influenced by the plaintiffs' evidence that the receiving waters were polluted and that compliance with the WRC
standards would continue to produce polluted water, the judge was
obviously concerned about the testimony by defendants' witnesses
that there were multiple sources of pollution and that tightening
restrictions on this plant alone would not be sufficient to clean up
the receiving waters. The court's opinion repeatedly noted, when
referring to testimony by defendants' expert, that
[the witness] did not know if stopping all phosphates from de145. State Journal (Lansing), Jan. 14, 1972, at B-2, col. 1. Because Judge Reisig
granted the defendants a change of venue from Ingham to Charlevoix County, the
case did not go to trial until March 6, 1972.
146. See text accompanying notes 91-101 supra, 261-66 infra.
147. Authors' trial notes.
148. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
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fendant plant would make any appreciable difference with regard
to Strawberry Lake.... It was [his] further testimony ... that if the
defendants herein comply with the amended final order of determination and damage is still being done to the receiving waters because
of nutrients, the levels in the order could be ordered "adjusted" or
the complaint ignored even though the "standards" are being
abused.149
The court no doubt concluded that the Water Resources Commission was reluctant to deal with any one polluter in light of the
fact that effluents discharged by others also contributed to pollution.
The court was also unimpressed by the defendants' notion that they
were relieved of responsibility because individual homeowners downstream were also polluting. Furthermore, the court determined that
the defendants had not made out an affirmative defense other than
by assertion. It noted:
[D]efendants merely recited, through their witnesses, that there was
no reasonable and feasible alternative to their actions and did not
support such recitations ·with facts other than alluding to economic
considerations. Defendants also admitted ... that present and future
population below the outfall pipe had not been taken into consideration at the original construction of their waste water treatment
plant and apparently is being ignored currently upon their request
to continue operation and expand the volume of their discharge.160
A judgment was thus entered for the plaintiffs that included more
restrictive effluent standards, but allowed as alternatives the reduction in total discharge and the establishment of a less harmful site
for waste discharge.

B.

Restraining Orders and Preliminary Injunctions

Preliminary relief has been at issue in about one third of the
cases filed under the EPA. In nine cases hearings were held on
plaintiffs' motions for restraining orders or injunctions; the relief
sought by plaintiffs was granted in four of those cases,m and denied
in five.152 There are, in addition, four cases in which ex parte tern149. Lakeland Decision of Feb. 29, 1972, supra note 95, at 13-14.
150. Lakeland Decision of Feb. 29, 1972, supra note 95, at 22.
151. Ray v. Raynowsky; MUCC v. Anthony; Lakeland Property Owners Assn. v.
Township of Northfield; Kelley v. Tannehill &: DeYoung, Inc.
152. Surowitz v. City of Detroit; Alvin E. Bertrand, Inc. v. City of Detroit; Blunt
v. Apfel; Wilcox v. Board of Rd. Commrs. (the court of appeals in Wilcox ordered
the injunction reinstated pending trial; see note 170 infra); McCloud v. City of Lansing
(injunction denied but jurisdiction retained to assure defendant's compliance with a
promise to screen and to place underground a challenged power line in a park; Order
of Judge Reisig at 2 (May 17, 1971)).
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porary restraining orders have been issued; 153 and in one other case
the plaintiff has not yet pursued his ex parte motion.154
Motions for preliminary relief are among the most important ·
tests of judicial competency in handling EPA cases, for it is at this
stage that the judge's power is greatest: Before all, or even a substantial amount, of the data in the case is available, the court must
decide upon whom the practical burden of the litigation is to be
placed. The cases brought thus far show that judges are not wildly
issuing injunctions to save the environment, oblivious to the interests of defendants; preliminary injunctions sought by plaintiffs have
been denied as often as they have been granted. But this bare statistic is only the beginning of the story, for the judges before whom
these motions were argued have acquitted themselves quite well, as
the cases illustrate.155
Surowitz v. City of Detroit was probably the least-prepared case
brought under the EPA. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the City
of Detroit from using the pesticide methoxychlor, a widely accepted
substitute for DDT, for the control of Dutch elm disease. The
plaintiffs sought an ex parte restraining order, but the judge quickly
scheduled a hearing on a temporary restraining order the day after
the complaint was filed. At the hearing, the city offered letters from
both the State and Federal Departments of Agriculture, and from
academic experts as well, that indicated approval of the use of
methoxychlor.156 The plaintiffs could produce no hard evidence
of harm, and they only suggested weakly that the city needed to
do more research on the insecticides. Indeed, it was even brought
out at the hearing that one of plaintiffs' own witnesses had recently
recommended the use of methoxychlor as a substitute for DDT.
Judge Foley denied plaintiffs' ex parte motion, noting-perhaps
153. Leelanau County Bd. of Commrs. v. DNR; Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee;
Tanton v. DNR; Trout Unlimited v. Milliken. In Trout Unlimited v. Milliken the order
led promptly to negotiations and a consent order disposing of the case. In Leelanau,
the judge held that the case was not yet ripe because the legislature had not yet authorized the transfer of state park land to the United States. In Gang of Lakes, the
defendant has not rushed to proceed to a hearing. In Tanton, the defendant developer
was eager to argue for the dissolution of the order, but he was temporarily delayed
by his own successful motion for a change of venue from Lansing to Charlevoix, where
the judge urged that the full case be brought to trial promptly and held the order
in effect until then. The trial was held in March 1972, three months after the ex: parte
restraining order was granted and about six weeks after the change of venue was allowed.
154. WCHD v. National Steel Corp.
155. See discussion of Blunt v. Apfel, in text accompanying notes 178-80, 307-08
infra.
156. Authors' notes taken during hearing. See Surowitz v. City of Detroit, Transcript at 2-3 (April 14, 1971).
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more tolerantly th.an the slapdash presentation of the plaintiffs warranted-that
[w]e have ... an involved question raised in a new area, dealing with
ecology, and ... the research is in its infancy.... We have [210,000]
trees ... dying at the rate of 10,000 a year. If nothing is done this
will double by next year.... This is the problem that the City was
faced with. . . . Every indication to this Court at this time is that
the City is using every precaution to carry out a properly controlled
program. There is no evidence to the contrary. And I appreciate the
testimony here today by the experts, because they have pointed up
that a great deal of work is necessary . . . because we just don't
know.... But I don't have any facts before me upon which I can
enjoin the City from a program which is almost necessitated, dictated
by the emergency they are faced with, and I don't have facts which
indicate that this will cause harm to persons or animals or fish .
. . . I am going to deny the request for injunctive relief at this
time, but ... rather than dismiss the case ... the case should be le£ t
pending. . . . If during this period some conclusion can be arrived
at which would support the allegation . . . then come in and ask
for injunctive relief, and I am pretty sure it would be agreed to.11l7

Alvin E. Bertrand, Inc. v. City of Detroit was a suit to enjoin the
operation of a municipal incinerator used to bum pathological
wastes. Plaintiff alleged that the city's incinerator was emitting particulate matter many times in excess of the Health Department's
minimum standards. At the hearing on plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, the city argued that the particular wastes fed
into this incinerator could not be put in a landfill, and that it had
already closed down three of its four incinerators and was presently
trying to eliminate or modify this facility. 11.i8
Apparently hoping to put additional pressure on the city to develop a prompt abatement plan, the judge adjourned the hearing
for sixty days without ruling on the prayer for interim relief. He
explained to the press that "[i]f the incinerator is absolutely necessary, I don't want to order it closed," but he added that if the city
could not abate the pollution, he might, at a later time, shut it
down.159 At the second hearing, the city steadfastly maintained that
no quick solution was obtainable, and plaintiff's witness testified
that the emissions were only slightly in excess of the applicable
limits. The judge, therefore, responded that interim relief was inappropriate and ordered the matter set for trial. 100
157. Surowitz Transcript, supra note 156, at 2-4.
158. Detroit Free Press, October 23, 1971, at 5-A, col. 2.
159. Id.
160. Conversation between Kenneth Prather, counsel for plaintiffs and author, Jan.
17, 1972. No order has yet been signed by the court.
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Both Bertrand and Surowitz suggest not only that judges use
common sense in resolving these cases, but that they are willing to
go beyond their formal responsibilities and to use the leverage of
their position to induce litigants to take further steps to alleviate
the problem. For example, the maintenance of jurisdiction, without
the issuance of a restraining order, would seem to indicate that
judges are often sensitive to the dynamics of public decision-making
as well as to their more narrow professional duties.
In Ray v. Raynowsky, plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin a proposed
land drainage project. Work was to have begun in early November
1971 when the case was filed and an ex parte restraining order
granted; the defendants filed a motion to dissolve the order, and
the judge brought that motion on for a hearing one week later.161
Raynowsky raised a pervasive problem in environmental litigation. The county drain commissioners were proceeding with their
land drainage project in the established way-proposing a stream
channelization.162 Plaintiffs urged that there existed a more sensible
solution-the creation of small ponds-that would be less harmful
to the water table, to wildlife, and to pollution drainage into the
rivers. They asked for an opportunity to put their proposal before
the court for examination and comparison.
At the hearing on defendants' motion to dissolve the restraining
order, the judge adopted a position that seems to be commonly taken
in EPA cases. He was reluctant to "try" the case twice; 163 thus he
both encouraged and promised the parties an early trial on the
merits.164 As a result, at the dissolution hearing he concerned himself with only two questions: Would there likely be irreparable harm
if the order were dissolved in the interim, and was there any urgent
need for the defendants to go fonv-ard with their plan? Satisfied that
the answer to· the first question was yes, and to the second no, he
allowed the restraining order to stand.165
Wilcox v. Board of Road Commissioners was one of the few
disappointing preliminary injunction cases. The plaintiff sought to
enjoin a county road commission from undertaking a highwaywidening that would require cutting down nearly a thousand old
oak and maple trees. There was little, if any, indication that the
Commission had undertaken a study in search of less damaging al161. Ray v. Raynowsky, Transcript (Nov. 23, 1971).
162. Reume v. Henick and Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee challenged similar conduct by Drain Commissioners. A restraining order was issued in Gang of Lakes on Jan.
19, 1972.
163. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
164. Ray Transcript, supra note 161, at 16.
165. Id. at 24-26. Trial was held on June 19 &: 20, 1972.
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ternatives. Accordingly, the case seemed an ideal vehicle for bringing
the conduct of one of these local-and traditionally environmentally
insensitive-agencies into the open.166 An ex parte restraining order
was obtained in mid-1971,167 and the case was not brought on for
hearing by the defendant for eight months. But on February 18,
1972, the court held a hearing168 at which it denied plaintiff's preliminary-injunction motion:
It appears to this Court that although the defendant intends to
cut down numerous trees, it is necessary to do so if the present plans
for the improvement of Duck Lake Road are to be carried out. There
appears to be good reason for making the proposed improvements.
Defendant has made a good showing that the health, safety and
welfare of the public should be protected by widening the ..• road .
. . . On balance, the protection of the health and safety of the traveling public on the highway outweighs the esthetic quality of the
environmental conditions.
. . . Over the past three years defendant has experienced an increase in costs of road construction.... The defendant has made a
showing that it ·will be subjected to material ultimate damage and
deprivation of rights if the injunction continues. Neither can it be
said, absolutely, that there will be an unnecessary destruction of
natural resources if the trees are cut down as planned.
Balancing the possible benefits to the public to have the trees
remain standing as against the benefit to the public in having an
improved highway, it appears to this Court that a preliminary
injunction should not be issued.169
Unless the judge found that safety considerations mandated a
prompt widening of the road, his denial of the injunction seems to
be contrary to the legislative intent behind the EPA. If the construction went forward, the case would become moot before it could
ever go to trial on the question whether there were "feasible and
prudent alternatives," an issue that was ignored in Judge Ryan's
opinion. Indeed, the only ground he specifically mentioned for denying the injunction pending trial was inflation in the costs of roadbuilding. It is not surprising, therefore, that the plaintiff immediately appealed and that the injunction was reinstated by the court
of appeals pending trial.170
166. For background on the case, see Jackson Citizen Patriot, Aug. 8, 1971, at 1,
col. I.
167. Wilcox v. Board of Rd. Commrs., Order of Judge Ryan Gune 16, 1971),
168. We have not, at this time, been able to obtain a copy of the hearing trnn•
script.
169. Wilcox v. Board of Rd. Commrs., Finding of Judge Ryan at 4-5 (March 1, 1972).
170. The court of appeals ordered, pursuant to MICH. CT. (GEN.) R. 806.7 (1969),
that the preliminary injunction be reinstated "pendente lite for the purpose of pre-

May 1972]

Michigan's Environmental Protection Act

1047

In two other cases, courts granted preliminary injunctions that
seemed plainly appropriate in light of the existing facts. One was
issued in Lakeland.171 The court enjoined the expansion of a sewage
treatment plant and prohibited new customers from tapping on to
the system until a trial could be held. That case has now been decided in favor of the plaintiffs after a full trial.
The other injunction was issued in Tannehill & DeYoung, the
case involving the notorious rendering plant in Traverse City that
had slipped out of every effort to bring regulatory enforcement into
play for eight years. 172 One could hardly imagine a case in which
immediate judicial action was more appropriate.173 In issuing the
preliminary injunction, the court said in part:
Plaintiffs produced nine witnesses ... whose testimony was that the
odors emanating from the Defendant's plant . . . has [sic] been
obnoxious, uncomfortable, offensive, disagreeable and nauseating.
No witnesses were produced by the Defendant to counteract or
contradict the testimony given by ... the Plaintiffs.... Witnesses
in managerial positions of two large Traverse City motels testified
that they had receivea numerous complaints from guests . . .
regarding these odors.
Lee Jager, ... head of the Air Pollution Control Division of the
Michigan Department of Health . . . testified that he has received
over 100 complaints regarding the odors and that he has made more
than IO visits to the plant, the first being in 1963 . . . . Defendant
requested and was granted a permit to install odor reduction devices
known as after-burners .••.
• . . The Court has purposely delayed rendering a decision in this
matter to give Defendants every opportunity to completely install
and have operable their latest proposed control device to demonstrate claims made for it but to date [the court] has not been informed that the same is in operation. Hence the Court feels that it
can no longer permit the situation to exist . . . •
. . . [A] temporary injunction .•. shall be issued which will ternserving the status quo pending a determination on the merits at trial." Wilcox v. Board
of Rd. Commrs., Order of Judges Holbrook, Bums, and Fitzgerald, No. 13835 at l (Ct.
App. at Grand Rapids, March 31, 1972).
171. See text accompanying notes 91-101 supra, 261-66 infra.
172. See text accompanying notes 102-12 supra.
173. A final absurdity occurred when the defendant's expert lied about his credentials during the preliminary examination hearing. The court held him in contempt,
fined him $250, and sentenced him to ten days in jail for each lie. Kelley v. Tannehill
&: DeYoung, Inc., Order of Judge Fitzpatrick (Feb. 7, 1972). The jail sentence was suspended upon payment of the fine.
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porarily en1om Defendant from conducting rendering or other
similar operations .••.174

Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Anthony, the Indian
fishing case,175 involved the most extensive hearing on a motion for
preliminary injunction. The plaintiff presented a fisheries expert
from the DNR, whose testimony set the stage quite effectively. Beginning with the historic decline in Great Lakes fisheries and the
difficulties in enforcing regulations, he quickly sketched the problem's background.176 He then described the nature of present regulations, the way in which the Indians were violating those regulations,
and the risk their violations presented to the management areas in
which these Indians were fishing. The witness was temperate and
cautious. He did not assert that the Indian fishermen were creating
some imminent risk of destruction of trout throughout the Great
Lakes. He did, on the other hand, maintain that fisheries were quite
localized and that in the particular areas where the defendants were
operating, their activities were consequential. He noted, too, that
only a few Indians were doing the bulk of large-scale commercial
fishing so that issuance of an injunction would not have widespread
effects on a substantial community of persons.
The defendants produced no witnesses of their own, but instead
relied upon their cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness. Counsel for the defendants pressed the point that the Indian defendants
were doing only a modest part of the entire Great Lakes fishing, and
thus tried to suggest that an injunction against them could hardly
be a significant factor for fisheries management. But the plaintiff's
witness re-emphasized that fisheries were quite localized and that
within those regions where defendants did fish, their impact was
substantial.
The hearing did not finally resolve the question whether damage
to fisheries should be considered on an area-by-area basis or in terms
of the lakes as a whole, but the plaintiff did accomplish what it had
set out to do. It had educated the judge about the nature of the
problem and demonstrated that continued Indian fishing in violation of state regulations might significantly deplete an important
resource. As in the other injunction cases, the judge seemed quite
capable of understanding the environmental problem. Subsequently
the judge commented to the press, "If I had waited until a trial, it
174. Kelley v. Tannehill &: DeYoung, Inc., Decision of Judge Fitzpatrick at 2-6
(Feb. 9, 1972).
175. See text accompanying notes 49-57 supra, 290-97 infra.
176. MUCC v. Anthony, Transcript at 47-52 (Aug. 18, 1971).
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would be closing the door after the cows were stolen. My idea is to
preserve the fish for both the Indians and the white man."177
Another EPA case, Blunt v. Apfel, illustrated how a motion for
a preliminary injunction may fail to make effective use of the EPA's
potential. Defendants were planning to build a condominium on
the shores of Torch Lake in Antrim County, but plaintiffs, who
were principally concerned about pollution from sewage, sought an
injunction to prevent the construction.178
The case was potentially fascinating because the issue of lakeside
recreational developments is very important in Michigan and has
been the subject of considerable litigation.179 Blunt was also of interest since, unlike earlier litigation, it involved a lake that was not
yet overdeveloped. Blunt thus sought to bring some management to
the lake's development at an early stage-something from which
many Michigan lakes could have benefited :years ago.
Unfortunately, Judge Brown's attention seemed riveted to the
fact that no harm had yet taken place. On a number of occasions
he referred to the case as being one of "mere apprehension or
fear.''180 Both lawyers limited themselves to the submission of a
177. State Journal (Lansing), Sept. 16, 1971, at A-1, col. 7-8. The court of appeals at
Lansing CTudges Quinn, Bronson and Danhof) denied the defendant's application for
leave to appeal from the grant of the preliminary injunction, Nos. 1318 & 1319, Jan.
19, 1972. Trial of the case in the circuit court is scheduled for July 25, 1972.
178. The case became quite complicated. Plaintiffs filed two amended complaints,
alleging violation of both riparian rights and a zoning ordinance, which had been enacted during the pendency of the suit. Both of these issues were ultimately dismissed by
the court, but jurisdiction was retained over the original EPA allegations. Blunt v.
Apfel, Decision and Order of Judge Brown CTune 10, 1971) (dismissing plaintiffs' claims).
When the developer commenced construction without a permit from the Township
Zoning Commission, the Township brought a criminal action. Judge Bro-irn, who was
presiding in Blunt, enjoined the criminal proceeding in an action brought by the
developer against the To'l\'llship. Ware Real Estate Corp. v. Forest Home Township,
No. 880, (Cir. Ct., Antrim County). This suit was consolidated with Blunt. Order of
Consolidation (March 15, 1971). Subsequently, the tmrnship agreed not to enforce
the zoning law if the developer would agree not to challenge the law's validity in
court and to pay the $400 required for a permit. The property mrners appealed the
permit approval to the Board of Zoning Appeals. In any event, Judge Brown in his
Order of June 10, 1971, held the zoning ordinance unconstitutional as applied to
this developer. The developer filed a damage action against the plaintiffs. Apfel v.
Cook, No. 926 (Cir. Ct., Antrim County).
As a collateral matter, the Securities Bureau, refused to grant the developers a permit
to sell the twenty per cent of the units that have already been built. Presently, it is not
certain whether, or when, the case will be tried. Settlement negotiations appear to be
on the horizon.
179. See, e.g., Thompson v. Enz, 385 Mich. 103, 188 N.W.2d 579 (1971); Pierce v.
Riley, 35 Mich. App. 122, 192 N.W.2d 366 (1971); Opal Lake Assn. v. Michaywe Ltd.
Partnership, No. 13599-C (Cir. Ct., Ingham County, Jan. 4, 1972).
180. Blunt v. Apfel, Decision and Order of Judge Brmrn at 3-4 (Dec. 16, 1970)
(denying preliminary injunction).
Counsel for the plaintiffs admit there is no pollution as yet but contends the
approved plans and requirements are insufficient • • •• Act 127 (the EPA) • • • is
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single affidavit from an expert, and both affidavits were brief, uninformative, and conclusory. No ·witnesses were called. The opportunity to offer evidence on the importance of avoiding irreversible
harm was lost.
VI.

IMPACT OF THE

EPA

ON ADMINISTRATIVE

AND INDUSTRIAL BEHAVIOR

To evaluate fully the EPA's contribution to environmental regulation, it will be necessary to look beyond courtroom proceedings
and to examine the effects of the statute on the day-to-day operations
of regulatory agencies and industries in Michigan. Cases actually
litigated at most can only touch the range of environmental problems. If the statute is to succeed, it must energize entrepreneurs and
agencies through the threat of potential litigation into doing their
jobs more conscientiously.
While no such inquiry has been undertaken by the authors,
there is some suggestive, anecdotal evidence that the statute has
caused agency behavior to change.181 The Air Pollution Control
extremely broad in scope by granting the right to any person to start an action
alleging a defendant is likely to pollute • • • •
The burden of proof is on plaintiffs to at least make a prima fade showing
and mere apprehension or fear that defendant-, "might" pollute the waters •••
a.11d that present standards ••• approved by the Department of Natural Resources
• • • are inadequate, is, in the opinion of this Court, insufficient to effect such a
prima fade showing, in view of defendants' evidence to the contrary.
Equity will. not interfere in advance of the creation of a nuisance, where the
injury is doubtful and contingent ••••
See Transcript at 15, 29 (Dec. 10, 1970). Note that in Leelanau, Judge Brown seemed
to take a more sympathetic view of the EPA's effort to deal with environmental de•
gradation before it passed the point of no return. In an Order denying Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 CTune 14, 1971), he noted that "[t]he Michigan
Environmental Control [sic] Act specifically provides action may be started ••• where the
alleged violation has occurred or is likely to occur••••" Because the legislature had
not yet authorized the transfer of the land in question, he adjourned the case tern•
porarily. His opinion suggests that he intends to adjudicate the n:iatter at the time
the transfer is authorized, rather than wait until actual degradation takes place,
Note also that the "likely to pollute" languag'! of § 3(1) of the EPA is similar to
§ 6 of the Water Resources Commission Act which makes unlawful a discharge that
"is or may become injurious." MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 323.6 (1967), as amended
(Supp. 1972). See the Opinion of the Attorney General, No. 4721, June 7, 1971. See
note 199 infra.
181. For example, the State Journal (Lansing) carried a story on April 5, 1972, at
B-5, col. 5, stating that

[w]ary of a possible lawsuit, members of Livingston County's De1;>artment of Pub•
lie Works may set up a close monitoring system on water quality at Thompson
Lake••••
• • • DPW members have taken careful note of a recent ruling by the Living•
ston County Circuit Court [Lakeland] • • • •
They are reasonably certain the Red Oaks Plant can meet most of the purity
standards Judge Paul R. Mahinske imposed [in Lakeland] ••••
If the question of pollution by the Red Oaks plant is ever raised in court •••
DPW members want to have statistics which can point the blame at some otl1er
source.
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Commission provides one such illustration.
From its creation in 1965 until 1971, when West Michigan Environmental Action Council v. Betz Foundry, Inc. 182 was filed, the
Air Pollution Control Commission issued final orders of determination in only two cases, preferring instead to negotiate pollution
control programs and to grant "variances in the interim."183 The
weakness of this procedure appeared whenever a violator failed
to live up to his agreement; the time-consuming process of issuing
a complaint, holding a hearing, and adopting a final order was
required before court enforcement could be initiated.
Betz-the first EPA suit naming the Air Pollution Control Commission as a defendant-apparently caused a departure from that
practice. Following initiation of the lawsuit, the approval of an application from another company seeking a variance was delayed by
the Commission pending further staff investigation. Previously such
applications were routinely granted. But Commissioner Stanley
Quackenbush has since remarked that such applications would be
scrutinized with greater care lest the Commission be brought into
court again,184 and soon thereafter, the Commission adopted a new
procedure under which it increasingly issued complaints and pressed
for orders, rather than the informal agreements embodied in a
variance.185
To be sure, this change cannot be attributed solely to Betz.
The variance procedure was previously under attack from both the
public and from some members of the Commission. Tannehill &
DeYoung, Inc. 186 had also contributed to the Commission's embarrassment. But at the least, Betz provoked reconsideration of the Commission's procedures. It was often discussed in formal and informal
Commission consideration of the variance issue,187 and it was clearly
an important factor in the new procedure that has been adopted.
A controversial proposal to build a harbor at the mouth of the
Platte River provides another example of the manner in which agency
behavior has changed since the EPA was adopted. The project had
been supported by the DNR, but opposed by conservationists whose
182. See notes 34 &: 94 supra.
183. See note 103 supra.
184. Authors' notes of the Air Pollution Control Commission meeting, March 16,
1971, and tape of the meeting made by the Commission staff.
185. Minutes of the meetings of the Air Pollution Control Commission, Feb. 16,
1971; July 20, 1971; Aug. 17, 1971.
186. See text accompanying notes 102-12, 172-74 supra.
187. Roger Conner, a member of the Commission, was a participant in the discussions.
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objections were strong, but seemed unavailing. The issue reached a
climax when plans were made to file a suit under the EPA that
would challenge the project. According to newspaper reports, the
anticipated suit played an important role in persuading the DNR to
reconsider, and ultimately abandon, its plan.188
The DNR's decision on the Platte River project was also affected,
no doubt, by the highly publicized Tanton case.189 Indeed, there is
every reason to believe that Tanton was the motivating force in the
Natural Resource Commission's formulation of its potent, new
land use policy, and it was this policy that the DNR used when
making its Platte River decision.190
A questionnaire we sent to attorneys handling EPA cases191 produced some interesting responses about the regulatory agencies'
behavior since the EPA's enactment. The first two comments are
from plaintiffs' attorneys:
188. Fulton, Platte Saved-Battle Leaves Bitter Taste, Ann Arbor News, Feb. 27,
1972, at 35, col. 6; Digest, Michigan Department of Natural Resources, Feb. 1972, at 1.
189. See text accompanying notes 130-45 supra, 233-36, 281-89 infra. Newspaper ac•
counts include Serrin, State Dilemma: Wilderness v. Homes, Detroit Free Press, Jan. 13,
1972, at 3A, col. l; Editorial, State's Environmental Act Faces Major Test, Midland
Daily News, Jan. 18, 1972, § 1, at 8, col. l; Editorial, Only Courts Can Now Save Our
North Woods, North Woods Call, Dec. 22, 1971, at 4, col. 1.
The DNR's "environmental reputation" was at stake in Tanton. The State Journal
(Lansing), Jan. 19, 1972, at A-8, col. 1, carried an editorial entitled D.N.R. Taltes Odd
Stance in Dispute, which stated in part:
Growing abuse in land development ••• has been spotlighted recently by recom•
mendations of a governor's commission. • • •
While the commission struggles with this approach, the D.N.R. seems, ironically, to be going in the opposite direction •••• It is somewhat astonishing to find
the D.N.R. defending itself in such an action [Tanton]. More difficult to under•
stand is the fact that the D.N.R. approved the dam and lake project in spite of
the fact that its own staffers in the Charlevoix area opposed it.
Dr. MacMullen immediately wrote a letter to the Editor, State Journal (Lansing), Jan,
28, 1972, at A-6, col. 6, in which he responded:
The editorial unfortunately_exemplifies a worrisome tendency on the :eart of the
communications media to take positions on matters of principle without full
knowledge.•••
Like most issues, this one was not 100 per cent clear-cut; in my judgment it
was more like 55-45 in favor. Thus it is not surprising that some D.N.R. employees and two of the five commissioners took a contrary view••••
Time and the Courts will tell whether the Monroe Creek decision was right
or not. I think it was, but I make no claim to infallibility.
190. See notes 144-45 supra and accompanying text; North Woods Call, Jan, 19,
1972, at 5, col. 2:
The policy was drafted by the DNR following its approval in December of an
impoundment and land exchange which would open the door for a 1,300-home
subdivision on Charlevoix County's Monroe Creek. Commissioner Gus Scholle
recommended that the department adopt a new, broader policy to regulate and
limit land development after the Monroe Creek action was taken.
The complexity of efforts to analyze these problems in terms of cause and effect is
revealed by the subsequent Escanaba River controversy. See Cooper, State Approves
UP River Project, Detroit Free Press, June 2, 1972 at 3-B, col. 3. Cf. Foster v. DNR,
No. 9906-C, Opinion of Judge Reisig (Cir. Ct., Ingham County, May 31, 1972).
191. See Appendix I infra. Because we promised ·the respondents anonymity, the
responses are not identified. All responses are in the authors' files.
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My case involved W.R.C. standards and witnesses .... I think that
this heightened their concern for their own standards and procedures.
Having them called into question ... seemed to sting.

* * *

Our case involved three administrative agencies ... the Department
of Natural Resources, the Michigan Department of Health and the
Securities Bureau. With respect to the former two agencies, I have
noted during the period of time of the pendency of this action an
increasing cautiousness on their part to grant permits for projects
of the type and magnitude proposed by the Defendants in this case.
It is apparent, however, that these agencies do not feel constrained
to "put the brakes on" developers to the degree that many of us
would appreciate. In this regard the recent granting of permit to
the developer of Monroe Creek [Tanton] is a good case in point.
Below are two comments from Assistant Attorney Generals, regarding EPA cases they have handled:
The case involves liabilities of a local unit of government and a
state agency...• In my view, the pending litigation has materially
affected their attitudes toward environmental issues. Both of the
agencies have tightened up their procedures for the handling of
contaminating wastes.
Speaking from the agency standpoint, it has made them more careful
in documenting their positions and more careful re: initial actions
(what is said in a letter or in a meeting). I see no result in so far as
D.N.R., Water and Air agencies etc. regarding attitudes on policy
and purpose.
The EPA is apparently having an impact in the private sector,
too.192 Shortly after the defendant pig-farmer won in Crandall v.
Biergans, the following appeared in an agricultural publication:
There is a tendency for some farmers to think that agricultureespecially the animal industries-won a sweeping victory in the
recent trial. This is a dangerous error ... Bill Biergans and his wife
received a favorable judgment on their specific, individual operation. Each livestock producer should evaluate his own operations
in light of Judge Corkin's opinion to see how he would fare in
court ..•. It is time agriculture took direct, positive action in the
area of pollution instead of always being on the defense. We desperately need voluntary guidelines. • . . They would strengthen the
position of any farmer brought to trial. . . . The time for us to
start on them is nowl
One last question: If you found yourself in court tomorrow,
how would you fare?193
192. See note 224 infra.
193. Michigan Farmer, March 4, 1972. In response to our questionnaire an individual
representing agricultural interests replied: " ••• a greater awareness has been created
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QUESTIONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The EPA as a Source of Substantive Law
I. Introduction

The EPA is not only a procedural statute expanding the scope of
standing to sue. It is also, in and of itself, a source of substantive
law. The right created by the EPA is set forth in section 3(1): It is unlawful "to pollute, impair or destroy the air, water or other natural
resources or the public trust therein," 194 unless there is no feasible
and prudent alternative that is consistent with the promotion of the
public health, safety, and welfare.
Most of the cases litigated thus far do not explore the nature of
the substantive right created by the EPA. Some seek to enforce rights
created by other statutes, and use the EPA as a source of standing to
sue195 or as a remedy196 on the theory that the EPA incorporates by
reference at least those environmental obligations imposed by other
statutes.
A number of other cases probably could not have been prosecuted without using the EPA as a source of substantive law,107 but
the question seems not to have been addressed in those cases. For
example, in Payant198 the defendant DNR was prepared to accept
the assertion that its deer management program ought to comply
with the policies of the EPA. It was thus willing to defend its conduct
on the environmental merits.109
within the agricultural industry toward upgrading and improving handling and dis•
posing of livestock waste." And defense attorney Tim Green advised a Michigan Fann
Bureau audience "Farmers who aren't using good animal husbandry practices arc in
for trouble.••• You should be a bit more conscious of how you run your operations."
State Journal (Lansing), Feb. 27, 1972, at G-4, col. l.
194. MICH. ColllP. LAws ANN. § 691.1203 (Supp. 1972).
195. E.g., WMEAC v. Betz Foundry, Inc.; Alvin E. Bertrand, Inc. v. City of Detroit;
MUCC v. Anthony.
196. E.g., the cases initiated by the WCHD and WRC v. Chippewa County.
197. See Appendix I infra.
198. See text accompanying notes 58-64, 113-23 supra.
199. However during preliminary skirmishing DNR lawyers made the usual objec•
tion that deer management should be left to the discretion of the DNR, barring
arbitrariness and caprice. See text accompanying note 237 infra.
In Muskegon County and Lakeland, the defendants conceded that their pro•
posed sewage treatment facilities ought not pollute, and defended on that ground.
The courts never reached the question whether or to what extent the EPA set differ•
ent or higher standards than the Water Resources Commission Act. Likewise, in Cran•
dall, the "pig odor" case, in which suit was brought both on common-law nuisance
grounds and under the EPA, it was plain that the defendant had some duty not to
create noxious odors as a matter of conventional nuisance law. The court, quite reason•
ably, found that the same evidence which established the absence of nuisance met
the affirmative defense requirement of § 3(1) of the EPA. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
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The Public Service Commission

The question of the EPA as a source of substantive law arises
whenever a defendant asserts that he has no obligation to take environmental considerations into account in the performance of the
challenged activity,200 and the plaintiff argues to the contrary that
the EPA, in and of itself, creates such a duty.
This issue has not yet arisen in pristine form.201 The question
was, however, addressed, though indirectly, in Michigan Consolidated
Gas Co.202 There the Gas Company petitioned the Michigan Public
Service Commission to authorize it to set up a priority scheme for
rationing natural gas; its proposal put the use of gas for control of
air pollution problems near the lowest of priorities. Both the Attorney General and the Wayne County Health Department intervened,
urging that the use of gas for pollution control should be given a
much higher priority.203 The Attorney General predicated both his
right to intervene and his demand for a higher priority for pollution
control explicitly upon the EPA.204
The Commission never denied that it had authority to consider
§ 691.1203 (Supp. 1972). In such a case, the addition of a count under EPA probably
does no more than to shift the burden of justification to the defendant. Compare
Blunt v. Apfel, Transcript at 31 (Dec. IO, 1970), in which the distinction between equity's
traditional reluctance to enjoin anticipated harm in nuisance cases, and the "likely
to pollute" standard of the EPA should have been considered. See note 180 supra and
accompanying text; text accompanying note 308 infra.

200. It also arises when the defendant asserts that its obligations are limited by
the provisions of another statute. Tanton was such a case, involving the Dam Act.
See text accompanying note 233 infra. Ray presented a similar situation involving
the Drain Code. See Brief of Defendant in Support of Answer and Motion for an
Accelerated Judgment of Dismissal (Feb. 18, 1972). When regulatory agencies have
been defendants, it has been argued that the granting of a permit or license by the
agency does not violate the EPA since the agency is not causing the pollution. See
note 283 infra.
201. See discussion of Roberts in text accompanying notes 65-71 supra, 239-41,
256-60 infra.
202. No. U-3802 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn. 1971).
203. Notice of Intervention of Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Jan. 8, 1971; Petition for Leave to Intervene by the Wayne County Health Department, Jan. 4, 1971.
204. Intervention is covered in § 5(1), and the substantive claim in § 5(2) of the
EPA, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1205(1)(2) (Supp. 1972). The Attorney General
also predicated his intervention on Attorney General Act § 28, MICH. Co?lll'. LAws
ANN. § 14.28 (1967), which provides that the Attorney General "shall, when requested
by the governor • . • and may when in his own judgment the interests of the state
require it, intervene and appear for the people of this state in any other court or
tribunal, in any cause or matter, civil or criminal, in which the people of this state
may be a party or interested."
The intervention caused a temporary controversy. Case No. U-3802 Transcript at
16-29 (Jan. 12, 1971) [hereinafter Transcript U-3802]. Intervention was not allowed
specifically under the EPA, but _objections were withdrawn and intervention was
allowed without citation of authority. Id. at 29.
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environmental issues,205 but seemed to be of the opinion that, while
it could take environmental quality into account, it was not required
to do so.200 The Attorney General argued that under the EPA the
Commission was indeed mandated to consider environmental quality
and had to give environmental protection a high priority.207 As one
of the Attorney General's representatives phrased the argument,
"the legislature has ... given to this Commission ... other mandates,
and one of those mandates is environmental considerations . . . .
Yes, there is a mandate to do something about pollution . . . .
Pollution questions or considerations should be given equal consideration with industrial uses for which gas is the only feasible
fuel."2os

The Commission did not resolve this question explicitly in its
order, but it did move pollution control higher on its priority list;
and, as one member of the Attorney General's staff later noted,200
the intervention served to educate the Commission and to sensitize
it to the presence of the EPA as a factor that must be considered
when it formulates utility regulation policy.
Subsequent events involving the Public Service Commission seem
to confirm this observation. Only a few months later the Commission
had before it a proposal for the construction of nvo separate gas
transmission lines within the same general area. 210 The Attorney
General intervened under the EPA on behalf of the DNR,211 and
objected on environmental grounds to the duplication of pipelines.212
205. The Commission cited (Transcript U-3802, supra note 204, at 9) Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 941
(1966), on appeal from remand, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 19'11), at 354 F,2d at 620 for the
proposition that as a representative of the public, the Federal Power Commission
must provide the public with "active and affirmative protection."
The Public Service Commission is given broad general powers under the Public
Service Commission Act§ 6, MICH, COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.6 (Supp. 1972):
It is vested with power and jurisdiction to regulate all rates • • • conditions of
service and all other matters pertaining to the formation, operation or direction
of such public utilities . • . to hear and pass upon all matters pertaining to or
necessary or incident to such regulation of all public utilities••••
206. Transcript U-3802, supra note 204, at 991-99.
207. Id. at 951-99.
208. Id. at 991-92, 994.
209. Letters from M. Robert Carr, Assistant Attorney General, to Roger Conner,
Oct. 4, 1971 &: Oct. 8, 1971, on file with authors.
210. Michigan Consolidated Gas. Co. (No. U-3933) &: Consumers Power Company,
(No. U-3935), consolidated, Michigan Public Service Commission, Pipeline Construction
Order (Oct. 22, 1971) [hereinafter Pipeline Order].
211. The Boardman River Advisory Council also intervened.
212. Pipeline Order, supra note 210 at 4. The Attorney General's Petitions to Inter•
vene were filed July 15, 1971.
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Shortly thereafter, the Commission brought about a mutually acceptable settlement that consolidated the pipelines.213
These proceedings set a highly important precedent, for they
represent the first instance in which the Commission relied on the
EPA, 214 rather than using the broad language in the Public Service
Commission Act216 to find jurisdiction. The Commission's opinion
stated:
On its own initiative and in accordance with the mandate of the
Environmental Protection Act of 1970, the Commission has given
very careful consideration to the environmental aspects of and alternatives to the proposals of the two Applicants, and the subsequent
compromise settlement. Testimony and evidence on the environmental aspects of the routes ..• were taken. . . . The compromise
settlement has resulted . . . in a route which is superior from an
environmental standpoint to that originally proposed.216

Commissioner William R. Ralls stated that the case was
an environmental triumph for the people of Michigan. At one time
the two utilities as well as the two oil companies said it was technically and economically impossible to develop a single pipeline
system.
But when it became clear that approval of duplicate systems
would be difficult to obtain, the producers and ,utilities got together
with members of our staff and the Department of Natural Resources
and decided that a single pipeline system could be developed.211
Having moved this far, the Commission took two further steps.
It first asked the legislature for authority to order public hearings
on the environmental effects of proposed routes for electric power
lines, and it simultaneously requested a formal opinion from the
Attorney General on whether the Commission already has such
authority under the EPA 218 Under present practice, the Commission
considers only the safety of proposed power lines. Should the Commission be found to have authority to order public hearings-and
the Attorney General's office has contended that it does under the
EPA 219-the routing of power lines in Michigan would be subjected
to environmental regulation for the first time.
213.
214.
215.
1972).
216.
217.
218.
219.

Pipeline Order, supra note 210 at 11.
Pipeline Order, supra note 210 at 12.
The Public Service Commission Act § 6, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.6 (Supp.
Id. at 11.
Detroit Free Press, Oct. 23, 1971, at 3-A, col. 1.
Id., Jan. 21, 1971, at 3-A, col. 1.
Id.
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Notably, the steps taken by the Commission have been motivated
not only by the Attorney General's initiative in the two cases discussed above, but also by another precedent that was initiated under
the EPA, Beach v. Detroit Edison Co.

3. Eminent Domain

Beach arose out of a condemnation petition filed by Detroit
Edison to acquire land in Washtenaw County for a proposed highvoltage transmission line.220 The affected landowners responded by
bringing suit under the EPA to enjoin the condemnation on the
grounds that the proposed route would be environmentally detrimental and that Detroit Edison had not adequately considered
less harmful alternatives, such as use of existing utility corridors.
The statute granting utilities the right to eminent domain does
require a sho-wing of "necessity" by the condemner,221 but that requirement has traditionally been ignored as a practical matter; most
condemnation cases have involved little more than the question of
how much money the landowner would receive.222
Beach was brought in the circuit court to enjoin or control the
condemnation proceeding in the probate court. It raised for the first
time the question of how the EPA's enactment affects condemnations
by utilities. The following excerpt from the circuit court hearing
provides a partial answer:
The Court: May I suggest for counsels' consideration a possibility
and that is that I issue to the Probate Court a mandamus, or a writ
of superintending control instructing the Probate Court that in
conducting the hearing on necessity in this action they are to
establish standards for compliance ·with the Environmental Protection Act . . . that I retain jurisdiction for the purpose of reviewing any finding of necessity which might be made in the Probate
Court and under section 2b of the Environmental Protection Act
to review the standards, or standard there established, to see whether
such is or is not efficient.
. . . The purpose of that is as follows: This allows the Probate Court
220. Petition of Detroit Edison Co. to Condemn a Right-of-Way, No. 58·068
(P. Ct., Washtenaw County).
221. MICH. Co11fi'. LAws ANN. 486.251-.252, -.254 (1967).
222. See Detroit Edison Co. v. Matuja, 365 Mich. 35, 112 N.W.2d 109 (1961), The situation is changing, but slowly. See Thompson v. Fugate, 452 F.2d 57 (4th Cir. 1971); New
Windsor v. Ronan, 329 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Seadale Indus. v. Florida
Power &: Light Co., 232 S.2d 46 (Fla. 1971); Texas Eastern Transmission Co. v. Wildlife
Preserve, 48 N.J 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966), 49 N.J. 403, 230 A.2d 505 (1967), discussed
in Sax, The Search for Environmental Quality, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 99 (H.
Helfrich, Jr., ed. 1970); Foster v. DNR, No. 9906-C (Cir. Ct., Ingham County, May 31,
1972); Note, Eminent Domain and the Environment, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 651, 659 (1971),
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to discharge the primary duty of finding project necessity and it
does not bar it from proceeding to make a determination of site
necessity so long as the Probate Court has established or found
satisfactory standards of compliance with the Environmental Protection Act, yet it reserves to this court the power to review those
standards in the present action and under that Act, and to overturn, if necessary, the standards approved and specified by this
Court, and if necessary to direct another re-hearing on at least site
necessity, should that be indicated. That leaves this Court in its
proper position of reviewing the actions of the Probate Court, yet
raises clearly the issue of whether or not the Probate Court can
properly follow this Court's order to comply with the standard
provisions of the Environmental Protection Act, thus raising a proper
question of law.22a

The attorneys were unable to agree on a precise wording for
the ·writ, and the dispute has since gone forward in the probate
court.224

4. Roberts v. Michigan
Roberts v. Michigan 225 indicates the limits of the EPA as a source
of new duties for administrative agencies. It will be recalled that the
plaintiff sued the Highway Department and Secretary of State for
failing to deal with automotive air pollution. While, as we have seen
in connection with our discussion of the Public Service Commission,226 the EPA can be read into a regulatory agency's mandate, the
question still remains: whether the particular environmental obligations the plaintiff seeks to impose should be made the responsibility
of the agency he has sued.
The Highway Department does not have a general mandate to
223. Beach v. Detroit Edison Co., Transcript at 2-3 (Sept. 16, 1971).
224. The three-member probate court commission found the project "necessary,''
but found no necessity for the taking of certain parcels of land. Ann Arbor News, April
27, 1972, at 3, col. 6; id., May 5, 1972, at 11, col. 3; id., May 23, 1972, at 3, col. 4. A
final decision must await the determination of the probate judge and subsequent proceedings in the circuit court. Meanwhile:
The Detroit Edison Co., concerned by public crticism over its condemnation of
private property, initiated a unique po1icy • • • of holding public hearings on
routes it selects for electric transmission lines.
Edison's [d]ecision to hold the hearings came ••• after public attention brought
by a number of landowners who • • • challenged in court the company's right to
condemn private property.
Although lower court decisions in that case [Beach v. Detroit Edison Co.] have so far
supported Edison, the company has also come under the review of the Public Service Commission, which for the first time is considering making an attempt to
control the location of power lines and power plants.
Detroit Free Press, May 26, 1972, at 7-C, col. 1.
225. See text accompanying notes 65-71 supra, 239-41, 256-60 infra.
226. See text accompanying notes 200-19 supra.
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regulate traffic on the highway, but is primarily responsible for the
highways themselves; 227 while the Secretary of State is authorized to
enforce statutory standards governing the condition of vehicles,228
it is the Air Pollution Control Commission that is responsible for
"[p]romulgat[ing] rules and regulations for controlling or prohibiting air pollution ..." 229-the relief that the plaintiff in Roberts was
seeking. Even though Roberts could have demonstrated that there
existed some nexus between the agencies he sued and the relief he
sought, he would still have had to convince the court that the legislature had not invested some other agency-in this instance the Air
Pollution Control Commission-with primary authority over the
subject matter of the suit.230
5. Relation of the EPA to Other Statutes
Whenever a plaintiff suing under the EPA challenges a defendant
who has complied with the provisions of another statute that also
governs his conduct, two difficult questions arise: Does the EPA
supplement and amend the other statute? If it does not, and if the
statutes are viewed as conflicting, which is to prevail?
Ordinarily, no substantive conflict will arise. The broad antipollution provisions of the Water Resources Act, for example, will
generally serve as cµnple basis for suits filed under the EPA. 231 In
such cases the courts can, and will view the EPA as an alternate route
for implementing the State's antipollution policy.232
In other instances, while the substantive environmental policy
of another statute may be adequate, it may be necessary to allege
that the EPA supplements the existing law by making mandatory
227. State Highway Department Organization Act § 7, MICH, Collfi'. LAws ANN,
§ 247.801 (1967) as amended (Supp. 1972), General Highway Law ch. 5 § 2b, MICH,
Collfi'. LAws ANN. § 225.2(b) (1967).
228. Vehicle Code §§ 204, '107(a), MICH. Collfi'. LAws ANN. §§ 25'1.204, ·,'107(a) (196'1)
as amended (Supp. 1972).
229. Air Pollution Act §§ 2(c), 5(a), MICH. COllfi'. LAws ANN. §§ 336.12(c), -.l!i(c)
(1967) as amended (Supp. 1972).
230. This is not to say that there will not at times be more than one agency with
authority over various elements of an environmental problem. See, e.g., Ray v. Ray•
nowsky, Transcript at 18-19 (Nov. 23, 1971), regarding the relative responsibilities of
the Drain Commissioners and the WRC. But whenever there is an agency that has an
obvious relationship to the problem, and which can do the job adequately, there is no
need to impose responsibility upon another agency whose regular functions arc quite
unrelated to the issue plaintiff wishes to raise. See Upper Pecos Assn. v. Stans, 452 F,2d
1233 (10th Cir. 1972). See note 70 supra.
231. This is not always the case. See discussion of Marble Chain of Lakes v. 'WRC
in note 71 supra.
232. See discussion of primary jurisdiction, especially Lakeland and Chippewa
County, in text accompanying notes 72-101 supra.
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what would otherwise be discretionary. For example, in Tanton,
in which the plaintiff challenged the DNR's granting of a permit
for the construction of a dam, the defendant Department relied upon
section 2b of the Dam Act, which states:
A permit may be issued if, in the opinion of the director . . . the
presence of an impoundment will not have a significant adverse
effect on fish, ·wildlife or recreational values in the watershed or
infringe on the public rights in the waters of the state.233
In cases like Tanton-where the Dam Act amendment became effective subsequent to the enactment of the EPA-the court must read
the statutes compatibly if possible. In Tanton, for example, harmonizing the provisions of the EPA and the Dam Act would seem
to present no great difficulty. The principal purposes of the EPA
were to remove free-wheeling administrative discretion and to assure
that regulatory agency decisions were environmentally defensible on
their merits.234 There is no· reason to believe that the recent Dam
Act amendment was intended to amend the EPA, and it is quite
easy to read the two statutes as conforming with each other. Thus
the language of the Dam Act emphasized above can be interpreted
-in conformity to the EPA-to mean that a permit may be issued
when the director believes there is no threat of harm and when that
opinion is warranted by the facts of the case.235 Such interpretations
233. MICH. CoMP. LA.ws ANN. § 281.132b (Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
234. Sax Testimony supra note 47; Press Release of Rep. Thomas Anderson (sponsor
of H.B. 3055) at I, Jan. 16, 1970, on file with author; Remarks of Sen. Basil Brown
(debate on H.B. 3055, Michigan Senate), June 25, 1970, transcript on file with author;
Allbaugh, Public Overwhelmingly Supports Antipollution Bill at Hearing Here, Grand
Rapids Press, Feb. 27, 1970, at 1-B, col. 3.
235. This interpretation is supported by two other legal mandates under which the
DNR operates. The DNR's enabling legislation, MICH. CoMP. LA.ws ANN. § 299.3 (1967)
as amended (Supp. 1972), provides:
The Department of Conservation shall protect and conserve the natural resources
of the state of Michigan; ••• prevent and guard against the pollution of lakes and
streams within the state, and enforce all laws provided for that purpose with all
authority granted by law, and foster and encourage the protecting and propagation of game and fish.
See also GOVERNOR'S ExEcUTIVE DIRECTIVE 1971-10, Sept. 30, 1971, which reads in pertinent part:
To: All Department Heads
From: Governor William G. Milliken
Subject: Environmental Impact Review
I believe it is the responsibility of State government to lead the way in all aspects of environmental quality protection. Major state activities which affect the
environment need to be carefully scrutinized, so that the changes brought about in
land, water or air use are consistent with overall State environmental policy objectives.
I am directing that each agency of State government review all major activities
within their jurisdiction to determine their effects on the environment. Such review
must include the following:
I. The probable impact of the action on the environment; this includes the
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have been made of similar language in other environmental cases.236
A similar question arose in Payant. In a pre-trial motion for
summary judgment, the Attorney General argued that the court had
no authority over the Department's game management program other
than that necessary to correct abuse of discretion, and cited as authority for this proposition a 1925 statute that gave the Conservation
Commission its "power to regulate the taking ... of all game or fur
bearing animals . . . whenever in the opinion of said commission
... it becomes necessary to assist in the increased or better protection
of such ... animals."237 The court's response, denying the DNR's
motion, should set a significant precedent for interpreting the EPA:
[W]e do not believe, especially in the light of the Environmental
Protection Act, that arbitrary, unfettered discretion and unchallengeable power is vested in the Department and Commission. If it can be
shown that the regulations permitting the taking of antlerless deer
are likely to impair or destroy a natural resource, the courts may
intervene. It is conceded that plaintiff has a standing to bring the
action and the Act clearly authorizes suits against such bodies as
the Department and Commission.23 B
In addition to the methods adopted in Tanton and in Payant
for reconciling the provisions of potentially conflicting statutes, there
is one other interpretive technique courts could use to preserve the
EPA's vitality. If necessary, provisions in existing statutes could be
impact on human life or other ecological systems such as wildlife, fish and
aquatic life; or on air, water or land resources;
2. Probable adverse environmental effects of the action which cannot be avoided
(such as air or water pollution, damage to life systems, urban congestion, threats
to health or other adverse effects on human life);
3. Evaluation of alternatives to the proposed action that might avoid some or
all of the environmental effects indicated above. This should include a full explanation of the reasons why the agency decided to pursue the action in its contemplated form rather than an alternative course of action;
4. The possible modifications to the project which would eliminate or minimize
adverse environmental effects, including a discussion of the additional costs in•
volved in such modifications••••
236. For instance, in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093,
1097-98 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court stated that
[r]espondents ••• argu[e] that the decision to suspend the registration ••• is committed by statute to unreviewable administrative discretion • • • • That evidence
cannot be found in the mere fact that a statute is drafted in permissive rather
than mandatory terms. Although [the statute] provides that the Secretary "may"
suspend the registration of an economic poison that creates an imminent hazard
to the public, we conclude that his decision is not thereby placed beyond judicial
scrutiny.
See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1970); Citizens To Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
237. Conservation-Fish&: Game-Regulatory Powers § 1, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 300.1 (1967). For a similar argument, See Ray Transcript, supra note 161, at 9-11.
238. Payant v. DNR, Opinion of Judges Brown, Davidson &: Munro at 2-3 (Sept. 4,
1971) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment),
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viewed as exemplary rather than exclusive, and no conflict could
therefore be said to exist between those statutes and the EPA. For
example, in Roberts, the judge noted that the Vehicle Code requires
every motor vehicle to "be so equipped and adjusted to prevent
the escape of excessive fumes and smoke."239 Had the case gone to
trial, and had the plaintiff proved that other emissions besides excessive fumes and smoke caused pollution problems, Judge Warren
could quite comfortably have treated the EPA and the Vehicle Code
as complementary. Instead, inexplicably, he viewed the prohibition
of fumes and smoke as the furthest that the legislature had gone in
regulating automobile air pollution, and suggested that if he were
to find and remedy pollution from other sources, he would, in effect,
be repealing a legislative limitation.240 Not only is this interpretation
of the Vehicle Code forced, but if accepted, it would create a conflict between the Vehicle Code and the much broader standards of
the Air Pollution Act. 241
Thus far no case has involved an explicit conflict between the
provisions and policies of the EPA and those of any other statute.242
Indeed, because the EPA is a direct implementation of a constitutional provision,243 it is unlikely that the EPA will, upon examination, be found in conflict with policies of other statutes; and it was
certainly the understanding of the legislature that the EPA stated
the general environmental policy of the state.
Naturally, it is always open to the legislature to enact an explicit
exception to the EPA. Just as they have enacted the law, so is it within
their authority to modify it; but one ought to be cautious in reading
implied modifications into statutes of general application such as the
EPA. Moreover, when attempting to determine legislative policy, it
is important to compare the present status of a 1970 law, like the
239. Roberts v. Michigan, Opinion of Judge Warren at 3 (May 4, 1971), quoting
Vehicle Code § 707(b), MICH. Collll'. LAws ANN. § 257.707(b) (1967).
240. Id. at 3-4.
241. See note 229 supra.
242, At present, only one case, Leelanau, which involves a proposed transfer of
state park lands to the federal government, may raise a specific conflict problem.
Should the legislature enact a law explicitly authorizing the transfer of the land and
expressly addressing the environmental issues involved in the transfer, it would be diffi.
cult to argue that the transfer violated the EPA.
243. MICH, CoNST, art. IV, § 52 (1963), set out in note 6 supra. To be sure, at
some point there is a constitutional question concerning the preservation of the public
trust, which even the legislature cannot violate; see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine
in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH, L. REv. 471, 489-92
(1970). Moreover, even when an express legislative authorization exists, it must be
examined closely, for it may well grant authority that is subject to compliance with
other laws. See, e.g., D.C. Fedn. of Civic Assns. v. Volpe, 434 F.2d 436, 443-44 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
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EPA, ·with that of some much older statute that is asserted to undercut the EPA's environmental mandate.
To the extent that judges may in future cases find conflict between the EPA and explicit, detailed provisions in other germane
statutes, they must, of course, apply the usual standards of statutory
construction for bringing diverse legislative pronouncements into
harmony. When the legislature has incorporated an exacting or
quantitative standard into a law subsequent to the EPA, the courts
should ordinarily view that standard as governing. If, for example,
the legislature has declared explicitly that certain areas shall be roadless wilderness, certainly one would expect a court to view that determination as setting the environmental standard, and the EPA would
have to be read in conformity with this more specific statute. Similarly, if the legislature has decided that there shall be so many
parts per million of dissolved oxygen in a given stream, or that certain industries shall have a limited number of years to clean up
pollution, the EPA would have to conform to those explicit mandates. It should be noted, however, that the preceding speaks only
to legislatively set standards, not to those promulgated by administrative agencies; for if anything is clear about the EPA, it is that the
law was designed to reduce the range of discretion traditionally given
to regulatory agencies and to enable citizens to challenge standards
established by those agencies.
Surely, difficult borderline cases will arise, and courts may at
times have to struggle to reconcile statutes that look in different
directions; but this task is inherent in the very nature of the judiciary's traditional job of statutory construction.244 Thus far the
courts have not had to face this problem in the litigated cases.
B.

Constitutionality of the EPA

The only provision of the EPA that has raised a constitutional
question is section 2, which provides:
(2) In granting relief provided by subsection (I) where there is
involved a standard for pollution or for an anti-pollution device
or procedure, fixed by rule or otherwise, by an instrumentality
or agency of the state or a political subdivision thereof, the court
may:
244. Some recent cases under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U,S.C,
§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 (1970), illustrate the problem, See National Helium Corp. v.

Morton 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971); Ely v. Vclde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971),
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(a) Determine the validity, applicability and reasonableness
of the standard.
(b) When a court finds a standard to be deficient, direct the
adoption of a standard approved and specified by the
court.245
Although the main purpose of this Article is to provide a description
of cases litigated under the EPA-not to set out a legal analysis of
the statute-in light of the controversy that has developed over section 2 in the litigated cases, a few general observations are warranted.
Section 2 seems to have created the impression in some quarters
that the courts are empowered, because of the EPA, to re-examine
legislatively set standards and to repeal and replace those found to
be deficient. Clearly, the section has no such purpose. Section 2 is
not directed to standards fixed by the legislature, but to those set by
regulatory agencies and political subdivisions. If the legislature sets
a specific standard that is inconsistent with the EPA, the courts must
comply with that standard. The EPA, after all, is not a constitution.
At the same time, the EPA itself does set an environmental policy;
and for the courts to implement that policy-against an agency's
rule or regulation-is not to usurp legislative prerogatives, but to
enforce them. Although its provisions are phrased in broad terms,
the EPA is nonetheless a statute, superior to the explicit decisions
and rules of regulatory agencies and local governments.
Moreover, there is no constitutional reason why the legislature,
which granted authority to the courts by enacting the EPA, may not
limit the ambit of agency discretion and require every agency to
meet the legal standard of section 3(1), leaving the enforcement of
that standard to the court. Indeed, the recent decision of the Supreme
Court in Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe 246 confirms
this point. In that case, the Court had to determine the validity of
a statute in which Congress, using language identical to that in section
3 of the EPA, 247 had commanded that highways should not be built
through parklands unless "there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land.... " 248 The government argued that the
location of highways had been left to the discretion of the Secretary
of Transportation and that the court could not interfere with his
determination of whether there were feasible and prudent alterna245.
246.
247.
248.

MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202 (Supp. 1972).
401 U.S. 402 (1971), on remand, 335 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Tenn. 1972).
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1203 (Supp. 1972).
The Department of Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
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tives. The Court flatly rejected this interpretation, stating, "there
is law to apply" ;249 that is, the Court was of the opinion that the
regulatory official's determination must now be tested against his
compliance with a legal standard relating to alternatives, and, of
course, the meaning and scope of that legal standard is a question
for the courts to decide.250
In light of these preliminary comments, it would be appropriate
to consider the three cases in which constitutional questions have
been addressed by the courts: Roberts, Crandall, and Lakeland.
Crandall is at once the most enlightening and puzzling of cases.
Although Crandall was originally brought as a common-law nuisance
action by neighbors of an odorous hog-finishing barn, a claim was
subsequently added under the EPA.
After hearing extensive testimony at the trial, the Crandall court
held that the defendants were carrying on their business "in a careful
and husbandlik.e manner and us[ing] such odor control products as
are ... available. . . ." 251 It thus concluded that "on balance the
equities are in favor of defendants and they are not maintaining a
nuisance." 252 As for the EPA claim, the court stated:
as the Court interprets Sec. 3 of the Act the legislature is in
effect saying that some balance has to be maintained between absolutely no pollution and the carrying on of activities necessary to
human existence. The raising of livestock ... is a lawful and necessary occupation that of necessity will result in ... odor. It would be
the opinion of the Court that if the livestock operation is carried on
in an area zoned for that purpose in a generally accepted manner,
and that the operation is carefully carried on so that waste products
are handled with reasonable efficiency and dispatch so that the odor
entering the atmosphere is held to a practical minimum, it could
very well be said that a defendant has established an affirmative defense "that there is no feasible and prudent alternative to defendant's
conduct and that such conduct is consistent with the promotion of
the public health, safety and weHare."2 53
Had the judge said no more than this, it would no doubt be generally
249. 401 U.S. at 413.
250. The Overton Park case was governed by the federal Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970), which provides a more limited degree of judicial review
than the EPA. Nonetheless, the Court made it clear that when a legislature limits
agency discretion and substitutes a legal standard, it is the duty of courts to enforce
that legal standard by the scope of judicial review that they have been authorized to
apply. Thus Overton Park addresses questions concerning the judicial function that arc
similar to the constitutional questions raised under the EPA.
251. Crandall v. Biergans, Opinion of Judge Corkin at 6 (Feb. 14, 1972),
252, Id.
253. Id. at 11-12.
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agreed that he had responded quite appropriately to the case before
him. He had heard the testimony, evaluated it, and found that the
defendants' conduct was in compliance with the mandate of the
EPA. As the judge quite correctly pointed out, the EPA demands
that "some balance has to be maintained...." So long as that balance gives important weight to environmental quality, and the court
considers the availability of alternatives and the necessity of defendant's conduct, the policy of the EPA is vindicated.
However, for reasons that are not clear,254 Judge Corkin seemed
to believe that the EPA required something more of him, for he
proceeded to say:
Here the Court, of necessity, must determine that standards relating
to the raising and maintaining of livestock are deficient because none
exist. It is being asked to create standards, direct their adoption and
proceed to enforcement. The Court would regard this as making
law and thus an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power so
far as the raising of livestock is concerned. The Court does not think
the Environmental Protection Act, as it now stands, can serve as a
basis for any relief to plaintiffs.255
The decision, as a whole, and especially that part reprinted above,
suggests that the court did indeed develop specific standards for the
case where none previously existed in legislation or administrative
rules; and that the judge enforced those standards by finding that
the defendants had complied with the policy of the EPA, a policy
that is largely coextensive with the law of nuisance as he applied it
in this case. Thus his own decision seems to obviate the constitutional concerns he expressed. The case may be counted as a successful
application of the EPA.
In Roberts, Judge Warren, after observing that the Vehicle Code
prohibited "excessive smoke and fumes," 256 unwisely read that provision as indicating that the legislature was unwilling to accept -any
regulation beyond that of "excessive smoke and fumes." Thus he
refused to read the EPA as authorizing him to take evidence on, and
to control, other automobile exhaust pollution problems. With that
rather peculiar interpretation behind him, he continued:
Quite clearly the legislature did adopt standards, and quite clearly
those standards are deficient.
This gives rise to the first question which is this: "Just who is it
254. The plaintiff seemed to be urging the judge to write a set of general regulations for agriculture, rather than merely apply appropriate standards to the instant
case. Crandall v. Biergans, Tape of trial (comments of plaintiff's attorney).
255, Crandall Opinion, supra note 251, at 13.
256. See note 228 supra.
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that this Court will "direct" to adopt adequate standards? Could it
be any body other than the legislature? ... This Court is disinclined
to attempt to "direct" the legislative branch of government. Courts
should resist the temptation to legislate and to substitute themselves
and their judgment for that of the duly elected representatives of
the general public.
"Legislative power" may not be delegated. . . . This Court concludes that it is being called upon to make law....
For the foregoing reasons the Court concludes that this Act, so
far as it pertains to pollution arising from the operation of motor
vehicles is unconstitutional.207
What Judge Warren apparently failed to realize is that the legislature is not required to spell out precisely what courts must do.
Rather, it may enunciate the general policy and leave the details to
be filled in by the judiciary on a case-by-case basis. It would clearly
be anomalous to find the EPA unconstitutionally vague208 when
other laws-such as the federal antitrust laws260-which are even
less detailed than the EPA-have been upheld by the courts for
years. Furthermore, it would seem odd for the courts, which have
for centuries evolved and applied common-law rights such as nuisance without statutory help, to balk at developing a similar body
of law for environmental regulation, especially when they are under
an explicit mandate from the legislature to do so.260
In Lakeland, the court, after a full trial, found that the effluent
from defendant's treatment plant was polluting waters below the
point of discharge and that the effluent from the proposed enlargement of the plant, even if in conformity with effluent standards set
by the Water Resources Commission, would constitute pollution.261
The court held that the plaintiffs had made a prima facie case and
that the affirmative defense raised by the defendants herein of there
being no feasible and prudent alternative to their conduct [had] not
been borne out by defendant's proofs. Defendants merely recited,
through their witnesses, that there was no reasonable and feasible
257. Roberts Opinion, supra note 239, at 4-5.
258. See Note, The Constitutional Question: Vagueness and Delegation of Powers,
4 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 397 (1970). See al.so Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 215 (1970).
259. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933). See
al.so United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 492 (1960) (vagueness challenge
to Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899).
260 See State ex rel. Board of Health v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., 63 N.J. Eq. 111,
115-16 (1902): Air Commn. v. Coated Materials, 1 BNA Env. Rep. Cases 1444, 1447 (Ct.
C.P., Dauphin County, Pa. 1970).
·
261. Lakeland Opinion of Feb. 29, 1972, supra note 95, at 180.
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alternative to their actions and did not support such recitations ·with
facts other than alluding to economic considerations.262
Judge Mahinske then noted that this suit was not brought to
review the standards set by the Water Resources Commission, but
was instead an original EPA action against the defendants for pollution in which the defense was largely predicated on compliance with
those standards.263 Under the EPA, his opinion quite properly indicated, mere compliance with such standards is not a defense; plaintiffs may challenge administratively set standards as inadequate to
prevent pollution prohibited by the EPA.264 In this respect, he also
found that defendant's conduct constituted a nuisance and violated
the plaintiffs' riparian rights.265
Having found that the defendant's conduct violated the EPA
and that the WRC's administrative standards, which defendant had
relied on, were insufficient to meet the demands of the EPA, Judge
Mahinske next dealt with the defendant's contention that the EPA
was unconstitutional:
Defendant, in its Brief, relies heavily on the opinion of Judge
Warren, ... in the matter of Roberts v. State of Michigan. . . .
This Court is of the opinion that it is not controlled by the opinion
set out in Roberts by the learned Ingham County Circuit Court
Judge and further finds that any dispute between circuits must be
resolved by a higher tribunal.
This Court does not believe [the EPA] is unconstitutional by
virtue of it having contained therein a prohibited delegation of
powers. Said Act simply states that when a Court finds a standard
to be unreasonable or deficient the Court may set an acceptable
standard which the Court may enforce directly or order the agency
involved to enforce such standard.266

C. Intervention in EPA Cases
The EPA provision on intervention is not as clear as it might be.
The statute provides:
Whenever administrative licensing or other proceedings, and judicial
review thereof are available by law, the agency or the court may
permit ... any person ... to intervene as a party plaintiff... .261
262. Id. at 18.
263. Id. at 19.
264. Id. at 21-23.
265. The Water Resources Commission Act, §§ 6(c) 12, 12(a), itself preserves other
remedies. MtcH. CoMP. LAws .ANN. § 323.6(c) (Supp. 1972), 323.12, -.12(a) (1967).
266. Lalieland Opinion of Feb. 29, 1972, supra note 95, at 19-20.
267. EPA § 5(1), MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. § 691.1205 (Supp. 1972). For a discussion
of the Attorney General's intervention in Public Service Commission Proceedings, see
text accompanying notes 200-24 supra.
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Plainly, the draftsmen of this provision did not have in mind interventions in suits originally filed under the EPA. The purpose of the
provision was to "equalize" the law by permitting anyone who could
have filed an original suit under the EPA to intervene in a proceeding in which the same type of issues might arise-that is, in an
administrative proceeding or in a court case brought to review
an administrative decision.
It was not thought necessary to specify a right to intervene directly in a suit filed under the EPA for the simple reason that anyone
who might wish to intervene could file an original suit himself under
the broad standing provision of the EPA. Indeed, when the question
of intervention by an environmental group arose in Tanton, the judge
responded to the defendant's opposition by saying "You want them
to file a separate action? I'll just consolidate them." 268 He then
granted the motion to intervene, under the rules governing permissive intervention.2 09
While it seems wasteful to deny intervention to an applicant who
can simply file a new complaint on his own and then seek consolidation, at least one court has nevertheless held that the right to intervene is permissive.270 In Wayne County Health Department v.
268. Hearing on Motion To Intervene and for a Change of Venue, Jan. 14,
1971 (from authors' notes taken at pre-hearing conference in Judge Reisig's chambers),
The question arose again in Charlevoix when EMEAC petitioned to intervene. The
motion was granted (authors' trial notes).
269. MICH. CT. (GEN.) R. 209.2(2) (1969): "Upon timely application anyone may be
permitted to intervene in an action ••• when an applicant's claim or defense and the
main action have a question of law or fact in common."
270. See MICH. CT. (GEN.) R. 209.1(1) (1969). The legislative history of the interven•
tion provision provides a fascinating sidelight on the dangers of divining legislative
intent. The original bill, introduced April 1, 1969, exactly as drafted by Joseph L. Sax,
provided:
Sec. 5(1) In such administrative, licensing or other proceedings, and in a judicial
review thereof made available by law, the attorney general ••• or a citizen may
intervene as a party on the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the proceed•
ing or action for judicial review involves conduct • • • which may have the effect
of impairing, polluting.•••
This provision, permitting intervention as a right, was not challenged. The Governor's
legal adviser objected to numerous provisions of the bill but approved of the intervention provision. See Memo from the Governor's legal adviser to Governor Milliken,
Jan. 26, 1970.
On March 25, 1970, the House Committee reported out a substitute bill whiclt
continued to include the language on intervention of section 5(1) cited above, and in•
eluded in the proposed section 6 additional intervention-as-of-right language recom•
mended by the Governor's legal adviser,
It was not until the second substitute version of the bill, passed by the House of
Representatives on April 21, 1970, that the language "the agency or the court may
permit" intervention first appeared. The only known source for this change is a
pencilled modification adding this language on a copy marked up by Joseph L. Sax,
which was prepared with a number of suggestions sent by Sax to the sponsor of the
bill (Rep. Thomas Anderson) to be added to the second substitute bill. Sax has no
recollection of why the change was made or what provoked it, nor does he recall having
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Chrysler Corp., a case involving air pollution at a Chrysler foundry,
intervention was sought by both the Attorney General and a group
of several hundred_ residents of the neighborhood. 271 No objection
was interposed to the Attorney General's motion,272 but Chrysler
opposed the private intervention, noting that the EPA gave no unconditional278 right to intervene. Chrysler also contended that the
parties seeking intervention were splitting their cause of action because they had a nuisance case for damages pending against Chrysler;
they were already adequately represented by the WCHD; and the
suit would be unduly delayed because complex negotiations between
Chrysler and the WCHD had been in progress for several months. 274
At first, the judge granted the citizens permissive intervention,275
and disposed of fears of delay by emphasizing that his strong management of the case would preclude any such problems. He added:
[t]his whole problem of pollution-environmental problems, we now
learn is affecting health, homes, property.... Who else has a greater
right, as a class, ... to be represented? ... One of the great sins of
our time, I think, is that there is a breakdown of communication
between people in public life and people in quasi-public life, as I
would refer to the Chrysler Corporation. . . . This constant communication and understanding and exchange is most important, and
if it has to be done in the media of a court, then I shall be the first
to see that it is done.276
Five months later, however, Chrysler, Wayne County, and the
Attorney General were all in agreement on a proposed order that
set out responsibilities for Chrysler and continued the court's jurisdiction to assure compliance with the order. But the intervening
citizens would not agree to the order. They wanted the judge to hear
testimony and Chrysler to admit that it had been polluting.277 The
any intention of making intervention more difficult. In any event the new permissive
language, replacing the previous intervention provision, stayed in the bill.
A detailed scrutiny of all the voluminous correspondence, drafts, reports and newspaper articles on the bill, gathered from the files of all those who were active in the
bill's enactment, including legislators, reveals that there was never any discussion or
consideration whatsoever of this language.
271. Motion of Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, to Intervene as a Party Plaintiff,
May 11, 1971; Motion of Rev. Joseph C. Nosal and 327 Others To Intervene as Parties
Plaintiff, March 23, 1971. See text accompanying notes 38-42 supra.
272. See note 204 supra.
273. Memorandum of Law of Defendant in Opposition to Motion To Intervene at
6, WCHD v. Chrysler Corp. See Transcript at 6 (April 2, 1971); Transcript at 45,
58-64 (Sept. 16, 1971).
274. Memorandum supra note 273, at 1-5.
275. Chrysler Transcript of April 2, 1971, supra note 273, at 8.
276. Id. at 5.
277. Chrysler Transcript of Sept. 16, 1971, supra note 273, at 56.
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intervening plaintiffs had a special interest in using this suit to
advance their interest in the separate, pending damage action.
The situation created a dilemma for the judge. He wanted to
settle the case, and he was obviously proud of the consent order he
had obtained from three of the parties, but he doubted the legality
of his signing the order without the consent of all of the parties.278
The solution the judge found was to dissolve the order granting
intervention. But to do this, he had to be satisfied that the private
parties were permissive intervenors and not intervenors of right.
The judge thereupon ruled that the EPA did not give a right of
intervention, that the intervention was creating delay, and that the
intervenors' rights would be adequately protected in their damage
action. He then set aside the order permitting intervention and
granted the private parties the status of amid curiae.270
D. Jurisdiction and Venue
In addressing the issues of jurisdiction and venue, section 2(1)
of the statute simply provides that a plaintiff "may maintain an action
in the circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation
occurred or is likely to occur."280
In Tanton,281 suit was brought against both a developer and
against the DNR, which had issued the permit authorizing the
dam. Although the proposed project itself was in Charlevoix County,
the plaintiff decided to sue in Ingham County, where the DNR was
located and where the permit had been issued. Thus three issues
278. The judge noted, id. at 57:
I am still fearful that if this case goes to trial now (you will not go to trial for
some time) and in the meantime nothing is being done, and the people out there
wait ••• the possibility is imminent and great that if I enter an orcfer it may be
appealed and that is going to take years.
What I am trying to do is get some Court order controlling the Chrysler Coryo•
ration with respect to these :problems that not only has some finality, but still gives
this Court a continuing junsdiction over the project. • • • It requires Chrysler to
do certain things and if they don't comply, on forty-eight hours notice they are
back in court for contempt of the Court's judgment.
279. Id. at 44-46, 59-64. The judicial order disallowing the intervention of the
private plaintiffs has been appealed, WCHD v. Chrysler Corp., appeal docketed No. 1219
Mich. Ct. App. In Lakeland, a local community intervened as a defendant, In Payant,
the MUCC intervened, without protest, as an amicus curiae. In Betz Foundry, the
plaintiff was denied the right to intervene in pending administrative proceedings
and has appealed that denial (see note 94 supra); and in Chippewa County, the State
Highway Department was joined as a third party defendant.
280. MrCH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1201 (Supp. 1972). The issue of removal from
state to federal courts is not discussed in the text. WCHD v. National Steel Corp,
was removed to the federal court. Judge DeMascio remanded to the Wayne County
circuit court. WCHD v. National Steel Corp., Order of Remand (Nov. 11, 1971), See
McPhail v. Corps of Engineers, note 13 supra.
281. See text accompanying notes 130-145, 233-36 supra.
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had to be decided by the Tanton court. First, was the issuance of
the permit (which does not itself create pollution) a "violation" of
the Act? Even if it ·was, does the EPA lay venue in the place where
the violation of the Act-the issuance of the permit-occurs, as well
as where the injury to the environment occurs? Finally, should the
case be transferred from Lansing to Charlevoix on forum non
conveniens grounds?
As to the first question, the Act rather inartfully refers in section
3(1) to "conduct of the defendant" that "is likely to pollute."282
While the granting of a permit does not comfortably fit within this
language as conduct that itself is likely to pollute, it is clear that the
legislature intended that plaintiffs be able to enjoin the granting of
permits by government agencies when the use of those permits will
create pollution.283 Moreover, section 5(2) of the Act imposes substantive duties on regulatory agencies that confirm this point. This
section of the Act states that in any "administrative, licensing or
other proceedings . . . no conduct shall be authorized or approved
which does, or is likely to ..." pollute.284
282. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1203 (Supp. 1972).
283. This issue has been raised in only one case, Beaman v. Township of Summit.
The plaintiff, a township resident, claimed that failure of the township to prosecute
individual polluters itself constituted "conduct • • • polluting • • • the water" within
the meaning of§ 3(1) of the EPA. The case was unusual since the relief sought was an
injunction against the township prohibiting it from building sewers for pollution
treatment (as required by the Water Resources Commission). Apparently plaintiff's
theory was that as a township taxpayer, he should not have to pay for the conse•
quences of the township's failure to deal with individual polluters. The court granted
summary judgment for the defendant, holding that no cause of action upon which
relief could be granted had been stated. The court stated at 2 of its Opinion on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment that
[i]n interpreting a statute, it must be strictly construed, especially when it has not
been construed by higher courts • • • • I agree with the defendant that interpreting the statute strictly, that the defendant would have to be alleged to be
guilty of polluting. In reading ••• [the EPA] it refers to the plaintiff showing
that the defendant "has polluted or is likely to pollute." ••• The complaint does
not claim the defendant is guilty of polluting or is doing anything that is apt to
result in pollution. The plaintiff's action under the "Environmental Act" should
be brought against the individuals who are polluting and not against the defendant township.
The legislative history of the EPA is clear that the Act was explicitly intended to
allow suits by private citizens against regulatory agencies to require them to fulfill their
legal obligations to prosecute polluters, and to treat their failure to do so as a violation
of section 3 of the Act. See note 234 supra and accompanying text. The plaintiff's
problem in Beaman was that he sought the wrong relief, not that he failed to state
a cause of action under the EPA.
Thus, Betz Foundry (see text accompanying notes 182-85 supra) was precisely the
type of suit the legislature contemplated. This is not to say that the EPA compels
mandatory enforcement of every violation, but at the least it requires a challenged
nonenforcing agency to persuade the court that its restraint is consistent with the
policy of the Act and art. IV, § 52, of the Michigan Constitution. It might meet this
burden by showing that the problem is trivial or that conciliatory tactics are more
likely to be effective than rigorous enforcement.
284. MICH. CoMP. LA.ws ANN. § 691.1205 (Supp. 1972).
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As to the question where did the legislature intend venue to lie,

the statute does not explicitly refer either to the place where a
violation of the Act occurs or to the place where damage to the
environment occurs. But it would seem natural to read the EPA
as referring to a violation of the law rather than to the more poetic
"violation of the environment." There is no documentary evidence
on this last point, but those involved in drafting the statute did have
a specific restriction in mind. They feared that some environmental
problems were so pervasive that a plaintiff in the Upper Peninsula
might sue there for air pollution that occurred in Detroit.280 Thus,
to protect defendants, rather than speaking of the place where the
injury occurred, the Act limits suit to the place or places where the
defendant has acted; that is, to a place where the conduct that allegedly violated the law has occurred.
It was understood that-in cases like Tanton-this would permit
suits either in Lansing or at the site of the alleged physical conduct,
and thus would be consistent with the general venue provision that
states: "if the cause of action arose in the county of the principal
office of [a] governmental unit [that] county is the proper county
in which to commence and try actions against such governmental
units."286
Finally, in resolving the most-convenient-forum issue, the Tanton
court, accepting the fact that venue was properly laid in Ingham
County,287 nevertheless granted a permissive change of venue "for
285. Debate in the Michigan Senate, June 26, 1970 (colloquy between Senator
Joseph Mack and Senator Basil Brown) (transcript on file with author).
286. Revised Judicature Act § 1651, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.1615 (Supp. 1972).
The venue issue arose from a suggestion of the Michigan chamber of commerce. In a
memo to the legislature dated March 4-, 1970, the chamber's Special Legal Subcommittee
suggested an amendment providing that
All actions ••• shall be commenced in the circuit court for the county in which
the defendant resides or has its principal place of business, or in the circuit court
for the county in which the conduct ••• occurs, and if such occurs in more than
one county, an action may be commenced in any of said counties and the circuit
court for the county in which the action is first initiated shall have exclusive
jurisdiction. Actions against the State of Michigan or any agency thereof shall be
commenced only in Ingham County.
The provision ultimately adopted, proposed by Senator Mack, was applauded by the
chamber of commerce. See Michigan State Chamber of Commerce State Legislation
Report, July 29, 1970, at 4-; 95 Mich. S. J. 1628.
In Lakeland the defendant township was a municipal corporation in Washtenaw
County, but the sewage treatment facility at issue in the case was located in Livingston
County. Thus, the defendant argued, since the general venue provision provides that
proper venue in a suit against a government unit is the county in which it exercises
governmental authority, venue must be laid in Washtenaw County. Motion of Defendant
for a Change of Venue, Sept. 15, 1970. The court denied the motion. Lakeland Property Owners Assn. v. Township of Northfield, Order of Judge Mahinske (Oct. 7,
1970).
287. Tanton v. DNR, Order of Judge Reisig Oan, 21, 1972).
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the convenience of parties and witnesses,''288 noting that many issues
in the case involved the Charlevoix area and that the Ingham County
courts were very busy.289
A somewhat more complicated problem was presented by Michigan United Conservation Club v. Anthony, a case brought against
a defendant-class that included "all other persons who claim by
virtue of Indian treaty rights with the United States ... the right to
fish in the waters of the State of Michigan without compliance with
the provisions of the fish and game laws . . . of the State of Michigan. "290 The first problem here was that Indians were fishing in
Great Lakes waters that were offshore of many different counties.
The question, therefore, was whether a suit filed in one circuit court
would be sufficient.291 More specifically, was section 2(1) of the EPA
jurisdictional,292 or did it only set venue? If it was jurisdictional,
the court would have no authority over Indians who were fishing
outside of the waters off Ottawa County. Relying on the Practice
Commentary's provisions that relate to circuit court jurisdictions,293
the plaintiff asserted, and the court agreed,294 that section 2(1) of
the EPA is not a jurisdictional limitation; it is simply a statement
of venue.
Thus the remaining question was how to handle the specific
venue provision of section 2(1) in a case in which the defendant
class members were engaging in conduct all over the state. Since the
288, Id. See MICH. CT. (GEN.) R. 403 (1969).
289. Author's notes taken at hearing in circuit court, Jan. 14, 1972.
290. MUCC v. Anthony, Complaint at 1. The essence of the claim was that the
Indians were subject to Michigan conservation laws and that the violation thereof
constituted a violation of the EPA. See text accompanying notes 49-56, 175-77 supra.
291. The defendant conceded that suit was properly brought in Ottawa County
to challenge fishing off the shores of that county in Lake Michigan. MUCC v. Anthony, Transcript at 27 (Aug. 18, 1971).
292. EPA§ 2(1), MICH, CoMP, LAws .ANN. § 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1972), provides that
the plaintiff "may maintain an action in the circuit court having jurisdiction where
the alleged violation occurred." In Payant, the defendant argued that the preliminary
injunction sought was in essence a petition for a writ of mandamus against a state
officer, as to which the courts of appeals and the supreme court have exclusive jurisdiction. Revised Judicature Act § 4401, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.4401; MICH. CT.
(GEN.) R. § 714.1(1) (1969), Brief of Defendants Supporting a Motion To Dismiss
at 1, Payant v. DNR. See Minarik v. Ziegler, 336 Mich. 209, 57 N.W.2d 501 (1953). The
court implicitly rejected this claim. Payant v. DNR, Per Curiam Opinion (Sept. 4,
1971).
293. The commentary to the Revised Judicature Act § 601, MICH, CoMP. LAws
.ANN. § 600.601 (1968), provides that
• • • the organic law of Michigan confers jurisdiction upon the circuit courts in
broad affirmative terms•••• Therefore, the basic approach to jurisdictional problems in Michigan is not a search for specific jurisdictional grants, but rather an
assumption that the circuit courts have jurisdiction unless the matter in question
is specifically excluded by law.
294. MUCC v. Anthony, Opinion of Judge Smith at 1 (Sept. 15, 1971).
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EPA does not speak to this precise question, the general court rules
governing venue are controlling.205 On this point, the Practice
Commentary states that "if the action joins defendants who are
established in different counties, venue is proper in the county in
which any defendant is established."296 Applying this principle to
the EPA, it would seem appropriate, if the "violation occurred" in
different counties, to lay venue in any county in which any violation
occurred. This is the result the court ordered. 297
E. Security Bonds
Section 2(a) of the EPA208 reflects the legislature's effort to accommodate preliminary injunction practices with the Act's innovative grant of standing-to-sue to private citizens and organizations that
initiate litigation in the public interest. The problem here is that
the general court rules governing preliminary injunctions anticipate
that the plaintiff will be required to post security sufficient to cover
the damages incurred by a defendant during the pendency of any
injunction wrongfully granted.299
This rule usually presents no great problem since the magnitude
of litigation in which private plaintiffs ordinarily become involved is
closely related to their own economic standing.300 This ordinary
equality of economic standing among the parties to a controversy,
however, does not apply to the kind of cases contemplated by the
EPA, for an EPA plaintiff is not, in most circumstances, suing to
295. Revised Judicature Act § 1621, MICH, Col\IP, LAWS ANN. § 600.1621 (Supp,
1972).
296. Commentary to Revised Judicature Act § 1621, MICH, Col\IP, LAws ANN.
§ 600.1621 (Supp. 1972).
297. Anthony Opinion, supra note 294, at 1: "The nature of the subject matter of
these actions indicates that Ottawa County as well as many other counties may be
affected by the alleged activities of the defendants. Accordingly, it is the opinion of
this court that jurisdiction lies in the Ottawa Circuit Court.''
298. MICH. Col\IP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202a (Supp. 1972).
299. MICH. CT. (GEN.) R. 718.3 (1969) provides:
The court may require the giving of security by the applicant in the sum the court
deems proper, for the payment of costs and damages that may be incurred or
suffered by any party who is found to have been wron~lly enjoined or restrained,
before granting a preliminary injunction or restrairung order. If security is not
required, the order shall specifically state why security is unnecessary.
MICH. Or. (GEN.) R. 718.11 (1969) provides: "This rule shall not apply to special
statutory actions to obtain an injunction, if the statute prescribes special procedures
to be followed ••••"
300. This is not always the case, and courts exercise discretion to protect the right
of plaintiffs to sue effectively by waiving security or setting it very low. E.g., Powelton
Civic Home Owner's Assn. v. Department of HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 840 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1971); Denny
v. Health & Social Services Bd., 285 F. Supp. 526, 527 (1968).
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protect his private interests, except to a very minor degree; he sues
as a "private attorney general,"301 to protect public resources.
Even a brief recollection of the cases discussed above makes this
clear.
Having included a broad standing-to-sue provision in the EPA,
the legislature recognized that to apply the usual bond requirements
governing preliminary injunction practice to such cases would undo
·with one hand what the legislature had just done with the other.
Obviously, to expect individuals to sue to protect large tracts of
public lands, or to see that fishery conservation regulations are enforced state-wide, means that they cannot be expected to bear the
losses wrong£ully sustained by defendants during the pendency of
litigation. At the same time, to deny such plaintiffs the opportunity
to obtain preliminary injunctive relief is frequently to deny them
any meaningful right to sue at all, for environmental cases are typically those in which failure to "stop the bulldozer" is to permit the
irreversible activity that is ultimately in controversy.
The equities are not all on the side of the plaintiffs, however,
for the damage incurred by a defendant under a preliminary injunction ought also to be a serious concern. A law that discourages plaintiffs from casually seeking such relief is highly desirable, too. 302 Since
there is no perfect accommodation of these competing interests, the
EPA has tried to resolve the problem through compromise. Some
protection is given to defendants, but that is accomplished without
significantly restricting the plaintiff's right to sue.
Section 2(a) thus provides:
If the court has reasonable ground to doubt the solvency of the
plaintiff or the plaintiff's ability to pay any cost or judgment which

might be rendered against him in an action brought under this act
SOI. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 4-00, 402 (1968); Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320
U.S. 707 (1943).
302. For reasons that are not entirely clear, the good sense and restraint of judges
has not been generally accepted as sufficient protection for the defendants. Notably,
the Michigan law follows the general pattern in stating specifically that no security
may be required of the state, a county, municipal corporation, or any officer or agency
thereof, in granting preliminary relief to such a public plaintiff. MICH. Cr. (GEN.) R.
718.3(2) (1969). It is not clear whether this provision merely exempts them from having
to post security, or whether it also exempts them from potential damage claims arising
out of a preliminary injunction found to have been wrongfully granted. We have
found no case in which a governmental plaintiff has had to pay such damages. If
immunity from payment of damages is the law, it reflects interestingly on the limited
responsibility put on private attorney general plaintiffs under the EPA. See note 301
supra. But see Attorney General ex rel. State Banking Commr. v. Hyde, 265 Mich.
363, 368, 251 N.W. 570, 571 (19llll).
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the court may order the plaintiff to post a surety bond or cash not
to exceed $500.0o.sos
The provision is not felicitously drafted. It was inserted at a late
stage when a number of provisions were simultaneously being revised
under considerable time pressure. Nonetheless, the provision's intent ·was never in doubt, as the background to its enactment indicates.
The first decision made by the legislature was to limit the amount
of security that could be required when a preliminary injunction is
issued.304 This amount was originally set at $300, but raised to $500
in response to requests that it be made as high as $3,000.300 There
was some concern that even a modest security that had to be supplied
during litigation would be undesirable for a publicly concerned
plaintiff who might have very limited resources at hand. However,
the legislature was persuaded that some disincentive should be imposed on a plaintiff ·with no resources who might be called upon to
pay for damages resulting from an injunction wrongfully issued.
As a result of the discussions, a distinction between insolvent
plaintiffs and those who were not judgment-proof was drawn. It was
thought that subjecting a solvent plaintiff's assets to risk would be
in itself a sufficient deterrent so that these plaintiffs should not be
placed under the additional burden of putting up even 500 extra
dollars to support their litigation. As to plaintiffs who might have
no such self-restraint because they were essentially without assets,
it was decided to protect defendants by requiring these plaintiffs to
post security, if the judge thought it desirable. The purpose, then,
of section 2(a) is to provide that (1) Solvent plaintiffs need not post
any security to obtain a preliminary injunction; (2) Plaintiffs whose
solvency the court has reasons to doubt may be required to post
security to obtain a preliminary injunction, but not more than $500;
(3) The liability of all plaintiffs, solvent and insolvent alike, is limited to a maximum of $500 for losses incurred if the preliminary
injunction is determined to have been wrongfully granted.300
303. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202a (Supp. 1972).
304. The provisions of section 2(a) of the EPA are intended to apply only to pre•
liminary injunctions, the problem dealt with in MICH. CT. (GEN.) R. 718,3 (1969).
305. Michigan Manufacturers Association Newsletter, May 13, 1970, at 3 (statement
on H.B. 3055).
306. There was no bond provision in the original bill. This issue was first raised
by the state chamber of commerce in its State Legislation Report, Feb. 27, 1970, at 3.
On March 4, 1970, the chamber's Special Legal Subcommittee, in a memo prepared for
the legislature, suggested the following amendment, at 2:
The court may require the giving of security in the sum the court deems proper
for the payment of costs and damages that may be incurred or suffered by any
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Thus far the bond issue has arisen in controversial fashion in
only one case, Blunt v. Apfel.307 The suit involved an attempt to
enjoin a proposed condominium development. According to the
plaintiff, the arrangements for disposing of the development's sewage
would pollute the lake on which the development was to be located.
The judge found no present danger in the project and refused to
grant a preliminary injunction, but he retained jurisdiction in the
event that damage could be shown after the project commenced. The
court's comments on the bond issue are all by way of dictum, but
they are nonetheless significant for their rather exotic interpretation
of section 2(a):
Such a provision could well allow any person on the welfare rolls to
start an action to delay an honest building project of millions of
dollars and is therefore, in the opinion of this Court, an invasion by
the legislative branch of the Government of the right of the judicial
branch of the Government to exercise judicial discretion as to the
amount of indemnity to be required of a party starting suit before
restraining work on such project.
This Court does hereby specifically find that defendants [sic] are

not insolvent and in the event any further proceedings to restrain
this condominium project of over Two Million Dollars are sought,
party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. If security is
not required, the order shall specifically state why security is unnecessary.
On April 20, 1970, Rep. Rohlfs proposed an amendment to the bill allowing bond to
be required without any limit. This proposal was rejected. 56 Mich. H.J. at 1273
(1970). The next day he amended his proposal to provide that "the court may order
the plaintiff to post a bond or cash not to exceed $300.00." This was accepted. 57
Mich. H.J. at 1296 (1970). The amount was ultimately raised to $500.00 by the Senate.
95 Mich. S.J. 1267 (1970).
Each of the proposals above contained the "s'olvency" language that now appears
in the bill. We have not been able to find any formal record of discussion on this
matter. Following the adoption of the Senate provision, the UPI story on the bill
reported:
One of the amendments adopted raises from $300 to $500 the amount of bond a
complainant would have to post if the court had "reasonable ground" to suspect
he did not have the money to pay any costs that might be rendered against him.
Sponsors of the change said the money increase would prevent frivolous lawsuits.
Ann Arbor News, June 27, 1970, at 9, col. 1.
307. Blunt Decision, supra note 180. See also Blunt v. Apfel, Transcript at 29 (Dec.
10, 1970), where the judge noted: "Well, I will say this: I am not in agreement with
only a $500 bond, as required. I don't think that is anywhere near adequate." In
Tanton, Judge Reisig's Order of Dec. 16, 1971, granting a temporary restraining order,
declared that "Since the Court has no reasonable ground to doubt the solvency of the
Plaintiff ••• no bond is required." In both Gang of Lakes and Wilcox, the ex parte
restraining order carried the notation: ''No bond is required because a public question
is involved and no economic interest of the Defendant is attacked or threatened." In
Leelanau, the order stated: "It is further ordered that no security be required of the
Plaintiffs." The order in Ray simply said "No bond shall be required." Bond was
waived by the County in Muskegon County (cross complaint).
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will require plaintiff to furnish an Indemnity Bond of between
Fifty and One Hundred Thousand Dollars.308

VIII.

CONCLUSION

In the first sixteen months following enactment of the EPA, several dozen cases moved steadily through Michigan's courtrooms
demonstrating that citizen participation is not an empty slogan.
The Act, though still very young, has strikingly emphasized several
important points.
(I) Government and industry are highly inertial, but when
prodded from without, they are quite capable of responding
to pressures for reform.
(2) Regulatory agencies are more often victims than villains, and
well-placed lawsuits naming them as defendants can liberate
them from unwarranted political pressures.
(3) Experts, however well intentioned, do not have all the answers. Far more than is generally believed, the application of
well-informed common sense is the vital ingredient in resolving environmental controversies.
It is not necessary here to reiterate the specific findings detailed
in this Article. Suffice it to say that enough cases have been resolved
speedily and intelligently to mark the Act as a success. This is not to
suggest that every case has come to a commendable conclusion. We
have seen ill-considered and ill-prepared suits that fell of their own
weight. We have judges who failed to face the responsibilities that
the Act imposed upon them; and we have seen attorneys who interposed unnecessary and undesirable technical objections. We have
seen, too, that money is an issue. The inability of plaintiffs to recruit
expert ·witnesses or to launch expensive, full-scale litigation has
certainly undermined the potential usefulness of some cases, and
has prevented others even from being filed. 300
The true success of the EPA, however, cannot be measured either
in the cold statistics of cases or in a closely reasoned analysis of the
statute's provisions. More than anything else, the Act has instilled in
ordinary citizens a confidence that it is possible for them to have their
day in court-in the fullest meaning of that phrase. Too often stu308. Blunt Order, supra note 180, at 3-5.
309. For example, plans to file an EPA suit in Ann Arbor to challenge a proposed
condominium development adjacent to Bird Hills Park was abandoned because:
We were told that to start a suit would cost $4,000 to $6,000, and it was open
ended from there. Depending on the need for experts and how far it was necessary to carry the case, it could cost as much as $30,000 to $60,000. People were
willing to commit themselves to some extent, but not to that level. • •• They
were willing to put up hundreds, but not thousands.
Author's interview with Mrs. M. Sahlins, March 15, 1972.
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dents of the administrative process forget that behind the formal
cases are always human problems. To some official, a new highway
may be another link in a grandiose transportation network; to the
individual in its path, it is a swath dividing the neighborhood in
which he has chosen to live and to raise his children. A small trout
stream or scenic woodland that is only an impediment to large-scale
planners is often a special source of joy and refreshment to those
who come back to it season after season seeking repose.
These values, unpretentious as they are, lie deep in the hearts of
many of our citizens, people who are unable to support representatives in the capital or to buy slick advertising in the mass media.
These are the people to whom the EPA speaks. And, as we have seen,
it is they who have most often used the Act. They have not always
prevailed, but they have had ample opportunity to be heard; and
in almost every instance, they have received fair and intelligent
treatment by the courts.
As noted earlier, the Act has been used affirmatively by public
officials more often than we expected. To us, this development has
been a happy bonus of the EPA for it indicates an unexpected public willingness to remedy environmental problems that only needed
the encouragement of a strongly worded legislative mandate. However, court cases alone cannot significantly ameliorate environmental
problems. In this regard, the evidence cited above of modified procedures by the Air Pollution Control Commission, of enlarged perspectives by the Public Service Commission, and of the whole
panoply of new initiatives in land use control by the Natural Resources Commission, is hopeful.
Whether the Act will fulfill its larger promise remains to be seen.
The ultimate issue is whether a fast-moving and complex society
can still afford to pause and permit an ordinary citizen to play a
role in the formulation of public policy. The EPA is a small but
significant affirmation of confidence in the citizen. Thus far the evidence is encouraging that the legislature's trust has not been misplaced.

Michigan Law Review

1082

TITLE, DATE,

[Vol. 70:1003

APPENDIX A
AND PLACE OF CASES FILED•
File No.

Date Filed

County

191-622

10/12/71

Wayne

5993
Cll-212

9/9/71
9/10/71

Washtenaw
Jackson

181665-S
849

5/24/71
ll/4/70
(amended
complaint)
2/15/71
(3d
amended
complaint)
10/27/70

Wayne
Antrim

Clinton

482

6/11/69
(amended
complaint)
9/3/71
10/1/70

7

1/19/72

Calhoun

3454-B

10/14/71

Lapeer

2626

ll/4/71

1453

8/27/70

Grand
Traverse
Livingston

510

3/1/71

Leelanau

235-70

12/14/70

Branch

13057-C

4/23/71

Ingham

U-3802

1/11/71

18. Michigan Consolidated Gas
Co. & Consumers Power Co.

U-3933
U-3935

19. Michigan United
Conservation Clubs
(MUCC) v. Anthony
20. Muskegon County v. Environmental Protection Org.

2331

7/15/71
(notice of
intervention)
8/2/71

Public
Serv.
Commn.
Public
Serv.
Commn.

C-5585

3/15/71

Title of Case
I. Alvin E. Bertrand, Inc.
v. City of Detroit
2. Beach v. Detroit Edison Co.1
3. Beaman v. Township of
Summit
4. Bise v. Detroit Edison Co.
5. Blunt v. Apfel2

6. Brown v. Lever
Bros. Co.

161228

7. Busard v. Muskegon
Heights
8. Crandall v. Biergans

5291

9. Davis v. Dept. of
Natural Resources (DNR)
IO. Gang of Lakes Env. Org.
v. Gee
11. Hadley Township v.
Dept. of Natural
Resources (DNR)
12. Kelley v. Tannehill
& DeYoung, Inc.
13. Lakeland Property Owners
Assn. v. Township of
Northfield
14. Leelanau County Bd. of
Commrs. v. Dept. of Natural
Resources (DNR)3
15. Marble Chain of Lakes
v. Water Resources Commn.
(WRC)
16. McCloud v. City of
Lansing
17. Michigan Consolidated
Gas Co.

844

Wayne

Muskegon

Otsego

Ottawa

Muskegon
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Title of Case
21. Owens v. Water Resources
Commn. (WRC)
22. Payant v. Dept. of
Natural Resources (DNR)
23. Ray v. Raynowsky
24. Reume v. Herrick
25. Roberts v. Michigan
26. Surowitz v. City of
Detroit
27. Tanton v. Dept. of
Natural Resources (DNR)4
28. Trout Unlimited v.
Milliken
29. Water Resources Commn.
(WRC) v. Chippewa County
30. Wayne County Health Dept.
(WCHD) v. American
Cement Co.
31. Wayne County Health Dept.
(WCHD) v. Edw. Levy Co.
32. Wayne County Health Dept.
(WCHD) v. Chrysler Corp.
33. Wayne County Health Dept.
(WCHD) v. National Steel
Corp.IS
34. Wayne County Health Dept.
(WCHD) v. McLouth Steel
Corp.
35. West Michigan Env. Action
Council (WMEAC) v. Betz
Foundry, Inc.
36. Wilcox v. Board of Rd. Commrs.

- County

File No.

Date Filed

5708

5/14/71

Washtenaw

1100

7/13/71

Dickinson

2-760
180998R
12428-C
178,640

11/17/71
5/21/71
10/23/70
4/12/71

Mason
Wayne
Ingham
Wayne

13859-C

12/8/71

Ingham

13243-C

6/18/71

Ingham

1255

2/10/71

Chippewa

194927-R

11/29/71

Wayne

166-224

10/1/70

Wayne

166-223

10/1/70

Wayne

187 905-R

8/20/71

Wayne

166,222

10/1/70

Wayne

11409

3/12/71

Kent

7-237

6/16/71

Calhoun

I. Collateral case In re Detroit Edison Co., No. 580068 (P. Ct., Washtenaw County)
(condemnation proceedings).
2. Consolidated with Ware Real Estate Corp. v. Forest Home Township, No. 880
(Cir. Ct., Antrim County). Collateral case Apfel v. Cook, No. 926 (Cir. Ct., Antrim
County) (suit by developers against plaintiffs for damages).
3. Collateral case Fisher v. Morton, No. G302-71 C.A. (W.D. Mich.) (to enjoin
United States Park Service from proceeding with development of park).
4. Change of Venue to Charlevoix County granted.
5. Collateral case WCHD v. National Steel Corp., C.A. No. 37111 (E.D. Mich. filed
Sept. 16, 1971) (removed) (order of remand Nov. 11, 1971).
• See note 13 supra for a list of cases filed subsequent to the closing date of this
study.
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APPENDIX B
IDENTITY OF PARTIF.S

Title of Case

~

Plaintiffs

Defendants

Private

Public

-

lndividuals

I. Alvin E. Bertrand,
Inc. v. City of Detroit
2. Beach v. Detroit
Edison Co.
3. Beaman v. Township
of Summit
4. Bise v. Detroit
Edison Co.
5. Blunt v. Apfel
6. Brown v. Lever
Bros. Co.
7. Busard v. Muskegon
Heights
8. Crandall v.
Biergans
9. Davis v. DNR
10. Gang of Lakes
Env. Org. v. Gee
11. Hadley Township
v. DNR

00

Private

-

Env.
Org.•

Local
Government

State
Agency

Class

lndividuals

Actions

Public

Corporations

X

Env.
Org.•

Local
Govt.

State
Agency

Class
Plaintiff

....~

X

X

Class
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X

X
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~

X

X

t"-i

X

e

~

X
X

X

X

~

X
X

X
X
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~
C1>

....

X
X

e

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X
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X

X

~
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APPENDIX B (Continued)
Title of Case

Plaintiffs

Class

:f

Actions

~

Defendants

Private

Public

Public

Private

....

<O

~

Individuals
12. Kelley v. Tannehill
& DeYoung, Inc.
13. Lakeland Property
Owners Assn. v, Township of Northfield
14. Leelanau County Bd.
of Commrs, v. DNR
15. Marble Chain of
Lakes v. WRC
16. McCloud v. City of
Lansing
17, Michigan Consol,
Gas Co.
18. Michigan Consol.
Gas Co. & Consumers
Power Co.
19. MUCC v. Anthony

Env.
Org.•

Local
Government

State
Agency

X

X

Individuals

Corporations

Env.
Org.•

Local
Govt.

State
Agency

Class
Plaintiff

....~

~-£..

X

X

~

:;:!
c.,"

X

X

~

X

~

X

~-

X

X

:;:!

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X

~

X

Cl>

....:;:!

X

~

X

....C
........

~

~

Cl>
C"')

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

amicus
20. Muskegon County v. Environmental Protection
Org. (counterclaim)
21, Owens
v.-WRC
22, Payant v. DNR

Class
Defendant
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C"')

....
X

X

X
X

C
:;:!

X

amicus

X

X

....

X

00
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APPENDIX B (Continued)
Plaintiffs

Title of Case

Public

Private

Individuals
23.
24,
25,
26,
27.
28.
29.
30.
81.
82.
83.
34.
35.
36.

Ray v. Raynowsky
Reume v. Herrick
Roberts v. Michigan
Surowitz v.
City of Detroit
Tanton v. DNR
Trout Unlimited
v. Milliken
WRC v. Chippewa
County
WCHD v. American
Cement Co.
WCHD v. Edw. Levy Co.
WCHD v. Chrysler Corp.
WCHD v. National
Steel Corp.
WCHD v. McLouth
Steel Corp.
'\VMEAC v. Betz
Foundry, Inc.
Wilcox v. Board of Rd.
CoIDJDIS.

Env.
Org.•

....

Defendants

Local
Govern•
ment

Class
Public

Private

State
Agency

Individuals

Corpo•
rations

Env.
Org.•

Local
Govt.

X

X

X

X

X

State
Agency

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

Class
Plaintiff

Defendant

X

X

X
X

Actions

X

X
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X

X

X

X
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~

~
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X
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X
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X

X
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• Includes only permanent organizations with more than local a>ncerns.

X

;.:.
0
0
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Ptrauc AGENCIES

APPENDIX. C
ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
CAsFs Fil.ED UNDER THE EPA

AND

PUBUC AGENCIES
Name or Type
of Agency

Air Pollution Control
Commission
Agriculture, Dept. of
Attorney General
County Govt. or Boards
of Commrs.
Detroit, City of
Drain Office
Governor
Local Govts. except Detroit
Michigan, State of
Natural Resources, Dept. of;
Natural Resources Commn.
Secretary of State
State Hwy. Dept.;
State Hwy. Commn.
Water Resources Commn.
Wayne County Health Dept.
(Air Poll. Control Div.)
ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS•
Name of
Organization
East Michigan Environmental
Action Council
Michigan United
Conservation Clubs
Trout Unlimited
West Michigan Environmental
Action Council

Number
of Cases
1
1
5

10
3
1
1
9

Plaintiff or
Intervenor

IN

Defendant

Amicus
Curiae

1
1
4

3
1

1

7

2
1

3

I
6

2

2

8
1

8
I

2

2

4

1

6

6

Number
of Cases

Plaintiff or
Intervenor

1

1

3
2

2

1

1

3

Defendant

1

• Includes only permanent organizations with more than local concerns.

Amicus
Curiae

2
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APPENDIX D
TITLES OF CAsEs IN ·wmcH Punuc AGENCIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS WERE lNvOLVED

Tln.Es OF CASES
Punuc AGENCIES

(P=Plaintiff; D=Defendant;
A=Amicus Curiae: !=Intervenor)

Air Pollution Control
Commission

WMEAC v. Detz Foundry, Inc. (D)

Agriculture, Dept. of

Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee (D)

Attorney General

Michigan Consol. Gas Co. &:
Consumers Power Co. (I)
Michigan Consol. Gas Co. (I)
Kelley v. Tannehill &: DeYoung, Inc. (I)
MUCC v. Anthony (A)
WCHD v. Chrysler Corp. (P)

County Governments or
Boards of Commrs.

Trout Unlimited v. Milliken (P &: D)
Kelley v. Tannehill &: DeYoung, Inc. {P)
Leelanau County 13d. of Colll1I1rs. v. DNR (P)
Ray v. Raynowsky (D)
Muskegon County v. Environmental
Protection Org. (D)
Reume v. Herrick (D)
WRC v. Chippewa County (D)
Wilcox v. l3oard of Rd. Commrs. (D)
Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee (D)

Detroit, City of

WCHD v. American Cement Co. (P)
Surowitz v. City of Detroit (D)
Alvin E. Bertrand, Inc. v. City of Detroit (D)

Drain Office

Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee (D)

Governor

Trout Unlimited v. Milliken (D)

Local Governments
except Detroit

Leelanau County 13d. of Commrs. v. DNR (P)
Hadley Township v. DNR (P)
Lakeland Property Owners Assn. v.
Township of Northfield (P&:D)
Muskegon County v. Environmental
Protection Org. (D)
Beaman v. Township of Summit (D)
l3ise v. Detroit Edison Co. (D)
Busard v. Muskegon Heights (D)
McCloud v. City of Lansing (D)

Michigan, State of

Roberts v. Michigan (D)
Leelanau County 13d, of Commrs. v. DNR (D)

Natural Resources, Dept. of;
Natural Resources Commn.

Hadley Township v. DNR (D)
Leelanau County 13d. of Commrs. v. DNR (D)
Marble Chain of Lakes v. WRC (D)
Payant v. DNR (D)
Tanton v. DNR (D)
Trout Unlimited v. Milliken (D)
Davis v. DNR (D)
Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee (D)

Secretary of State

Roberts v. Michigan (D)
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State Highway Dept.;
State Highway Commn.

Roberts v. Michigan (D)
WRC v. Chippewa County (D)

Water Resources Commn.

WRC v. Chippewa County (P)
Marble Chain of Lakes v. WRC (D)
Owens v. WRC (D)
Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee (D)

Wayne County Health Dept.
(Air Poll. Control Div.)

Michigan Consol. Gas Co. (I)
WCHD v. American Cement Co. (P)
WCHD v. Chrysler Corp. (P)
WCHD v. Edw. Levy Co. (P)
WCHD v. McLouth Steel Corp. (P)
WCHD v. National Steel Corp. (P)

ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

East Michigan Environmental
Action Council

Tanton v. DNR (P)

Michigan United Conservation
Clubs

MUCC v. Anthony (P)
Payant v. DNR (A)
Tanton v. DNR (A)

Trout Unlimited

Tanton v. DNR (P)
Trout Unlimited v. Milliken (P)

West Michigan Environmental
Action Council

WMEAC v. Betz Foundry, Inc. (P)
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TYPES

OF

APPENDIX E
CAsES FILED UNDER THE EPA,

Type of Case
Pesticides
Municipal Spray Program
Land Use
Land Drainage

No. of
Cases

2

Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee;
Ray v. Raynowsky
Michigan Consol. Gas Co. &: Con•
sumers Power Co •
Tanton v. DNR
Wilcox v. Board of Rd. Commrs.
Leelanau County Bd. of Commrs.
v.DNR
McCloud v. City of Lansing
Davis v. DNR
Beach v. Detroit Edison Co.
Hadley Township v. DNR

Dam &: Homesite Development
Road Widening-Tree Cutting
Park Management

1
1
2

Oil and Gas Leasing
Condemnation by Utilities
Solid Waste Disposal

1
1

Water Pollution
Phosphate Detergents
Ground Water Contamination
Municipal and Private
Treatment Systems

Water Management
Lake Level Maintenance
and Drainage
Fish and Game Management
Deer Hunting
Indian Fishing Rights

Short Title of Cases
Surowitz v. City of Detroit

1

Automobiles
Natural Gas Allocation
Municipal Incineration

SUBJECl' MATIER

1

Pipeline Location

Air Pollution
Industrial

BY
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I
9

I
1
I

1
I
8

WMEAC v. Betz Foundry, Inc,;
WCHD v. Chrysler Corp.;
WCHD v. Edw. Levy Co.; WCHD
v. McLouth Steel Corp.; WCHD v.
Great Lakes Steel Corp.; WCHD
v. American Cement Co.;
Kelley v. Tannehill &: DeYoung,
Inc.; Crandall v. Biergans;
Bise v. Detroit Edison Co.
Roberts v. Michigan
Michigan Consol. Gas Co.
Alvin E. Bertrand, Inc.
v. City of Detroit
Brown v. Lever Bros. Co.
WRC v. Chippewa County
Reume v. Herrick; Owens v.
WRC; Muskegon County v. Environmental Protection Org.; Lakeland Property Owners Assn. v.
Township of Northfield; Busard
v. Muskegon Heights; Blunt v.
Apfel; Beaman v. Township of
Summit; Marble Chain of Lakes
v. WRC

I

Trout Unlimited v.
Crawford County

I
I

Payant v. DNR
MUCC v. Anthony
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APPENDIX. F
CAsEs Fil.ED UNDER

REcoRD OF

Cases in Which Plaintiffs (or Intervenors}
Succeeded
Busard v. Muskegon Heights (informal}
Michigan Consol. Gas Co.
Michigan Consol. Gas Co. &: Consumers
Power Co.
Lakeland Property Owners Assn. v.
Township of Northfield!
Trout Unlimited v. Crawford County
(formal settlement}
WCHD v. Chrysler Corp.
(formal settlement}
WMEAC v. Betz Foundry, Inc.
(informal)
WCHD v. American Cement Co.
(formal settlement)
Cases in Which Plaintiffs Failed
Crandall v. Biergensl
Surowitz v. City of Detroit
Muskegon County v. Environmental
Protection Org. (counterclaim)
Payant v. DNR
McCloud v. City of Lansing

THE

1091

EPA

Cases 'Still Pending
Alvin E Bertrand, Inc. v. City of Detroit
Beach v. Detroit Edison Co.
Beaman v. Township of Summit2
Bise v. Detroit Edison Co.
Blunt v. Apfe13
Hadley Township v. DNR
Kelley v. Tannehill&: DeYoung, Inc.
Leelanau County Bd. of Commrs. v.
DNR
MUCC v. Anthony
Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee
Ray v. Raynowsky
Roberts v. Michigan2
Tanton v. DNR
WRC v. Chippewa County
WCHD v. Edw. Levy Co.
WCHD v. Great Lakes Steel Co.
WCHD v. McLouth Steel Co.
Wilcox v. Board of Rd. Commrs.4
Cases That Are Dying or Have Not Been
Pursued
Brown v. Lever Bros. Co.
Davis v. DNR
Marble Chain of Lakes v. DNR
Reume v. Herrick
Owens v. WRC

I. Case may be appealed.

2. Case on appeal, plaintiff lost in circuit court.
3. Status uncertain; Defendant won partial summary judgment. Case may go to
trial.
4. The court of appeals reinstated preliminary injunction pending trial on the
merits.
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APPENDIX G
DURATION OF CASFS

Cases Completed
From Initiation to Termination
Months
Title of Cases
Busard v. Muskegon
Heights (voluntary
dismissal-settled)

I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

--•

Crandall v. Biergans
(judgment for defendant
after full trial)l
Lakeland Property Owners
Assn. v. Township of
Northfield (judgment
for plaintiffs after full trial)

•

McCloud v. City of Lansing
(preliminary injunction
denied)

--•

Michigan Consol. Gas Co.
(order issued granting
relief sought)

-•

Michigan Consol. Gas Co.
&: Consumers Power Co.
(order issued granting
relief sought)

-•

Muskegon County v. Environmental Protection Org.
(judgment for original
plaintiff, EPA defendant,
after full trial)
Payant v. DNR (judgment
for defendant after full trial) - - Surowitz v. City of Detroit
(plaintiffs' application
for T.R.O. denied)

-o

Trout Unlimited v. Milliken
(consent order issued)

--•

WCHD v. American Cement
Co. (consent judgment)

-•

WCHD v. Chrysler Corp.
(consent judgment)

•

WMEAC v. Betz Foundry, Inc.
(informally concluded)2
------------•
I. Case filed as nuisance action before EPA became effective.
2. Equipment purchased but not yet installed; appeal pending on collateral issue,

~

APPENDIX G (Continued)
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Title of Case
Alvin E. Bertrand, Inc, v.
City of Detroit
Beach v. Detroit Edison Co,l
Beaman v. Township of Summit2
Bise v. Detroit Edison Co.
Blunt v. Apfel3
Gang of Lakes Env. Org. v. Gee
Hadley Township v. DNR
Kelley v. Tannehill &:
DeYoung, Inc.
Leelanau County Bd.
of Commrs. v. DNR4
MUCC v. Anthonyu
Ray v. Raynowsky
Robe1ts v. Michigano
#
Tanton v. DNR
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WRC v. Chippewa County
WCHD v. National Steel Corp.
WCHD v. Edw. Levy Co.
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Footnotes
1. Trial of the condemnation case in Washtenaw Probate Court, In re Detroit Edison Co., File No. 580-068 began Oct. 29, 1972, and was continuing periodically through March, 1972.
2. Summary Judgment for Defendant: case on appeal.
3. Partial Summary Judgment for Defendant: may go to trial.
4. Case held in abeyance since June, 1971, because held not yet ripe for decision.
5. Application to appeal order granting preliminary injunction on appeal.
6. Plaintiff's complaint dismissed: case on appeal.
7. Temporary restraining order of June dissolved and preliminary injunction denied in March, 1972. The court of appeals has reinstated pre•
liminary injunction pending trial on the merits.
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APPENDIX H
THOMAS ] . .ANDERSON, GORDON ROCKWELL ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION Acr oF 1970
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1972).

The People of the State of Michigan enact:
Sec. 1. This act, shall be known and may be cited as the "Thomas J.
Anderson, Gordon Rockwell environmental protection act of 1970."
Sec. 2. (I) The attorney general, any political subdivision of the
state, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity may maintain an action in the circuit
court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is likely
to occur for declaratory and equitable relief against the state, any political subdivision thereof, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of
a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity for the protection of the air,
water and other natural resources and the public trust therein from
pollution, impairment or destruction.
(2) In granting relief provided by subsection (1) where there is involved a standard for pollution or for an anti-pollution device or procedure, fixed by rule or othenvise, by an instrumentality or agency of
the state or a political subdivision thereof, the court may:
(a) Determine the validity, applicability and reasonableness of the
standard.
(b) 'When a court finds a standard to be deficient, direct the adoption
of a standard approved and specified by the court.
Sec. 2a. If the court has reasonable ground to doubt the solvency of
the plaintiff or the plaintiff's ability to pay any cost or judgment which
might be rendered against him in an action brought under this act the
court may order the plaintiff to post a surety bond or cash not to exceed
$500.00.
Sec. 3. (1) 'When the plaintiff in the action has made a prima facie
shmving that the conduct of the defendant has, or is likely to pollute,
impair or destroy the air, water or other natural resources or the public
trust therein, the defendant may rebut the prima facie showing by the
submission of evidence to the contrary. The defendant may also show,
by way of an affirmative defense, that there is no feasible and prudent
alternative to defendant's conduct and that such conduct is consistent
1vith the promotion of the public health, safety and welfare in light of
the state's paramount concern for the protection of its natural resources
from pollution, impairment or destruction. Except as to the affirmative
defense, the principles of burden of proof and weight of the evidence
generally applicable in civil actions in the circuit courts shall apply to
actions brought under this act.

1096

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 70:1003

(2) The court may appoint a master or referee, who shall be a dis•
interested person and technically qualified, to take testimony and make
a record and a report of his findings to the court in the action.
(3) Costs may be apportioned to the parties if the interests of justice
require.
Sec. 4. (I) The court may grant temporary and permanent equitable
relief, or may impose conditions on the defendant that are required to
protect the air, water and other natural resources or the public trust
therein from pollution, impairment or destruction.
(2) If administrative, licensing or other proceedings are required or
available to determine the legality of the defendant's conduct, the court
may remit the parties to such proceedings, which proceedings shall be
conducted in accordance with and subject to the provisions of Act No.
306 of the Public Acts of 1969, being sections 24.201 to 24.313 of the
Compiled Laws of 1948. In so remitting the court may grant temporary
equitable relief where necessary for the protection of the air, water and
other natural resources or the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction. In so remitting the court shall retain jurisdiction of the action pending completion thereof for the purpose of determining whether adequate protection from pollution, impairment or
destruction has been afforded.
(3) Upon completion of such proceedings, the court shall adjudicate
the impact of the defendant's conduct on the air, water or other natural
resources and on the public trust therein in accordance with this act.
In such adjudication the court may order that additional evidence be
taken to the extent necessary to protect the rights recognized in this act.
(4) Where, as to any administrative, licensing or other proceeding,
judicial review thereof is available, notwithstanding the provisions to
the contrary of Act No. 306 of the Public Acts of 1969, pertaining to
judicial review, the court originally taking jurisdiction shall maintain
jurisdiction for purposes of judicial review.
Sec. 5. (I) Whenever administrative, licensing or other proceedings,
and judicial review thereof are available by law, the agency or the court
may permit the attorney general, any political subdivision of the state,
any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision
thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization
or other legal entity to intervene as a party on the filing of a pleading
asserting that the proceeding or action for judicial review involves conduct which has, or which is likely to have, the effect of polluting, impairing or destroying the air, water or other natural resources or the
public trust therein.
(2) In any such administrative, licensing or other proceedings, and
in any judicial review thereof, any alleged pollution, impairment or
destruction of the air, water or other natural resources or the public
trust therein, shall be determined, and no conduct shall be authorized
or approved which does, or is likely to have such effect so long as there
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is a feasible and prudent alternative consistent with the reasonable requirements of the public health, safety and welfare.
(3) The doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata may be
applied by the court to prevent multiplicity of suits.
Sec. 6. This act shall be supplementary to existing administrative
and regulatory procedures provided by law.
Sec. 7. This act shall take effect October I, 1970.
This act is ordered to take immediate effect.
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APPENDIX I
In February 1972 we sent questionnaires to all of the lawyers
involved in EPA cases. We received thirty-three responses covering
twenty-eight cases. The questions are reprinted in this Appendix
along with a summary of the responses.
I. Were you able to obtain the kind of experts you needed to support client's case? If not (or if the difficulty was great) was the
problem one of finding knowledgeable people? Too expensive?
Unwilling to testify for your side of the case?
The following are excerpts from plaintiffs' replies:
The problem is that most of the experts in the field . . . are
employed by the defendant, and any other experts would have been
too expensive.
We were unable to obtain a sanitary engineer willing to testify
against other sanitary engineers-their livelihood depends on the
favor of [defendants and others like him].
I have not had a great deal of trouble. . . . These people are,
however, quite expensive. Many of the people who are in the air
pollution consulting field with respect to engineering and control
derive most of their income from consulting with polluters and are
unwilling to testify. The only way I have been successful is by finding out who their principal employers are and using them to testify
against other polluters and even then they are sometimes reluctant.
We had no difficulty whatsoever in securing expert testimony
since we in effect were representing . . . the interest of [a state
agency]. Since [the agency] employs most of the experts with regard
to the [problem area] in this stage, ... we were able to secure expert
testimony without cost simply by subpoenaing those persons whom
we knew had knowledge in the field.
We were able to obtain two expert witnesses who were willing to
testify in our case without fee but only by deposition.... We did
have considerable reluctance on the part of ... professors at [the
universities] to get involved because they work so closely with the
[agency involved].
The following are excerpts from defendants' replies:
We were able to obtain any experts we needed at modest cost.
I am primarily engaged as counsel to the manufacturer and do
not have any problems finding expert witnesses. The cost of such
experts is high, i.e., $75.00 per hour.
My client is an Intercounty Drainage Board. It is very difficult to
find knowledgeable experts who are willing to testify on matters of
this type either for the plaintiff or the defendant ... there is such
a wide variety of what the experts agree and disagree upon, it is
difficult to tell who to believe.
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2. I£ your client was an industry or government agency, did you
find the lawsuit a serious impediment to your client's activities?
Was there great delay? Did the court handle the case expeditiously? Did you view the case as an opportunity to vindicate a
controversial program in the courtroom? How much delay (in
months) did the case involve for your client?
Two thirds of the defendant attorneys who responded reported
no significant delay in the handling of their cases and several specifically praised the courts' expeditious handling of the suits. Only one
lawyer-of a dozen respondents-criticized a court's failure to schedule a trial promptly. One other lawyer noted that the trial court had
acted promptly, but that a subsequent appeal had led to a delay of
between six months and a year in resolving the controversy.
Several respondents, however, noted collateral delays arising out
of the suits. One said: "The mere fact that there is litigation and
an injunction will increase [contractors'] bids by at least twenty
percent, as contractors are very leery of bidding on matters ... when
there is litigation involved." Another noted that the litigation had
delayed ongoing negotiations between his client and the regulatory
agency with which the client was dealing, commenting that "the
moment that a suit is commenced the typical corporate reaction is
to cease negotiations and fight the lawsuit." Interestingly, in this
particular case, the regulatory agency with whom the client had
been negotiating was itself the plaintiff.
Only one defendant's Ia-wyer responded positively to the second
question: "The suit was an excellent vehicle to resolve a very controversial issue-its final [decision] had a very settling effect on the
affected persons."
3. In round numbers, how much did the case cost the client? $1,000;
$5,000; $10,000; $25,000; more?
Generally, how were these costs allocated, as between:
1) costs of obtaining expert opinion and studies?
2) depositions, travel and other out-of-pocket expenses?
3) attorney costs?
Give rough percentages.
The economics of EPA cases seem to break down into three general categories:
I. About ten per cent of the cases involve costs which are not
directly measurable. These include a few cases in which an attorney
sues as plaintiff pro se, and absorbs the costs in his general office
expenses; cases in which public agencies are parties and do not cal-
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culate attorneys fees or out-of-pocket expenses separately, and in
which there is often access to expert witnesses who work on salary
for the public agency. In one case the attorney's fee is contingent on
success in a companion damage case.
2. About a third of the cases have either been settled at an early
stage or have not progressed beyond preliminary hearings and pretrial activities. Of the ten such cases on which we received responses,
expenses in half were estimated to have run between $2,000 and
$2,500. In the other half, expenses were estimated at between $4,000
and $5,000. The more expensive estimates generally represent cases
that have involved a number of preliminary motions, a hearing on
a preliminary injunction and some pre-trial discovery and conferences.
It seems a fair conclusion that a case that is settled fairly quickly
without much courtroom action will probably not exceed $2,500 in
cost, assuming there is not a great deal of preliminary legal motion
practice involved. A case that involves a preliminary injunction and
other preparatory work short of a trial seems to average about $5,000.
One exception to this observation inheres in the fact that most
cases thus far have not been handled by "Wall Street" type law firms.
We have only one response from such a firm, involving a case that
has not gone to trial, but has involved somewhat more in the way
of preliminary hearings and motions than the average such case just
mentioned. The lawyer handling the case reported that his billings
thus far were $15,000 and that this fee was calculated at only half
his regular billing rate.
3. In the third category are cases that have gone to full trial. The
costs in such cases average about $10,000, with a minimum cost of
$5,000 and a maximum of $12,500.
The allocation of costs as between attorneys' fees, expert witnesses
and other out-of-pocket expenses is directly related to the degree to
which scientific issues are brought into the case. In the quick-settlement type of case referred to above-the $2,000 cases-attorneys' ,
fees amount to about ninety per cent of the costs.
Many of the cases that have gone to preliminary-injunction hearings and through some discovery-the $5,000 cases-have involved
very little use of experts. Thus the increased cost is attributed by
lawyers largely to increased attorneys' time and to greater out-ofpocket expenses for transcripts and travel. A typical $5,000 case
would involve $3,000 in lawyers' fees, $1,500 in out-of-pocket costs,
and $500 for experts.
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As the cases go to trial, all costs increase of course, but the proportion devoted to expert costs increases most sharply. The average
such case (in the $10,000 range) ·will involve $5,000 in lawyers' fees,
$3,000 in expert witness fees, and $2,000 in out-of-pocket expenses.
The range is from seventy per cent of costs for lawyers, nventy per
cent for experts, and ten per cent for out-of-pocket costs, to thirty per
cent of costs for lawyers, fifty per cent for experts, and twenty per cent
in out-of-pocket expenses.
It seems clear that most private litigants thus far have under-used
experts in terms of the objective requirements of the case; and a
number of responding attorneys have noted the high cost of expert
witnesses. Thus it might be concluded that the costs of litigation
noted above would probably be doubled if the lawyers used as much
expert help as they truly needed. An average case prior to trial would
jump in cost from about $5,000 to $10,000; and a case taken to full
trial would cost about $20,000 rather than $10,000. Litigants using
big-city, large corporate firms (unless they get a bargain) can expect
their costs to be more than twice this much; that is, a full trial,
properly conducted, involving extensive expert testimony, can be
expected to run from $40,000 to $50,000.
4. Was the judge able to understand and handle the environmental,
scientific and technical issues? Greater, less or about the same
problems of comprehension as in accident, commercial, corporate
cases?
Sixty per cent of the respondents reported that the judge understood the scientific, technical and environmental issues. Only ten
per cent said the judge had more problems of understanding than in
the ordinary case, and the rest found that the judge had "a little
problem" of understanding, but no greater than in the ordinary case.
Excerpts from some of the responses follow:
The Court has shown unusual ability to understand and handle the
legal, scientific, and technical issues involved. (Agency lawyer)
I doubt that the judge was able to handle the principal [legal]
issue involved. In my judgment it was a very simple issue, ... and
... the opinion denying plaintiff's motion made no sense in terms of
the briefs ... presented. (Plaintiff's counsel)
The problem with 127 [the EPA] is the need in each case to educate the judge on often highly technical matters. (Agency lawyer)
Judge probably has as good a grasp on issues as in other cases.
(Defendant's counsel)
I think the judge was able to understand the issues. (Defendant's
counsel)
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(The following two responses are from a winning plaintiff and a
losing defendant, respectively, in the same case.)
I have seen judges show less comprehension of [ordinary] personal
injury cases. [The judge] showed a comprehension borne of attentiveness devoutly to be ·wished for in other cases.
I believe that the trial judge was not as familiar with the scientific
and technical aspects as he would be in the case of accident . . .
cases.

5. If your case involved an industry or an administrative or regulatory agency, do you think the case has affected their general way
of doing business, or their attitude toward environmental issues,
in any significant way? Please be as specific as possible. (E.g., the
agency has tightened up its procedures for giving variances; it
has hired some new staff with environmental expertise).
A bare majority of the respondents felt a defendant public agency's behavior had been affected by the suit. In one case industry behavior was said to be affected by the litigation. Several respondents
wrote that it was too early to say. Comments include the following:
[The agency] won't do this again on ad hoc information from the
government-[it] ·will require some flow data on stream, and may
even get some legal advice before signing something it might regret.
(Plaintiff)
[We] proved it [the agency] had insufficient data. [We] hear
rumors that it was embarrassed. Certainly it will get data before
granting any more such permits-[the case] may have resulted in a
major change of position. (Plaintiff)
I heard various rumors indicating that it forced the agency to
tighten up its procedures for granting variances while other rumors
indicated that it had no effect. I am convinced ... that because the
agency viewed the suit as frivolous or otherwise unjust that it will
favor the polluter on any position taken by it if it possibly can.
(Plaintiff)
I announced concurrently with commencing the litigation that
I would dismiss it if [the defendant] would agree to join the waste
water plan.... They did join the plan ten days or two weeks [later].
While I am sure that the ... litigation was not the only factor which
compelled reconsideration of their position, I feel that it probably
played some part and such part may possibly have been decisive.
(Plaintiff)
None of these cases has resulted in a tightening up of any attitude except [one case which] I believe is much to do about nothing.
(Agency)
Speaking from the agency standpoint, it has made them more
careful in documenting their positions and more careful re initial
actions (what is said in a letter or in a meeting). I see no result
regarding attitude on policy and purposes. (Agency)
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In my view, the pending litigation has materially affected their
attitudes toward environmental issues. Both of the agencies have
tightened up their procedures for the handling of contaminating
wastes. (Agency)
Since our plant was an industry, specifically the case substantially
affected the way of doing business since it terminated its business
activities. (Defendant)
The State ... Department is now providing means to [deal with
the problem so that the issue raised in the case will not arise again].
While denying any connection [with the harm] or liability, they are
very, very aware of the problem. (Defendant)
The suit was an excellent vehicle to resolve a very controversial
issue-its final determination had a very settling effect on the affected
parties. . . . I think the [federal and state] agencies welcomed the
opportunity to get the controversy resolved. It took the pressure off
them since the Court's decision was well accepted and practically
eliminated further complaints. (Agency)

6. If your client was a plaintiff, could you have sought the relief
you wanted without the EPA? E.g., could nuisance law or a claim
under another statute have done the job? Was the EPA indispensible as to standing-to-sue?
The EPA was said to be necessary in ten cases, and alternatives
would have been uncertain or created difficulties of proof in three
others. In three cases respondents felt that an: alternative ground,
such as nuisance, could have been the basis for the action. Excerpts
from some of the responses follow:
Answering from the point of view of the . . . defendant; this
plaintiff would have no standing to sue without the E.P.A.
. . . A similar suit was started several years ago in Houghton
County and the case was dismissed summarily because the court
found there was no authority under Michigan law to entertain such
a suit.
. . . [I]t would appear that the ,nuisance law would have been
sufficient to get the relief obtained.... The EPA was helpful in this
case however because the intervening plaintiffs residents could put
pressure on the administrative agency, which could not have been
done in a nuisance suit.
No [we could not have sought the relief] except [as to] the
Riparians. Note that we brought them in under EPA so as to get
the protection of the bond limitation.
. . . [P]laintiff could not have effectively sought the equitable
relief requested without the EPA. It is clear that we could not obtain
this relief under theories of common law nuisance, or by proceeding
under Act 245 of the Michigan Public Acts of 1929, as amended.
Judicial redetermination of the WRC standards could not have
been had without the EPA. However, the principal relief sought ...
was available under common law and other statutes....
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... Nuisance law would have done the job with respect to damages but probably would not have afforded as good a level for
injunctive relief. I have not yet filed a case in which the EPA was
indispensable as to standing.
The Environmental Protection Act was essential in this case
since -the Drain Code provides very little avenue of appeal from
decisions of the Drain Commissioner, whether environmental or not.
With regard to the EPA specifically, this represents but one count
of our lawsuit. In addition we have alleged that the project constitutes a violation of the common law riparian rights of other proprietors in the area as an unreasonable overuse of riparian property
and that it violates a local Zoning Ordinance. At various stages in
the lawsuit the various claims have assumed different relative positions of importance. It is our opinion that the EPA did provide
initial access to the Court for the individual Plaintiffs that could
not otherwise have been obtained by them. We regard the granting
of standing to individuals to sue for present or future damage to
the environment as one of the major accomplishments of our legislature in the recent past....
EPA was essential to joining the State . . . Department in this
case.
7. The EPA was drafted to be as concise as possible. Was this a
mistake? Do you find the statute too cryptic? Does its brevity
help to cut down time-consuming litigation over details, or increase it?
A sample of the comments follows:
I do not think it was a mistake to keep this statute brief and
concise.... One of the arguments made by the Attorney General's
office in their motion for a summary judgment was that attempting
to enjoin [the agency] from issuing ... permits does not come under
the statute. The court specifically found that this was a proper object under the statute. (Plaintift)
.
I thought in my particular case . . . the statute was clear. . . .
[R]egardless of how a statute is drafted the first few years of litigation under it always require ironing out procedural matters. (Plaintift)
[A] possible problem ... is ... that, in suing an administrative
agency, the Courts may incorporate some of the old appellate review standards such as "whether the findings were supported by the
law...." (Plaintift)
The EPA was drafted in a concise manner and perhaps this is
the best way to start. I am not in a position at this time to say that
there should be any amendments. We need to obtain some Court
decisions and then determine the direction of where our efforts and
pressures should be put. Case by case method appears to be the best.
(Plaintiff)
I think the [EPA] was drafted in too concise [of a] manner and I en-
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vision that this will be apparent as time goes along. It is my position
that there will need to be a substantial amount of legal precedent
before the statute is finally settled in its niche and I don't believe
the brevity of it is going to cut down on time-consuming litigation.
(Defendant)
The EPA is a definite benefit to plaintiffs filing suit under it.
It allows for very little quibbling over procedural details and forces
the parties to get to the merits of the case. (Plaintiff)
The statute is too indefinite to be of any value. I am of the
personal opinion that it is unconstitutional, as it delegates complete
powers to the judge to set up regulations and standards without
any guidelines. (Defendant)
It is not too cryptic. I believe it does help cut down time-consuming litigation. (Defendant)
It is too cryptic. Litigation ... doesn't come about because of too
many details, but because people who have to spend money to comply with the law ·will .•. fight whenever it costs less to fight than
to comply. (Defendant)
8. In general have you found judges sympathetic, hostile, or neutral
on the goals of the EPA?
Thirteen judges were found to be "sympathetic" to the goals of
the Act; thirteen "neutral," three "hostile," and one "really didn't
want to get involved."
9. Any other comments? (We need a provision for attorneys' fees;
the provision on bonds is helpful, harmful? The venue provision
creates problems, etc.).
Concerning the bond requirement (§ 2a), the lawyers responded as
follows:
The provision with respect to a bond is neither helpful nor harmful. While my client was never requested to put up a bond it could
have done so easily and since the bond requirement is so minimal
the ·willingness of a plaintiff to put up a bond may have some influence on a judge. (Plaintiff)
This is a double edged sword. The low limit is helpful because
without it I think few cases would be started. On the other hand, it
may lead some judges to refuse to issue TRO's or preliminary injunctions. (Plaintiff)
.
The bond provision has merit and should be continued in order
to prevent harassment by litigious plaintiffs. (Defendant)
I understand [the bond provision's] purpose but believe it does
cause injustice as to a private defendant who is subject to great financial loss because of delays, etc. (Agency Ia-wyer)
Provision on bonds may be contrary to equal protection notions.
(Plaintiff)
The provision on bonds is extremely helpful since none of the
parties plaintiff in [EPA] suits whom I have represented have had
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the wherewithal to pay any substantial bond fee and might well have
been precluded from achieving any relief by way of preliminary injunction if the bond maximum had not been set by the statute.
(Plaintiff)
Four lawyers gave unqualified support to a provision allowing
attorneys' fees to be awarded to the prevailing party; another found
the idea "intriguing"; and three others offered more extended discussions:
I would be careful about attorney fees. Very careful. I don't want
them being assessed against plaintiffs when a public question is involved. While the experts are expensive, their expense limits vexatious suits. If costs could include attorneys fees and be assessed
only if defendant loses, who would buy that? Necessarily these actions will be self-limiting because of expenses and attorneys fees.
Many attorneys will have to be at least partially pro bono, as I have
been .... We need a state bar section of EPA-type attorneys. (Plaintiff)
[A good idea] as long as it only works one wayl It would obviously stimulate suits. Too soon for this, in my opinion, in Michigan.
(Plaintiff)
In our judgment, the [EPA] opens the door to a plague of law
suits in which any defendant needs protection from expense . . . .
[W]hen the suits are brought, redress should be available for the
defendant to recoup its legal and financial expenses and losses resulting from the litigation if the defendant prevails. (Defendant)

